On 18 October, President Zelenskyy accused Donald Trump of trying to pressure Ukraine into capitulating to Russia.

Asked by NBC whether Ukraine could win the war without the US, he answered: "Without United States support it's very difficult. But if United States will support Putin, it's historic mistake and big tragedy.... If the United States officially will take the side of Russia, if these two countries will be together, of course we will not prevail and we will not be able to stand."

He said Ukraine hopes Trump will be on its side, or at least "in the middle," and that he will "change his decisions" on Russia, as "it's all mistakes, it will not help us, and it will not help United States." In an interview with NBC's Meet the Press, when asked whether Trump is still an ally of Ukraine, Zelenskyy said: "I hope so." Not a definitive yes, but a weak maybe.

As diplomacy goes, statements do not come much stronger than this. What triggered them?

Probably the sum of all things. We all remember Trump and Vance humiliating Zelenskyy in the White House on 28 February 2025. Trump told the Ukrainian President that he was "gambling with" a third world war. Zelenskyy was told to come back "when he is ready for peace". Most will also remember that the USA enacted the decision to halt its aid to Ukraine across two separate, sweeping actions taken during the first months of the second Trump administration in early 2025. Presently, it is only delivering military aid decided by former President Biden.

Some might have forgotten that Trump called Zelenskyy a "dictator without elections," suggested Ukraine started the war, and pushed a "peace plan" whose original 28-point draft gave Russia terms more favorable than what Moscow sought at the 2022 Istanbul talks.

After 640 days in office, Trump's disdain for Ukraine and admiration for Russia seem to grow by the day, and his kakistocracy—government by the least qualified—keeps undermining Ukraine's defense. In less than two weeks:

• 9 October: the administration imposed new sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), an institution crucial for holding Putin and the Kremlin accountable for their atrocities in Ukraine.
  
• The same day, Trump lifted sanctions on Russian diesel exports, effectively helping fund Russia's wars.
  
• 10 October: Trump said of the elected president of a country fighting off Russia's full-scale invasion: "It's time for Ukraine to get a new president."
  
• 11 October: Trump declared on Truth Social an "energy ceasefire" between Russia and Ukraine that bound only Ukraine. Zelenskyy said it was "news to him."
  
• 14 October: SpaceX restricted Starshield, the classified, military-grade version of Starlink; Reuters reported on 15 October that the order came from the White House, undermining Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian jet-powered drones and strike Russian forces in occupied territory.
  
• 15 October: the US suspended critical intelligence sharing for three days, Zelenskyy said on 18 October, leaving Ukraine without warnings of Russian ballistic missile launches against its citizens and energy infrastructure.
  
• 16 October: two days before they were due to take effect, Trump waived the sanctions, restrictions and tariffs on Russia required by the Graham Act, calling it in the US national interest, and put nearly all of the congressional sanctions package on hold.
  
• 18 October: the administration reportedly proposed that Europe resume buying Russian gas to help "entice Russia to end the war in Ukraine." Europe balked.
  
• 19 October: it emerged that the US is delaying Patriots procured by allies under NATO's Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), leaving Ukraine short of defenses against Russian ballistic missiles. Ukrainian officials say the shipment is stalled because Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has not signed the transfer documents on his desk.
  
• 19 October: Trump said that "Xi Jinping has been very fair on Ukraine. He hasn't been very much involved. Same with Russia. They haven't been nearly what they could've been," ignoring that Russia is waging an unjust, unprovoked and genocidal war against Ukraine.
  
• The same day, Trump claimed Zelenskyy targets Russian refineries knowing the attacks are seriously hurting world diesel markets, including in the US, and that he "doesn't want to end this war, and probably never did."
  
• Talking to reporters outside the White House, Trump said Zelenskyy should get someone else to negotiate on Ukraine's behalf, and that he is willing to meet Putin and Xi to discuss the war, without the Ukrainian president. Kyiv fears Washington might decide Ukraine's future without it.
  
• 20 October: Vice President JD Vance said Ukraine should not join NATO and should stop striking Russian energy. He refused to call Ukraine a US "ally," downgrading it to a "partner": "We don't have a formal alliance... they're not in NATO... we're going to work together on some things, but also we're going to be opposite on some things, too."
  
