Armored vehicles aren't dead in Ukraine—they just need a lot of help. That's one of the biggest lessons from the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi, its recent successful counteroffensive just north of the town of Lyman in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.

Russia spent 18 months building its salient toward Sloviansk; Ukraine took much of it back in three. By 30 September, three of four planned phases in, the operation had returned 176 sq km to Ukrainian control, taken 250 Russian prisoners, and cost Russia more than 5,000 killed and wounded, Ukraine's presidential office said. It also foiled a Russian plan to break into the rear of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban area, the office said.

Defying critics who insisted vehicles couldn't possibly survive in the drone-patrolled gray zone, the 3rd Army Corps repeatedly deployed mechanized forces as it counterattacked across a roughly 100 sq km salient the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies had extended toward Sloviansk, one of the last two big free cities in Donetsk Oblast.

Maneuvering for months under a veil of secrecy, the 3rd Army Corps found and exploited gaps along the flanks of the 20th and 25th CAAs, ultimately breaking into the Russian armies' rears and forcing them to pull back across the Zherebets River in order to avoid encirclement.

Armored vehicles were key to the Ukrainian effort. They sped assault troops into battle, dropped them off under fire, and then supported them as they clashed with the Russians. "Maneuver warfare isn't going anywhere," stated Ryan O'Leary, a US Army veteran who once commanded volunteers in Ukraine.

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3rd Army Corps commanders knew they were taking a risk deploying armored vehicles in a Russian-controlled salient patrolled by first-person-view drones from Russia's elite Rubicon Center drone unit. But they clearly believed that, with adequate support, the vehicles could accomplish their missions—and survive.

They were right. A dramatic video shot by 3rd Army Corps troopers depicts the troopers disembarking from their armored trucks and rushing into the fight while small arms fire clatters all around them.

Given the intensity of the Russian fire, a mechanized assault "was the only real way to push positions in an effective manner to keep losses low as well as gain and hold momentum and aggression," O'Leary wrote. Walking into battle under the cover of trees might help the infantry avoid the attention of overhead drones, but it takes too long to sustain an aggressive assault, and it can be difficult to mass enough footborne infantry to overcome stiff enemy defenses.

"This is something that hasn't changed even with the advent of drone warfare coming of age," O'Leary added. "Suppression tactics and such have changed and now there is more than just indirect fires and counterassaults that you must be able to suppress and plan for."

But the concept of the infantry-carrying armored vehicle "isn't going anywhere," O'Leary stressed. "Especially when it takes a drone tens of minutes to get to target area, acquire target and hit the target. Right now, the front is extremely susceptible to maneuvering forces on assaults if it is planned right and executed properly."

The 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi is an excellent example of an operation that was planned right and executed properly—in ways that helped the corps' mechanized forces fight and survive.

Careful preparation

The corps explained that it deployed footborne scouts to find the best paths for follow-on vehicular assaults—and subsequent medical evacuations. Scouts "conducted recon of the front lines, ensured the breakthrough of equipment and led adjacent units along secret paths while evacuating the wounded," the 3rd Army Corps stated.

Before the armored vehicles rolled into action along the pre-scouted paths, the 3rd Army Corps deployed robotic engineering vehicles to clear Russian mines. After that, the corps sent in old BTR-60 wheeled armored vehicles modified for remote control and packed with anti-tank mines. These "robotic kamikaze complexes ... were used to demolish the enemy's strongest fortifications," the corps said.

Only after the assault routes were scouted and cleared of mines and Russian strongpoints did the manned vehicles and their precious infantry cargo roll out. We don't know how many losses the 3rd Army Corps' mechanized infantry suffered on the attack, but we do know they ultimately prevailed—when the battered Russian 20th and 25th CAAs retreated.

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"Recent Ukrainian operations demonstrate that maneuver is not dead," stressed Mick Ryan, a retired Australian army general. "Despite the difficulty in ground operations maneuver observed in eastern Ukraine over the past few years, offensive operations are still possible in modern war. But they need the intellectual effort to develop new techniques to make them viable and repeatable at scale."

In addition to the reconnaissance and robots-first engineering and suppression tactics the 3rd Army Corps employed, Ryan recommended commanders deploy more drone-grounding electronic warfare and use AI tools to help plan attacks.

