Federal officer slammed vehicle into a construction worker while pursuing a man who died in similar circumstances

A federal officer slammed a vehicle into a Houston construction worker and broke his leg, believing him to be a man who apparently died years ago, the dead man’s family said on Friday, further calling into question the account given by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

The worker, 48-year-old Miguel Parra Hernandez of Mexico, remains hospitalized with multiple leg fractures and needs reconstructive ankle surgery, according to FIEL, a Houston-based immigration advocacy group. At a news conference on Friday, the group said the alleged suspect’s family had shared documentation proving his death.

Court filing alleges ‘physical abuse by guards’, ‘filthy living conditions’ and disease outbreaks at Camp East Montana

• How has Trump’s immigration agenda affected the US midterms? Send us your questions

Attorneys and experts are raising the alarm that immigrants at Camp East Montana, the sprawling desert detention camp on the Fort Bliss military base in west Texas, face a risk of serious injury or death because of ongoing, extreme health and safety hazards there, according to a fresh court filing, the Guardian can reveal.

The allegedly dangerous conditions persist at the tent jail, the largest immigration detention facility in the US, despite regular reports from inside and outside the federal government that it has violated dozens of official standards since it opened last year.

Thousands of vetted and approved refugees are suffering as Trump restricts quotas and prioritizes white South Africans

Donald Trump plans to once more severely restrict the number of refugees admitted to the US, announcing a limit of just 17,500 people in fiscal year 2027 – and that, again, those let in will be “primarily” white South Africans.

Refugee rights groups are alarmed and infuriated at the decision last month by the US president to exclude almost every other demographic.

Join our final live Q&A before the midterm elections, on 22 October at noon ET on the Guardian US site

Since Donald Trump started his second term in January 2025, immigration enforcement has remained a major issue for US voters, with arrests reaching record highs, operations becoming deadly and immigration raids hitting politicians’ homes. Our reporting has documented the experiences of those directly affected by the harsh conditions in detention centers and resistance to ICE agents on the ground.

Immigration will be a defining issue in the final weeks of campaigning for the 2026 US midterm elections.

The makeup of the Democratic party, plus key races to watch

Who are the groups financially backing the candidates in the midterms?

Will the Iran war cost Trump in the US midterm elections? Your questions answered

Exclusive: Trump has falsely claimed Afrikaners are facing ‘white genocide’, but very few have applied to live in US

The US government could spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on a media campaign in South Africa to figure out why more white Afrikaners are not applying to become refugees to the US, as Donald Trump had hoped.

State department officials, according to an August proposal seen by the Guardian, outlined a roughly $335,000 research and advertising effort after applications to the refugee program “trended lower than expected” since Afrikaners were allowed to apply directly online in November 2025. The document, written by the US mission in South Africa with a department research unit for the embassy in Pretoria, admits officials know little about why.

Account by Oscar Belgal differs sharply from that of DHS agents, who fired into vehicle with young boy in back seat

Lawyers for a man wounded by an immigration officer while driving with his young son in New York City said in a court filing Wednesday that the agent who shot him never identified himself before he ran up to the car, smashed one of its windows, then fired several shots into the vehicle.

The account by lawyers for Oscar Belgal contrasted sharply with the version of events outlined by Department of Homeland Security officials. They have said officers opened fire only after Belgal smashed his car into two government vehicles and “accelerated toward other officers”.

A conviction on the possible charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon could mean up to 20 years in prison

A Texas prosecutor said he was considering felony assault charges for an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer who ran over a man following an attempted traffic stop and broke his leg in multiple places.

Sean Teare, district attorney for Harris county, said video of the incident in west Houston on Saturday morning, in which the officer’s unmarked SUV is seen veering into the man as he runs away across an empty parking lot, could support a charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Armed escorts in masks pushed a group of migrants from Belarus toward Latvia and threatened Latvian soldiers, and hours later masked people crossed into Latvia and stole border surveillance cameras, Latvian Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava said on 6 October. Latvia's military described the incident as part of a continuing hybrid campaign on the border, and Ukraine's foreign minister blamed Moscow.

Russia keeps probing the EU's eastern defenses with migrants pushed from its own soil and through its ally Belarus, alongside drone incursions and sabotage that ISW has linked into one Russian pattern across Europe.

Armed escorts threatened Latvian soldiers

Latvian soldiers stopped at least 20 migrants trying to cross the border illegally from Belarus, the Latvian National Armed Forces said. Masked escorts led the group, and this time they were armed, threatened the soldiers, and urged and drove the migrants toward Latvia, the military said.

"Unlike many previous incidents, this time the provocation was particularly demonstrative and aggressive," Dombrava said.