• 21 October: after four and a half years of genocidal full-scale war and amid persistent Russian air strikes on Ukrainians, US special envoy Steve Witkoff praised Putin as a "humanitarian," echoing Trump's claim that Russia had restrained itself.
  
• The same day, Trump said the end of the war is closer than ever. He may step up efforts to coerce Ukraine into a deal by the end of 2026, The Atlantic reports, with Ukraine's prospects shaped by the US midterms and possible Trump-Putin-Xi talks in November.
  

Less than two weeks, summarized.

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Europe now faces two strategic adversaries: Russia and the United States

This is how Trump's administration talks about, and acts towards, the victim of an unjustified, unprovoked and horrendous war. Trump's USA (TUSA) is siding with autocracy against democracy and the rules-based world order. It talks about America's former allies in a similar manner: derogatory and disrespectful. None of the above is the word or deed of an ally.

When one chooses to see the world as it is, Zelenskyy's statements become both necessary and important. This is not only about Ukraine's self-respect and survival. Once we acknowledge the realities—that Europe is in an undeclared war with Russia at a moment when the USA has chosen to become a strategic adversary—we stand better prepared to defend ourselves: to accept that our present security system does not work and new solutions are urgently needed, and that diplomacy alone does not work and military force is essential to protect freedom, democracy and international law.

More than a year ago, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned that Europe is "not at war, but no longer at peace either" with Russia. Other heads of state have echoed him. NATO has since shifted from a peacetime alliance to one focused on urgent wartime readiness. Unfortunately, the process started years too late.

By seeing the world as it is, European leaders might reach the long-overdue conclusion that Russia's wars in Ukraine and Europe can only be stopped by a demonstration of strength: an alliance willing and capable of using military force to stop Russia. The alliance Russia fears isn't NATO. It's a coalition that will actually fight.

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The alliance Russia fears isn’t NATO. It’s a coalition that will actually fight.

European courage and action are urgently needed. Ukraine is exposed to a two-front war, defending itself against both Russia and TUSA, and their attacks are increasing in scale and scope. Both Moscow and Washington want to end the war this year and are ramping up their assaults on Ukraine accordingly.

Irrespective of one's view of Ukraine, it is commonly understood that it is stopping Russia from advancing and increasing its border with NATO and the EU. Ukraine is defending European values and principles, ensuring the rest of us can continue living in something resembling peace. The consequences of its defeat would be truly devastating.

There can be no European strategic autonomy without Ukraine. There can be no European security and stability without Ukraine. Europe can never become a Great Power without Ukraine. And neither Russia nor the USA want Europe to achieve any of the above.

It is time to act according to the present-day realities and face down Europe's two strategic adversaries. In the worst case, Ukraine's destiny might be decided in November already.

Hans Petter Midttun

Hans Petter Midttun, independent analyst on hybrid warfare, Non-Resident Fellow at the Centre for Defense Strategies, board member of the Ukrainian Institute for Security and Law of the Sea, former Defense Attaché of Norway to Ukraine, and officer (R) of the Norwegian Armed Forces. 

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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On 11 October, Trump declared an “energy ceasefire” between Russia and Ukraine. It binds only Ukraine. In the two days that followed, Kyiv held its fire while Russia kept hitting Ukrainian energy and critical infrastructure across 19 regions. A Russian strike collapsed an apartment stairwell in Kharkiv and killed three. And before Russia’s latest ballistic missile strike, five missiles and more than 100 drones, Ukraine received no early warning at all. Washington then said both sides were to blame.

This is what one of Trump’s decisions looks like on the ground. There were four of them, in three days, 9 to 11 October.

Three days that further weaken the West and undermine liberal democracies. Three days that encourage Putin to continue his war against Ukraine and his hybrid war against Europe. Like China, the US has sided with Russia against Ukraine and Europe. Whatever the motives in Washington—diesel prices before the midterms, a long feud with the court—the effect is the same.

International law

On 9 October, the Trump administration announced new sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC), an institution crucial for holding Putin and the Kremlin responsible for the war of aggression and its atrocities. The sanctions came hours after the Nobel Peace Prize went to Navi Pillay, a former ICC judge.