But ages-old human elements are still essential, Ryan wrote. "Developing viable methods for offensive tactical and operational maneuver in the 21^st century also demands the inclusion of older ideas about the employment of mass, logistic support and casualty evacuation [and the] maintenance of morale and leader's provision of purpose to their people."

Even when the assault route is clear, it's understandably terrifying to ride in an armored vehicle across drone-patrolled terrain. But a good leader can motivate their troops to try.

1960s-vintage, Soviet-made T-62Ms aren't the oldest tanks in the Ukrainian inventory. That dubious honorific belongs to Ukraine's ex-Slovenian M-55S tanks, which are based on Soviet-made T-55s from the 1950s.

The T-62M hasn't gotten better. The job has changed. These days, many tanks on both sides function as mobile artillery, angling their guns high to fire a few rounds at targets kilometers away. They rarely work as tanks, closing with the enemy and firing directly from a few hundred meters. The threat from tiny explosive drones has pushed armor back from the gray zone, and at that distance a T-62M is not much less effective than a T-64BV. Or, for that matter, than a far more precious Leopard 1, Leopard 2, or M-1.

That is one reading of a war that has changed shape, and nobody has published a study of it. Ukraine's T-64, Leopard, and Abrams fleets have all taken heavy documented losses. Oryx, which logs a loss only where photos or video exist, lists no Ukrainian T-62Ms at all.

These tanks, all captured from the Russians, are also available. And that matters in a military struggling to sustain its tank force. As Russia's war on Ukraine grinds through its 56th month, Ukraine is running low on its newest and best tanks. Older and less capable ones fill in ... for lack of a better alternative.

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Observer Stevius, who closely tracks developments in the Ukrainian armor corps, recently highlighted the ongoing importance of former Russian T-62Ms to the Ukrainian war effort. "Captured T-62Ms still out there!"

Specifically, Stevius noted an ex-Russian T-62M belonging to the Ukrainian National Guard's 19th Brigade participating in a recent competition for best tank crew in the National Guard. According to Stevius, at least two other Ukrainian units have operated the survivors of at least 45 T-62Ms that Ukrainian troops have captured. Most of the captures took place during the Ukrainian counteroffensives in eastern and southern Ukraine in late 2022.

Lesser tanks

The 40-ton, four-person T-62M is Ukraine's second-oldest tank, and where the slightly older M-55S got a deep upgrade in 1990s Slovenia, the T-62M has not. In its DNA it is still a vehicle of the early Cold War. The Ukrainian army's 110th Mechanized Brigade temporarily operated T-62Ms before swapping them out for much newer and more capable T-64BVs. Where the T-62M has a 115-millimeter main gun loaded by hand by a fourth crew member, the T-64BV has a more powerful 125-millimeter gun loaded by a fast mechanical autoloader.

The fast-firing capability of the made-in-Ukraine T-64BV was central to the Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade's successful defense of the city of Chernihiv during the early weeks of the wider Russian invasion starting in February 2022. The Ukrainian tanks engaged passing Russian tanks at point-blank range, and out-shot them.

That is the kind of fight the T-62M would lose. It is a kind of fight fewer tanks now get.

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Surely some of the 60-something-year-old T-62Ms in Ukrainian service have been withdrawn owing to wear and tear and a possible shortage of spare parts. But there's a good chance most of the 45 Ukrainian T-62Ms are still in, or near, the action.

But not all are still tanks. Seeing the value in the thickly protected hull and reliable chassis that carries the T-62M's turret and gun, Ukrainian volunteers and units have converted some captured T-62Ms into specialist vehicles that benefit from the tanks' sturdy bottoms but don't need their obsolescent tops.

A few ex-Russian T-62Ms have undergone conversion into recovery vehicles by losing their turrets and guns and adding a heavy-duty winch for towing other armored vehicles. Volunteers working with the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation turned another into a heavy infantry fighting vehicle. The recipe is simple. Just pop off the existing turret and replace it with a smaller one fitted with a 30-millimeter autocannon, in this case one pulled from a captured Russian BMP-2.

Potentially dozens of Ukrainian T-62Ms are still T-62Ms, however, and still adding bulk and firepower to units that otherwise might struggle to deploy any tanks at all.