The incident confirms that deliberate provocations and hybrid threats on the border will continue, the armed forces said. Illegal migration is being used as a tool to pressure Latvia's border and, with it, the external border of the EU and NATO, they added.

Belarus began funneling migrants toward the EU in 2021, a campaign Poland's government called a hybrid attack in which the migrants end up as weapons. In 2023, Finland closed its border crossings with Russia, accusing Moscow of the same tactic, and by mid-July Latvia had logged 111 straight days of migrants pushed across from Belarus.

Masked people stole the cameras

Several hours after the standoff, people in masks entered Latvian territory, damaged a distribution cabinet, and stole surveillance cameras, Dombrava said. They returned to Belarus before the border guard patrol could arrive.

"Belarus should understand that such incidents could lead to more serious consequences for Belarus itself," he said.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Ukraine stands in full solidarity with Latvia. "Make no mistake: Moscow is behind it," he wrote, adding that Russian President Vladimir Putin "deliberately weaponizes migration, with the help of Lukashenka, to destabilise Europe."

Tunnels, tear gas, and damaged cameras on the border

Latvia's border guards stopped 11,384 attempts to cross illegally from Belarus between the start of 2026 and 24 September. In January, Latvia's armed forces and border guard published evidence that Belarusian security agencies were organizing illegal migration across the border. Latvia has also recorded deliberate damage to cables, distribution cabinets, and camera poles on its eastern border, aimed at slowing the rollout of an automated border control system.

Explore further

Stop arming Ukraine or we shut down your defense firms, pro-Kremlin group tells Latvia, Poland, and Portugal

On 22 July, Latvian soldiers fired warning shots and used tear gas against migrants trying to cross. The next day, Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs said Russia and Belarus were stepping up their hybrid war against the Baltic States to distract from Russia's failures in Ukraine. Latvia temporarily halted crossings on the Belarus border on 31 July. In August, Latvian guards found the first tunnel dug from Belarus and turned back 15 migrants who used it.

[L'article Comment les cinq principaux partis se positionnent en matière d’immigration a d'abord été publié dans InfoBref.]

A ride from Tangier, the largest city in northern Morocco to the Spanish enclave of Ceuta takes less than two hours. The border crossing has its own, sleepier rhythm, quite different from the tourist-driven bustle of Tangier. In Ceuta, traders run their errands, Morocco-based expats make visa runs and Spanish people catch ferries to the mainland. On most days, the border crossing seems almost ordinary. The fences, though menacing and topped with razor wire, are less imposing up close and officers make small talk with the expats waiting to get their visas stamped. 

Then there are those days when the routine collapses and Ceuta becomes the center of Europe’s migration debate. 

The territory is a geographic and political paradox. Despite falling under Spain’s — and the European Union’s — jurisdiction, it sits on the northern edge of Africa, surrounded by Morocco and separated from the Spanish mainland by the Strait of Gibraltar. It is an entry point to Europe, yet not fully part of the Schengen zone, requiring additional immigration checks for travelers crossing to the mainland. 

When more than 60,000 people — mostly Moroccan men and teenagers — rushed into Ceuta (almost doubling the coastal city’s population), the images reverberated across Europe. There seemed to be no dramatic buildup to the incident, nor any obvious explanation why thousands of people chose that day to make their way to Spain. 

Europe’s far-right politicians seized the narrative, portraying the influx as an imminent invasion, warning that the men were on their way to “Calais” and “Germany.” Italy temporarily suspended the Schengen free movement regime with Spain, meaning travellers arriving by sea and air would now be subject to border checks. Spain threatened to take “proportional measures” in response and did so at midnight on August 8, when it imposed similar checks for visitors from Italy. 

The standoff between European governments — led by socialist Pedro Sánchez in Spain and conservative Giorgia Meloni in Italy — is not simply a test for European border security. Instead, what transpired in Ceuta poses bigger questions about the shifting nature of state sovereignty itself: How are we to understand borders, if they’re shaped by forces beyond the state’s reach? 

Borders are not just lines separating geographic entities. They are systems built on surveillance, diplomatic bargains and digital networks. Ceuta is the place where all three converge. Its borders, already protected by the sea, have been fortified with steel, outsourced through diplomacy and tested by coordinated rumors.

Steel

The crossings into the enclave are blocked by a multi-layered barrier of fences and wire. Morocco administers a fence separating it from the neutral area between the two countries. Two fences on the Spanish-controlled territory follow, creating an enclosure monitored by the Spanish Civil Guard. The physical infrastructure is reinforced with motion sensors, thermal and CCTV cameras, maritime communication systems and facial recognition technology. 

Even the sea has now been incorporated into the border system. Just three days after the Ceuta border chaos, Spanish authorities installed a 500-metre floating barrier and anchored naval buoys to create another monitored enclosure. 