"We will ban transactions with this rogue court, cutting off their resources and crippling its ability to operate," Secretary of State Marco Rubio said. "Either the ICC will end its threats, or we will end the ICC." He expects allies, many of them ICC members that rely on American servicemembers for their defense, to rein in the court.

The ICC exists to investigate, prosecute, and try individuals accused of the world's gravest international crimes. Washington wants to end it. The court called the measures an assault on the rule of law and the foundations of the international legal order.

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Funding Russia's war

On 9 October, Trump also lifted sanctions on Russian diesel exports. The deal comes less than a month after he signed the sweeping Russia sanctions law dedicated to the memory of Sen. Lindsey Graham, which allows tariffs on buyers of Russian oil. Multiple US lawmakers argue the move violates federal law. Congress banned Russian energy imports in 2022, and a bipartisan group of seven senators, including Republicans Thom Tillis and Lisa Murkowski, stated that the decision "runs directly counter to that law." They also argue that the administration failed to consult Congress or justify its decision as the statute requires.

Western sanctions and Ukraine's strikes on Russian refineries—its own "sanctions"—aim at the same effect: making the war unaffordable for Russia. Trump's decision does the opposite: it helps Russia pay for the war. It also breaks with the principle of unity of effort, further undermining Western cohesion.

Zelenskyy said the deal showed US weakness, as Washington had secured no concessions in return: "What did [Trump] get? That he will have more diesel? For whom? More Russian diesel for Americans? ... It looks like Alaska No. 2. You know, it looks like a happy birthday present for Putin. It looks absolutely terrible."

Stability and sovereignty

On 10 October, Trump said of the elected president of a country fighting off Russia's full-scale invasion: "I think it's time for Ukraine to get a new president... I suggest they get a new leader who can make a deal, because he could have made many deals and, for some reason, he never does." He claimed Zelenskyy could have ended the war many times, and insisted that Zelenskyy "wants to make problems for the world" by authorizing strikes on Russian refineries.

The Trump Administration conspicuously ignores the Swiss Summit on Peace in Ukraine, President Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan based on international law, and not least, the international effort to establish unity of efforts to enforce a just peace.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly proposed talks and shown willingness to compromise for a peace that guarantees Ukraine's sovereignty. On 18 July, he said: "This year alone, we have reached out to Russia dozens of times with proposals to stop this war—but all we got in return were refusals."

The "deals" Trump alludes to would not have secured peace or guaranteed Ukraine's future existence, nor safeguarded Europe against future Russian aggression. They were not rooted in international law, but in the prospect of great wealth for Trump and his associates—business deals dressed up as "peace plans”. Ukraine and its European partners instead proposed amendments and defined red lines to bring the drafts up to the standards of international law.

The Kremlin itself exposed the absurdity of Trump's claim. In a phone call with Trump, Putin categorically ruled out resuming peace talks, his aide Yuri Ushakov said, and sought to convince Trump that Ukrainian resistance has "no prospects whatsoever."

Supporting Russia

On 11 October, Trump announced: "Effective immediately, there is an ENERGY CEASEFIRE in the War between Russia and Ukraine. Both parties have agreed. Do not break it!"

He gave no details. Zelenskyy had no prior knowledge, but said Ukraine would agree if Russia did. He had already offered to stop striking Russian refineries if Russia stopped attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

It was not an energy ceasefire. It was a gift to Putin. A White House official told Axios that, as Trump understands it, the term means only that Russia and Ukraine stop attacking each other's oil refineries—and that this is what Washington expects Ukraine to do. Ukraine has one refinery, while Russia has 38, of which 21 have been targeted by Ukrainian drones.

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Three days after Washington announced an energy ceasefire, Russia fires 39 ballistic missiles at Ukraine’s grid

To most of the world, an energy ceasefire covers the whole energy sector: nuclear power, oil refineries, power plants, the grid down to local transformers. But not in Trump's world. The official said a deal on power plants and grids could come next—if Ukraine first stops striking the refineries fueling Russia's war.

Axios wrote that White House officials see Ukraine's refinery strikes as doing more damage to Zelenskyy's relationship with Trump than to Russia. The administration has reportedly threatened to cut Ukraine off from US intelligence if the strikes continue.