The EU has funded most of the fortifications. The Border Violence Monitoring Network’s report says that since the construction of Ceuta’s border barrier in the 1990s, the EU has spent tens of millions of dollars to make the Spanish-Moroccan frontier more secure, technologically up-to-date and heavily surveilled. With the recent mass crossing, Spain will now receive additional emergency financial aid. 

Yet, the architecture of physical surveillance, built and re-built with European money for decades, cannot prevent the human cost of attempting to cross a border. In Ceuta alone, at least 100 people died according to local authorities. “The rationale behind increasing surveillance is that you'll be able to save lives and smash the [people trafficking] gangs, right?” asked Nathan Akehurst, who has written about Ceuta’s border for Jacobin. “Where was that in this case?” 

Diplomacy

Akehurst’s question touches upon the human-centered rationale for heavy border surveillance. But there is also a political one. It is not only Spain, as a EU member, that receives funds to manage migration. Morocco has received €427 million since 2015, for migration-related expenses, including technology and training. That’s part of Europe’s wider strategy of border externalization, a practice where Europe moves border control beyond its own territory. 

The practice has been around for decades, but went into overdrive after 2015, when approximately 1.3 million people, mostly from Syria, came to the continent seeking asylum. Many of them reached Europe through Turkey, prompting the EU to strike a deal with Ankara: €6 billion in funds, visa liberalization and EU-ascension negotiations in exchange for stricter border controls and curbing irregular arrivals to Greece. The EU also agreed to resettle within Europe one Syrian from Turkey for every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece. But by 2020, when the EU failed to resettle Syrians, Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared he would no longer prevent migrants from crossing Turkey en route to the EU. 

“Border externalization is basically paying other countries, but also subjecting them, through a carrot and stick approach, to performing functions that are usually performed by a state itself at their borders,” explained Josephine Solanki from the Transnational Institute, an Amsterdam-based think tank. It leaves space for leaders like Erdoğan, Solanki added, to bargain for influence by turning migrants “into political leverage.”

The cost of outsourcing borders is not just material. It is measured in control that Europe cedes to the foreign governments it relies on for migration policy enforcement. 

In Ceuta, migrants claimed local authorities did not stop them from crossing the border. A young Moroccan man told the New York Times a day after the event: “They opened the border and let everyone go by.”

Border outsourcing agreements were made, among others, with authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, where EU funds were used to detain migrants and quell domestic protests, rights organizations say. Alliances with “deeply unreliable and authoritarian actors” in the name of stability, said Nathan Akehurst, “is short-termist, insane and loses Europe any credibility it has left.” These alliances also allow Europe to “shift the blame to the Moroccans, the Eastern Libyans, the Turkish or whoever decides to take advantage of that moment.”

Rumors 

It is yet to be revealed who, if anyone, has taken advantage of the mass crossing into Ceuta. Local and international media have uncovered now-deleted posts that shared tips on routes and equipment for the journey. One of the main networks was called Hrig Sebta network — “Sebta” being the Arabic name of Ceuta and “hrig” being the Maghrebi term for undocumented migrants, literally referencing the burning of identity papers. 

In the wake of Ceuta, European ministers pledged to tackle online misinformation to avoid migration crises, but remained cautious when asked about thousands of posts reportedly linked to Russia. Other theories attributed the crossing to Morocco’s tensions with Spain over its closer ties with Algeria, or to Spain’s position on Palestine.

But those rumors, and what appears to be a weeks-long coordinated online campaign behind them, reveal something deeply human that fences can’t deter: movement that is spurred by hopes for a better life. 

“[The crossing] would have happened anyway at some point,“ Akehurst argues. “There would have been a crossing because all of the circumstances that generate that are already there before someone with a twitter account throws a match on the fire.”

Yet, let’s pause at the match. It’s not about someone with a social media profile creating chain messages. It is about the ecosystem that can jeopardize borders by creating information flows, turning rumors into perceived opportunities.

Moroccan newspaper TeleQuel already published a report about social media posts amplifying the next hrig — another attempted crossing into Ceuta — on August 15. 

When packaged to a hungry audience, rumors carry the currency of truth. They’ve driven migration long before social media was even conceptualized. Now those rumors speed through digital space owned and operated by private companies not prone to accountability and sitting well outside the reach of any single state.

And the EU has understood that for years. “It is necessary to structure the information space, as we have organized in the past the territorial space, the maritime space and the air space,” Thierry Breton, the European Commissioner for Internal Market of the EU said back in 2018. He warned about Big Tech companies treating digital space as a no-man’s-land that they would write rules for. 

The no man’s land between Morocco and Spain appears calmer now. But the turmoil of the crossing revealed a new, digital dimension to border governance. Information has always found a way to spread; digital platforms have given it new channels: ones which allow those behind the information to remain faceless, while the information itself passes from screen to screen. It reaches a boiling point, spills over from the digital space and then can be disappeared, even before anyone has had a moment to scroll back.

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The post The manufactured crisis of Ceuta appeared first on Coda Story.

[L'article Au moins neuf personnes sont mortes lors d’une arrivée massive de migrants en Espagne a d'abord été publié dans InfoBref.]

My name is Darina,” says an elfin teen, ponytail pulled through the back of her cap, and “next year I’ll be earning 150,000 rubles (nearly $2,000) a month.” Darina works at what she calls “the world’s largest drone factory,” helping to assemble versions of the Iranian Shahed drone. “My parents are proud of me. Wanna do the same?” She asks as she advertises a polytechnic in Tatarstan. The Russian government, in the face of war and looming demographic disaster, has been relaxing child labor laws since 2022, making it easier to put 14-year-olds to work. Now, legislators are open about the need to reform “outdated” restrictions on employing minors in industries that were “considered dangerous 20 years ago.” Drone production is not the only part of the war effort to which teenagers are being recruited. This month in a “content camp” in Moscow, soldiers and state media propagandists trained 120-plus teens on how to make videos, use AI, and grow their audiences as aspiring influencers. Vladislav Golovin, a former soldier and a leader of Russia’s Young Army Cadets National Movement, said the program had “created a huge team of kids who understand how to broadcast government values.” 

But many young people, subject to year-round conscription, subject to internet shut downs and subject to surveillance, have little desire to spread propaganda. Instead, according to Google Trends data, growing numbers of Russians are seeking information on how to emigrate. A new exodus would accelerate Russia’s deep demographic crisis. Already, up to a million people are thought to have left Russia since the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to one recent count, nearly 210,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in the war with Ukraine, with other estimates suggesting over 1.2 million casualties, including 325,000 deaths. And Russian fertility rates are the lowest they have been for 200 years. Anton Kotyakov, the labor minister, has told Vladimir Putin that the country faces a labor shortage of 11 million people by 2030.

So concerning is this crisis that Rosstat, the national statistics agency, has stopped publishing monthly demographic data. State officials and local governors have been told to compete to come up with the most innovative solutions to a seemingly intractable problem. The pressure on Russian officials and the Kremlin is leading to desperate measures, including guidance from the Russian health ministry that women who say they do not want to have children should be referred to a psychologist. Nothing the Russian state has tried has worked, from financial incentives (extended even to schoolgirls under 18) to banning advertising that supposedly promotes “child-free” lifestyles and so-called “LGBTQ propaganda.”   

Alongside “anti-woke” policies disguised as family values, is rising xenophobia and anti-immigrant rhetoric that has led to a marked decline in the number of foreigners living in Russia. The Kremlin’s anti-migrant policies include a new system to monitor migrant workers through biometric registration, location tracking, and intensified police oversight. The Russian parliament is currently debating enhancing the number of offences that can be punished by deportation or substantially increased fines. Much of it is targeted at Russia’s Central Asian migrants who make up an overwhelming majority of immigrant labor. Some Central Asian governments, notably Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have now urged their citizens to think twice about going to Russia for work. 

Russia has been publicizing political stunts such as its “shared values visa” in which applicants from 46, largely developed, nations are given temporary residence permits if they profess to support “traditional Russian values.” The visa, the Kremlin has said, is “Russia’s response to what it perceives as the harmful effects of Western neoliberal policies.” But only a tiny fraction of the immigrants Russia needs will be Westerners who apply for such a visa; instead, Russia has been diversifying its pool of migrant workers by looking further east. Around 72,000 work permits were issued to Indian nationals in 2025, up from just 5,000 in 2021. Russian officials have signaled they are ready to accept “unlimited” numbers of workers from South Asian countries like India, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar.

While the Kremlin is looking to South Asia and Africa to address its immediate need for workers (and soldiers), the ambition in the longer term is to boost Russian birthr rates, despite the signal failure of ongoing attempts. 

In the U.S., there have been several moves borrowed from the Kremlin’s playbook, including the restriction of abortion, the attempt to deny women birth control, and even alarm at the fall in teen pregnancies. But data released this month showed that women in the U.S. gave birth to 710,000 fewer babies in 2025 than they did in 2007, a reflection of two decades of steadily dropping birth rates. Russian demographer Salavat Abylkalikov, at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Germany, says “if the birth rate has fallen below the level of simple reproduction, it is almost impossible to raise it back.” Especially when financial incentives cover just a fraction of childcare costs. 