Forcing Ukraine to halt its refinery strikes, while Russia keeps hitting not only power plants and the grid but heating and water systems, hospitals, schools, railways, ports and civilians, does not motivate Russia to stop. Within hours of Trump's announcement, Russia struck a power plant in Kharkiv. Trump's one-sided pressure encourages Russia to continue.

Enabling Russian aggression

Moscow paints Ukraine as the intransigent party, though Russia has offered no concessions and rejected numerous compromise proposals from the US and Ukraine. Still, Trump insists that Ukraine, not Russia, is the problem.

In three days, Trump has sanctioned the court that could hold Russia accountable, called on Zelenskyy to step down, secured revenue for the Kremlin's war, and declared an "energy ceasefire" that only asks Ukraine to stop striking Russian refineries, while Russia goes on turning winter into a weapon.

The call for Zelenskyy to step down led Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chair of the European Parliament's Committee on Security and Defence, to say: "If Trump calls on Zelenskyy to step down, he is clearly siding with a murderer. Only the Ukrainian people can decide who leads Ukraine in free elections, not the White House, and certainly not the Kremlin." Her conclusion: "By once again attacking allies and democratic institutions, Trump is weakening the West and undermining democracy. [...] Europe must therefore remain firmly on course and support Ukraine, because the US can no longer be relied on."

The US's latest National Security Strategy does not merely shift America's foreign policy priorities. It aligns them with Moscow's on seven separate issues, while explicitly calling for Washington to "cultivate resistance to Europe's current trajectory" by backing nationalist parties against sitting EU-aligned governments.

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Europe has 11 ways to choke Russia’s war. It doesn’t need Trump’s permission for any of them

Europe must stand on its own

The last three days demonstrate that the US is no longer an ally, but a strategic adversary. None of Trump's recent decisions helps end the war on Ukrainian or European terms. On the contrary, they encourage Putin and push any realistic hope of peace years away. They undermine international law and support the notion that might makes right.

Worse still, they help explain why war between Russia and Europe by 2029 is becoming more likely. Trump—Putin's close ally—leaves office on 20 January 2029.

Europe must stress its support for continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries unless the Kremlin agrees to a comprehensive energy ceasefire in line with Ukraine’s demands.

Europe urgently needs to distance itself from the US and its foreign policy. Heads of state must join Canada's efforts to unite middle and small powers in common defense against increasingly aggressive great powers. As this series has repeatedly argued, Europe must build a Coalition of Like-Minded countries strong enough to confront Russia, China and, sadly, the US.

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The alternative to NATO: A Coalition of Like-Minded European Countries

Hans Petter Midttun

Hans Petter Midttun, independent analyst on hybrid warfare, Non-Resident Fellow at the Centre for Defense Strategies, board member of the Ukrainian Institute for Security and Law of the Sea, former Defense Attaché of Norway to Ukraine, and officer (R) of the Norwegian Armed Forces. 

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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For decades, Europe operated on a series of assumptions: that borders were essentially settled; that economic interdependence would constrain major-power conflict; that international law would increasingly regulate state behavior; that military force was becoming less relevant; and that, ultimately, the United States would guarantee European security.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shattered those norms, as Moscow attempts to change borders by force and reshape the European security order. NATO now describes Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allied security, while also identifying sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and other hybrid actions as part of the threat.

The foreign policy of the Trump administration is further undermining past postulations. It threatens to annex Canada, speaks of occupying Greenland by force, and ignores Spain's sovereignty. It disrespects European military contributions, then demands European support for operations of its own choosing, legal justification optional. It negotiates European security over Europe's head while resetting relations with the power that threatens the continent, calls European countries "decaying" and their leaders "weak," and has launched a trade war against its former allies while pursuing business with its former strategic opponent.

Discussing solutions without first agreeing on the problem is meaningless. Yet that is what Europe has done since the war started in 2014.

Eight realities

Analyzing the security environment, before recommending solutions, I have identified eight fixed points that I regard as constants.

1. It was never a Russia/Ukraine war

Russia has offered the West four tales, all unpleasant, one designed to look like an "easy way out." The first calls on Ukraine to give up Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, the lie Trump's plan is built on. But Putin's demands transcend Donbas, as his 2024 speech and Russia's operations show. The second, "Novorossiya," adds Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv and Odesa to the first lie.