In any case, Abylkalikov says, “in Russia, death is much more profitable than birth: in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, the government provides around 1,000,000 rubles (about $12,000) for each child, but if one person goes to war and dies, the family receives up to 12 million rubles in total. That's more than $120,000. This is the economy of death.” The evidence, from countries like Russia, Hungary and the U.S., is that appeals to tradition, to religion and to female “responsibility” do not work, when support for families is limited. And while migration is an obvious fix to demographic questions everywhere, it’s politically toxic.

Russia knows it is hurtling towards demographic doom but can do little to halt the momentum. Its policies are riddled with inconsistencies — a strong line in anti-migration rhetoric and bullying, while being forced to import workers and soldiers from Asia and Africa; a patriarchal view of women’s roles, mostly confined to the domestic, while increasingly reliant on women to take the jobs of the men who are fighting and dying in Putin's war; and encouraging more women to give birth, while employing children to build drones. With family values like these, no wonder young Russians are hesitant to procreate.

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The post Teens making drones: Russia’s demographic collapse appeared first on Coda Story.

When the United States and Israel started blitzing Iran last weekend, eyes turned to the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean. The British-administered archipelago is home to a strategically vital US air base on the island of Diego Garcia. Would US President Donald Trump be using it in his “Operation Epic Fury”?

It's fair to say Trump probably didn't give a damn about Misley Mandarin’s opinion. But the self-styled “interim first minister” of Chagos, who recently upped sticks from Britain in a “super, super secret” mission to take up residence on the long-deserted Peros Banhos atoll, gave Washington his official “blessing” anyway.

I spoke via WhatsApp to the 47-year-old Chagossian in his base camp: basically a few tents, with a solar generator and a Starlink satellite connection enabling him to beam reels to his 10,000 Facebook followers. He quit his job as a bus driver in London to come here, determined to halt Britain’s plan to hand over what he considers to be his land to Mauritius after a long-running decolonization battle.

“We’re British citizens here. We’re not moving,” he said.

Mandarin wants the land of his forebears to remain under the rule of Britain, the former colonial ruler that booted out about 1,500 native Chagossians, including his own father, to make room for the U.S. military base in the late 1960s. The removal consigned Chagossians to a miserable fate in newly independent Mauritius.

Now on home turf, Mandarin, his 72-year-old dad, and two other Chagossians have dodged immediate deportation: they’ve obtained an injunction from a British court allowing them to stay until a hearing on March 13. Since their arrival, two more Chagossians have joined them. “We can do self-determination right now. We don't want to cut any links with Britain. We're not looking for independence,” Mandarin says.

“The next generation will decide on independence.”

Marriage of convenience

Life on Île du Coin, the largest island on Peros Banhos, is simple. The daily routine revolves around catching fish and finding a supply of fresh water. The new residents collect overnight rainfall in tarpaulin sheets to drink. Bathing involves a dip in the sea to wash off dirt, followed by a splash of precious rainwater to rinse. 

Mandarin appears to be relishing the experience. Soon after his arrival, the former army cook, who has bags of swagger, posted a video of himself cooking up “naan fromaaz”, or cheese naan, in a skillet on a makeshift stove. “Pa bizin madam isi mwa!” he jokes. I don't need a wife here!

The Chagossians arrived on the island on 16 February, accompanied by former army officer Adam Holloway, a former Conservative MP who recently defected to the radical right Reform UK party.

Reform, which is surging in the polls, is leading opposition to a bilateral treaty that would see Britain cede sovereignty of Chagos to Mauritius, while paying an average of £101-million ($135-million) per year to maintain a lease on Diego Garcia over the coming century. Negotiations began after the International Court of Justice ruled in 2019 that Britain should transfer sovereignty of Chagos to Mauritius “as rapidly as possible.”

The sleek yacht that brought the group on the five-day journey from Sri Lanka and travels back and forth with supplies was paid for by British-Thai businessman Christopher Harborne, a mega-donor to Reform. Its name is No Excuse – as in, “no excuse for us not to stay on Chagos,” says Mandarin.

Reform UK and the Chagossians make for curious bedfellows. On the one hand, there's a political party that has floated plans to create a Trump-inspired, ICE-style agency to carry out mass deportations in Britain. 

On the other, there’s Mandarin’s dad, finally back home after being brutally evicted from his atoll at the age of 14. “I will not go back to England. I want to die here,” said Michel Mandarin, as he set foot on his cherished Chagossian soil.

The unlikely pairing has had cause for joint celebration. Two days after they arrived, Trump withdrew his approval for the UK-Mauritius transfer treaty, which was supposed to provide legal certainty for the base in a hypothetical world governed by the rules-based international order. 

It turned out the president was annoyed at British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s refusal to sanction the use of Diego Garcia for the Iran offensive. “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA!” he told the British prime minister. The treaty was paused. Then war broke out and a beleaguered Starmer agreed to “defensive” strikes from Diego Garcia.

On Île du Coin, war seems like a distant prospect, even if it is potentially less than 200km (about 125 miles) away in Diego Garcia. As Tuesday drew to a close, there had so far been neither sight nor sound of the US’s deadly B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers in the slightly overcast skies.

Kicking the can

Mandarin left Mauritius at age 22. He joined the British army in a bid to improve his lot and later became a bus driver in south London. He says he always felt like a second-class citizen in Mauritius, with “no opportunity to progress”.

Rights groups have charted how evictees from Chagos struggled to cope in Mauritius, many of them ending up trapped in an urban nightmare of poverty, mental illness, and addiction — with little sympathy from their hosts. Many Chagossians left for Britain after securing citizenship rights.

Now the fate of their homeland is being decided by a treaty negotiated over their heads. Last year, a UN committee on racial discrimination warned that the treaty could perpetuate “long-standing violations” of Chagossian rights.

The treaty says Mauritius is “free” to resettle islanders on any of the Chagos islands — except Diego Garcia. But there is no binding obligation for it to do so and the exclusion of Diego Garcia rankles. The deal also includes a £40-million trust fund to be managed by Mauritius, which has been criticised as a ruse by Britain to avoid paying proper compensation. 

“People talk about decolonisation, but if Britain did the wrongs, Britain should have to repair the wrongs — not kick the can to Mauritius,” says Mandarin. “Or they will get away with it.”

One of the reels he has filmed on Île du Coin features an industrial oven that was used by colonial officials to burn the islanders’ dogs before they were evicted. Officials threatened the islanders with the same fate if they refused to leave. Britain must pay compensation, he says.

'Belongers'

Mandarin’s joint odyssey with Reform UK has provoked mixed feelings among the Chagossian diaspora in Britain, Seychelles, and Mauritius. 

“He’s put us back in the centre of the story, but will we be overshadowed by Reform’s agenda?” asked one Chagossian in the English town of Crawley – home to a 3,500-strong Chagossian community — who is also opposed to the deal.

As the treaty was being negotiated, Chagossians’ concerns were largely swept under the carpet as a complicating factor in a pragmatic decolonization drive.

The hard right has capitalized on the deal’s major flaw, positioning itself as the main champion of Chagossians, just as their ancestral land finds itself embroiled in a conflict that could upend the global order.

One video recently posted by Reform leader Nigel Farage saw him express outrage after being “denied access” to Île du Coin for the delivery of “humanitarian” supplies to Mandarin and his men, racking up a cool 4.7 million views on X. 

Asked whether he is being used by Reform and its supporters, Mandarin is sanguine. He says he also contacted the left-wing Green Party for support, but it never replied. “Only Reform responded. At the end of the day, it’s politics. You have to make your own judgements for the sake of your people,” he says. 

He views the upcoming hearing as a potential “turning point in our fight”. The injunction barring their removal was granted on the basis that their location was too far from the base to pose a security threat. “If the court says they can’t remove us, then maybe more people will come,” he says. “This is our people. This is our time. We’re not visitors — we’re belongers.”

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The post The Belongers: What the Chagos Islands tells us about the new world order appeared first on Coda Story.

Il paraît que l’Allemagne et le Danemark devraient servir d’exemple au Québec en matière de politique migratoire. C’est ce que laisse entendre le député Alex Boissonneault dans une vidéo voulant défaire le « mythe » que « plus d’immigration veut dire moins de pénurie de main d’œuvre ». Selon lui, les gouvernements allemand et danois ont changé leur politique d’immigration après avoir réalisé que l’immigration ne règle pas la pénurie de main-d’œuvre. M. Boissonneault connaît-il réellement la politique migratoire de ces deux pays et leurs fondements?

« Il y a plusieurs exemples de pays qui ont changé de politique en matière d’immigration parce qu’ils ont constaté cette situation. C’est le cas de l’Allemagne. L’Allemagne qui comptait beaucoup sur l’immigration pour combler ses postes vacants mais qui a constaté en 2023 que l’augmentation de l’immigration avait créé une pénurie de main d’œuvre dans les secteurs névralgiques. Donc il y a eu changement de politique. »

C’est complètement faux. La modification de la politique migratoire allemande en 2023 n’a rien à voir avec des considérations économiques ou sociales. Au même moment où le gouvernement d’Olaf Scholz renforçait le contrôle des frontières, l’Allemagne cherchait à attirer des travailleurs étrangers, en particulier les travailleurs qualifiés, notamment en réduisant les barrières administratives. Voici ce qu’affirmait Scholz en novembre 2024: « Aucun pays du monde ne peut connaître de croissance économique avec une main-d’oeuvre qui diminue. C’est la vérité à laquelle nous sommes confrontés. » Dans le même discours, le chancelier allemand défend le droit de l’Allemagne de choisir qui est admis en son sein, donc de repousser les réfugiés. Le problème de l’Allemagne n’est pas que l’immigration ne suffit pas à combler la pénurie de main-d’oeuvre, mais qu’elle ne parvient pas à attirer une main d’oeuvre de souche européenne en assez grande quantité.