The third, "one people, one nation," claims all of Ukraine. In the words of former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski: "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire." The fourth, "the Russian World," is the only one formalized in Russian strategic documents, encompassing the "former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation."

Ukraine's defeat is crucial to Russia's broader strategy. Integrated with Belarus, a subjugated Ukraine would give Russia the population, economy and technology to be seen as a near peer to the US and China, project power across the post-Soviet space, and ease its own demographic decline, while handing Moscow the country's defense industry, farmland and mineral, gas and oil deposits, and moving Russian military power nearly 900 km closer to London, Berlin and Paris.

It would create an aggressive, imperialist power on Europe's border, emboldened to force NATO's withdrawal to its 1997 borders and to deny the US the ability to deploy forces and nuclear weapons to Europe. The West, not Ukraine, has been defined as Russia's enemy.

2. A war is ongoing in Europe

Russia has been conducting an ever-escalating hybrid war against NATO's European member states since 2014. The EU Parliament acknowledged as much in September 2021. Its aggressions include sabotage against critical infrastructure, cyberattacks, disinformation, GPS jamming affecting civilian aviation, repeated airspace violations by strike drones, and attacks on Europe's defense-industrial base.

Russia's acts of violence against Western targets are becoming increasingly brazen. In August, Western intelligence sources reported a new wave of attacks on weapons factories in Europe under cover of "plausible deniability," The Telegraph reported. A CIA report shared with European governments warns Russia may attack Spain, France or Italy with Gerbera drones launched from ships, El Mundo reported, citing Lithuanian sources.

It is the same hybrid war Ukraine faced until 24 February 2022, one expected to turn open by 2029. Article 5 could, and probably should, have been triggered years ago. Having failed to respond, NATO has lost credibility, raising the risk of war.

3. The tsunami of ripple effects is changing the political landscape in the West

In May 2022, I began using the term tsunami of ripple effects to describe the cost of not intervening in a war that threatens the security of the Alliance. It is the reverberations that raise the cost of living, undermine food and energy security, and spread famine, recession and inflation, raising the risk of unrest, extremism, and, ultimately, the fall of governments. Europe is living through the biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War.

The international security architecture is being dismantled, our institutions discredited, and NATO no longer deters Russia. Building on public frustration, the tsunami of ripple effects gave us Trump and the rise of right-wing parties across Europe.

4. NATO no longer deters Russia

If Russia were deterred, it would not have launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO's strategic concept commits it to ending, by political and military means, conflicts that threaten Alliance security, including in Ukraine. Nor would Russia be conducting an ever-escalating hybrid war against NATO's European states, or preparing for a military conflict with the Alliance, as US and European intelligence services warn. Lack of deterrence raises the risk of Russian strategic miscalculation and war, especially since NATO was the only military power able to deny Russia its Great Power aspiration and its demand for a sphere of influence over the post-Soviet space.

NATO used to display readiness and capabilities. Today it has become a religion. Europe begs it is still almighty while Russia is a disbeliever.

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NATO no longer deters Russia. A new coalition could

5. The transatlantic rupture undermines NATO and European security

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put it plainly at Davos on 20 January 2026: "We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition." We "cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination," he said, calling for countries to organize in the face of great-power rivalry through different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests. As he told the World Economic Forum: "We actively take on the world as it is, not wait around for a world we wish to be."

6. The war is existential to both Ukraine and Russia

Ukraine is fighting for its right to exist. Russia is fighting for its Great Power status, strategic parity with the USA and China. If it is defeated in Ukraine, it will forever remain a pariah state, potentially imploding. For a negotiation to succeed, it must solve the cause of the war: Russia's Great Power ambitions, which cannot be negotiated away, only denied through military power.

7. Russia will never accept being defeated by Ukraine

Even with the tools to evict the Russian Armed Forces, Ukraine cannot expect Russia to accept defeat by a nation that, in its distorted narrative, "does not exist." Russia would only accept withdrawal from Ukraine if the alternative were to fight a far superior military power and thereby risk losing the means that secure the survival of the regime and the state.

8. Europe has very limited time to stop the war from escalating

Several European intelligence services warn of war by 2029;

• French intelligence is preparing for large-scale Russian attacks by 2030, and autumn 2027 is now being discussed, France Télévisions reported;
• US intelligence expects Russia may test NATO's resolve with a limited strike against a member state between this autumn and 2029, the Wall Street Journal reported in August;
• Baltic intelligence chiefs told The Guardian on 20 September that an attack could come within "months, not years."
• Worse still, Europe won't be ready until 2035, six to nine years too late, SACEUR warns.

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NATO’s generals warn of war by 2029. Europe won’t be ready until 2035.

Rules do not enforce themselves

International law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity remain fundamental principles. But without the capability and political will to defend them, principles become aspirations, not constraints on states prepared to use force. Acknowledging the world as it is means acknowledging that power still matters. It means accepting that deterrence requires more than statements of concern: ammunition, air and missile defense, long-range strike and counter-drone systems, secure communications, logistics, cyber resilience, and the industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict.

This is where Carney's second formulation matters: countries must rely not only on "the strength of our values, but also the value of our strength." Values mean nothing unless one is prepared to defend them, as Canada is doing, raising defense spending and strengthening domestic industry. Europe needs to draw the same conclusion: strategic autonomy, not abandoning NATO, but ensuring Europe can defend itself and its interests even when an ally's priorities change.

The European Council already calls Russia's war an existential challenge and demands defense readiness be strengthened by 2030. But acknowledging reality means going further than setting targets.

It means recognizing that Ukraine is not merely the recipient of European security assistance. Ukraine is an integral part of Europe's security architecture. Its battlefield experience, defense industry, intelligence, and ability to absorb and defeat Russian attacks are crucial to European security.

Because individual member states refuse Ukraine as a member, NATO has made itself a liability, and some of the same countries are erecting hindrances to its EU membership too, letting national interest block common security.

The solution

The choice is not between idealism and realism. It is between pretending that the old assumptions still hold and building the capabilities required by the reality that has replaced them.

Acknowledging the world as it is means seeing the threats clearly; defending the world as it should be means acting on that knowledge, and the bridge between the two is strength.

Accept those eight fixed points, and Europe's room for maneuver is gone, along with its present strategy. Europe cannot afford another 12 years of futile diplomacy while Russia exploits our naivety to prepare for war in the next two to three years, diplomacy that has undermined Europe's need to rearm and establish credible deterrence.

European governments have long acknowledged that their armed forces no longer provide credible defense, yet their security policy still assumes NATO guarantees collective security.

Acknowledge reality, and the illusion shatters.

Europe urgently needs a new strategy, one that looks beyond NATO and the EU's inherent weaknesses toward a military alliance credible enough to reshape the strategic environment. This is why I have long argued for a Coalition of Like-Minded European countries (CALM). It offers a path from recognition to action, from acknowledging NATO's failure to building something that works.

Strength is not found in numbers, but in unity: agreeing on the enemy, his aims and strategy, and committing to countermeasures that demonstrate real will and capability to fight.

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The alternative to NATO: A Coalition of Like-Minded European Countries

Unlike NATO or the EU, CALM does not have to wait for Europe's rearmament to reach 2035. It builds on existing NATO interoperability.

The force already exists: Ukraine's battle-hardened army, National Guard, Special Operations Forces, air defense, and Unmanned System Forces, combined with European fifth-generation aircraft and state-of-the-art navies, are credible, combat-proven, and in place.

Russia already struggles to fight Ukraine alone; it would face a different reality entirely if Ukraine formally joined a coalition of European military powers. That is why the declaration matters now, not after the capability is fully built: with the interoperability already proven, it changes Russia's strategic assessment immediately, not in 2035.

This is not only about physical capabilities. It is about changing Russia's perception of its strategic environment. It starts with a declaration; preparing for military intervention comes next. But it begins with the declaration.

Hans Petter Midttun

Hans Petter Midttun, independent analyst on hybrid warfare, Non-Resident Fellow at the Centre for Defense Strategies, board member of the Ukrainian Institute for Security and Law of the Sea, former Defense Attaché of Norway to Ukraine, and officer (R) of the Norwegian Armed Forces. 

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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