« Même chose pour le Danemark avec un gouvernement social-démocrate, normalement considéré de gauche. Le gouvernement danois a constaté que l’augmentation de l’immigration a eu des conséquences négatives sur les services à la population. Il y a donc eu un changement de politique. »

Encore une fois, ce « changement de politique » du gouvernement danois n’a rien à voir avec l’économie ou avec les services à la population. C’est une question purement idéologique et, ce gouvernement ne s’en cache pas, raciste.

Commençons par dire que le racisme n’est pas une question de droite ou de gauche. On peut très bien être à gauche économiquement et à droite sur le plan de l’identité nationale. C’est le cas de la première ministre danoise, Mette Frederiksen, très attachée à l’État-providence danois, mais ouvertement raciste. En 2018, elle proposait de renvoyer les migrants « non occidentaux », non seulement du Danemark, mais de l’Europe, et de les placer dans des camps de concentration en Afrique sous supervision des Nations unies. À son arrivée au pouvoir en 2019, Frederiksen a promis de faire du Danemark un pays « sans demandeur d’asile ». En 2021, le gouvernement danois a voté une loi pour expulser les demandeurs d’asile hors d’Europe en attendant le traitement de leur demande, en contradiction totale avec les traités internationaux et les directives européennes. En 2022, une entente est signée avec le Rwanda. En gros, le Danemark paie le Rwanda pour détenir les demandeurs d’asile. Un bien triste revirement pour le premier pays à avoir signé la Convention de 1951 sur les réfugiés. Ce n’est pas sans raison que ce gouvernement « social-démocrate » est appuyé par l’extrême droite danoise.

En soi, la politique de Frederiksen et des sociaux-démocrates ne jure pas avec celle des administrations précédentes. Depuis le début des années 2000, le gouvernement danois est hostile à l’immigration. Le délai nécessaire pour obtenir la résidence permanente est passé de trois à huit ans. La « loi sur les étrangers » est modifiée régulièrement pour devenir toujours plus restrictive et viser des groupes en particulier. Elle a été modifiée 42 fois entre 2017 et 2019. Et la loi danoise est ouvertement raciste en ciblant des groupes spécifiques. En 2016, les Syriens ont été directement ciblés par une loi restreignant l’accés au regroupement familial pour les réfugiés et confisquant leurs objets de valeur pour financer leur séjour. En 2018, des mesures sont prises pour que des peines plus sévères soient infligées aux « résidents non occidentaux ». Des amendes importantes sont infligées aux personnes venant en aide aux « immigrants irréguliers ». Et pour bien montrer que la politique danoise est motivée par le racisme et non pas par des préoccupations économiques ou sociales, le Danemark a ouvert grand ses portes aux réfugiés ukrainiens fuyant l’invasion russe.

Ironiquement, ces dernières années, c’est la droite (modérée) qui a commencé à demander un assouplissement des politiques migratoires au Danemark. Pas pour des raisons humanitaire, mais pour des raisons économiques. Il y a une pénurie de main-d’œuvre, voyez-vous. Et les employeurs aimeraient bien qu’on leur permette de recruter à l’étranger les travailleurs qu’ils ne trouvent pas localement.

Christèle Meilland, chercheuse à l’Institut de recherches économiques et sociales (IRES), explique que la politique migratoire danoise s’appuie sur un discours « assimilant les étrangers, et particulièrement les réfugiés, à un fardeau pour l’État-providence ». Ça vous rappelle quelque chose?

Il paraît que l’Allemagne et le Danemark devraient servir d’exemple au Québec en matière de politique migratoire. C’est ce que laisse entendre le député Alex Boissonneault dans une vidéo voulant défaire le « mythe » que « plus d’immigration veut dire moins de pénurie de main d’œuvre ». Selon lui, les gouvernements allemand et danois ont changé leur politique d’immigration après avoir réalisé que l’immigration ne règle pas la pénurie de main-d’œuvre. M. Boissonneault connaît-il réellement la politique migratoire de ces deux pays et leurs fondements?

« Il y a plusieurs exemples de pays qui ont changé de politique en matière d’immigration parce qu’ils ont constaté cette situation. C’est le cas de l’Allemagne. L’Allemagne qui comptait beaucoup sur l’immigration pour combler ses postes vacants mais qui a constaté en 2023 que l’augmentation de l’immigration avait créé une pénurie de main d’œuvre dans les secteurs névralgiques. Donc il y a eu changement de politique. »

C’est complètement faux. La modification de la politique migratoire allemande en 2023 n’a rien à voir avec des considérations économiques ou sociales. Au même moment où le gouvernement d’Olaf Scholz renforçait le contrôle des frontières, l’Allemagne cherchait à attirer des travailleurs étrangers, en particulier les travailleurs qualifiés, notamment en réduisant les barrières administratives. Voici ce qu’affirmait Scholz en novembre 2024: « Aucun pays du monde ne peut connaître de croissance économique avec une main-d’oeuvre qui diminue. C’est la vérité à laquelle nous sommes confrontés. » Dans le même discours, le chancelier allemand défend le droit de l’Allemagne de choisir qui est admis en son sein, donc de repousser les réfugiés. Le problème de l’Allemagne n’est pas que l’immigration ne suffit pas à combler la pénurie de main-d’oeuvre, mais qu’elle ne parvient pas à attirer une main d’oeuvre de souche européenne en assez grande quantité.

« Même chose pour le Danemark avec un gouvernement social-démocrate, normalement considéré de gauche. Le gouvernement danois a constaté que l’augmentation de l’immigration a eu des conséquences négatives sur les services à la population. Il y a donc eu un changement de politique. »

Encore une fois, ce « changement de politique » du gouvernement danois n’a rien à voir avec l’économie ou avec les services à la population. C’est une question purement idéologique et, ce gouvernement ne s’en cache pas, raciste.

Commençons par dire que le racisme n’est pas une question de droite ou de gauche. On peut très bien être à gauche économiquement et à droite sur le plan de l’identité nationale. C’est le cas de la première ministre danoise, Mette Frederiksen, très attachée à l’État-providence danois, mais ouvertement raciste. En 2018, elle proposait de renvoyer les migrants « non occidentaux », non seulement du Danemark, mais de l’Europe, et de les placer dans des camps de concentration en Afrique sous supervision des Nations unies. À son arrivée au pouvoir en 2019, Frederiksen a promis de faire du Danemark un pays « sans demandeur d’asile ». En 2021, le gouvernement danois a voté une loi pour expulser les demandeurs d’asile hors d’Europe en attendant le traitement de leur demande, en contradiction totale avec les traités internationaux et les directives européennes. En 2022, une entente est signée avec le Rwanda. En gros, le Danemark paie le Rwanda pour détenir les demandeurs d’asile. Un bien triste revirement pour le premier pays à avoir signé la Convention de 1951 sur les réfugiés. Ce n’est pas sans raison que ce gouvernement « social-démocrate » est appuyé par l’extrême droite danoise.

En soi, la politique de Frederiksen et des sociaux-démocrates ne jure pas avec celle des administrations précédentes. Depuis le début des années 2000, le gouvernement danois est hostile à l’immigration. Le délai nécessaire pour obtenir la résidence permanente est passé de trois à huit ans. La « loi sur les étrangers » est modifiée régulièrement pour devenir toujours plus restrictive et viser des groupes en particulier. Elle a été modifiée 42 fois entre 2017 et 2019. Et la loi danoise est ouvertement raciste en ciblant des groupes spécifiques. En 2016, les Syriens ont été directement ciblés par une loi restreignant l’accés au regroupement familial pour les réfugiés et confisquant leurs objets de valeur pour financer leur séjour. En 2018, des mesures sont prises pour que des peines plus sévères soient infligées aux « résidents non occidentaux ». Des amendes importantes sont infligées aux personnes venant en aide aux « immigrants irréguliers ». Et pour bien montrer que la politique danoise est motivée par le racisme et non pas par des préoccupations économiques ou sociales, le Danemark a ouvert grand ses portes aux réfugiés ukrainiens fuyant l’invasion russe.

Ironiquement, ces dernières années, c’est la droite (modérée) qui a commencé à demander un assouplissement des politiques migratoires au Danemark. Pas pour des raisons humanitaire, mais pour des raisons économiques. Il y a une pénurie de main-d’œuvre, voyez-vous. Et les employeurs aimeraient bien qu’on leur permette de recruter à l’étranger les travailleurs qu’ils ne trouvent pas localement.

Christèle Meilland, chercheuse à l’Institut de recherches économiques et sociales (IRES), explique que la politique migratoire danoise s’appuie sur un discours « assimilant les étrangers, et particulièrement les réfugiés, à un fardeau pour l’État-providence ». Ça vous rappelle quelque chose?