Lithuania's government approved an expanded plan on 12 August to fortify its borders with Russia and Belarus against a possible attack, LRT reports. Lithuania, a Baltic state and NATO member, sits wedged between Russia's Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus. The decision opens a new counter-mobility belt reaching inland from the border, a 20-meter strip that widens to 150 meters where the army marks out areas for operations.
The buildout answers a fear that has gripped the Baltics since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022: that a Russia left unchecked in Ukraine could turn on them next. Western intelligence agencies have warned for years that Moscow could eventually threaten NATO itself, and former CIA director David Petraeus has singled out Lithuania as the likeliest first target, pinned between Kaliningrad and Belarus and sitting beside the Suwałki Gap, the thin land corridor that is NATO's only overland route to the Baltic states.
The decision raises the number of engineering parks, storage depots for obstacles like concrete blocks and roadblocks, from 27 to 50, and gives that work until the end of 2028, more than three years past the original April 2025 target. The state rail company LTG Infra is to store the equipment. The changes could cost an extra €50 million ($58 million) from the State Defense Fund between 2026 and 2030.
Of the Baltic states and Poland fortifying their eastern borders, Lithuania is the most at risk yet the least fortified, according to a satellite review by open-source analyst Clément Molin, even as Belarus keeps testing that border with engineered migrant crossings. The plan is Lithuania's share of the Baltic Defense Line, the joint barrier it launched in 2024 with Latvia and Estonia, alongside Poland's parallel East Shield.
The design comes straight from Ukraine. Lithuania began building counter-mobility parks in 2023, drawing on Russia's war against Ukraine, and much of what it is now putting into the ground, the swamps, ditches, and obstacle fields, was tested first on Ukrainian battlefields, where mud, water, and simple barriers have repeatedly stalled armored advances.
The restored swamps should make some ground impassable to heavy military vehicles within a few years, the Defense Ministry says, with that work due by the end of 2030. Plans for defensive ditches and streams in the Marijampolė municipality were dropped, and the ministry found better sites in the Vilkaviškis and Šakiai districts. Deadlines for obstacles on roads and bridge approaches, and for fitting bridges with holders for explosives, were also moved to the end of 2028.
"Military counter-mobility is an important part of Lithuania's defence preparedness," Deputy Defense Minister Tomas Mikelkevičius said. "We seek to make the best possible use of Lithuania's terrain and engineering measures to impede an adversary's movement if necessary and create more favorable conditions for our armed forces to operate."
Lithuania approved its first counter-mobility plan in July 2024. The plan's original 2024 estimate put the full system at around €600 million ($690 million) over the decade.
The buildout lands amid steady friction along NATO's eastern edge. Latvia has absorbed the bulk of the migrant crossings funneled from Belarus, and this week found its first used smuggling tunnel under the border. Estonia has switched on the first sensors of a planned drone wall along its Russian frontier and is reallocating €500 million ($575 million) toward air defense and long-range strike. Russia, for its part, has shut seven rail crossings with Latvia, Estonia, and Finland without explanation.
The fortification drive is a bet on time. Estonia's military chief has set a two-year clock, warning Russia could be combat-ready again by 2027, and ISW analysts assessed in May that Moscow was manufacturing pretexts for aggression against the Baltics. Poland's parallel East Shield, meanwhile, has gone up far slower than promised, leaving the region's defenses still thin where the threat is judged greatest.
© Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times
Latvia has discovered its first known border tunnel used to enter the country illegally from Belarus, the country’s State Border Guard said on 11 August. Officers intercepted 15 people who had crossed through the underground passage and returned them to Belarus.
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland accuse Belarus and Russia of directing migrants toward their borders to retaliate for EU sanctions and strain countries supporting Ukraine. Minsk and Moscow deny orchestrating the crossings. Tunnels found in Lithuania and Latvia show organizers adapting to fortified borders, requiring Baltic governments to deploy more personnel and surveillance technology.
Border guards found the group on 10 August in Skrudaliena parish, in Latvia’s southeastern Augšdaugava municipality, and briefed the public on the discovery the following day. The operation involved the State Police, a Lithuanian border-service dog handler, and a rapid-response unit, the Latvian Border Guard said.
While reconstructing the group’s route, officers found the passage near the Silene border post, about 10 meters from Latvia’s fence. The agency said it had received intelligence that a tunnel might be under construction, but had previously found no sign of a breach there.
Riga answered on 11 August 2026 by launching Operation Vilkatis, or “Werewolf,” scheduled to run through the end of August. The government says the operation will improve intelligence-sharing among border guards, police, the military, and security services. It will also expand aerial surveillance and target networks that transport and shelter migrants after they cross.
Belarus has weaponized migration since 2021, when EU governments accused Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime of bringing people from the Middle East and Africa to the bloc’s frontier in retaliation for sanctions. Belarus denied orchestrating the crisis.
Latvia reported more direct evidence in January 2026. Documents and phones taken from detained migrants linked Belarusian military and border personnel to organized crossings, according to Latvia’s armed forces and Border Guard.
By 13 July, Latvia had recorded 7,791 attempts over 111 consecutive days, 87% of all attempts along the EU-Belarus border by then. Lithuania later found an unfinished tunnel dug from Belarus. Latvia’s tunnel, unlike the unfinished Lithuanian passage, had already been used.
© Moises Saman/Magnum, for The New York Times
© Eric Lee/The New York Times
On 9 August, Russia and Syria signed a memorandum on the reorganization of Moscow’s military presence in the country. For about 18 months, the two countries had been negotiating the status of Russian facilities in Syria. As a result, Damascus will take control of facilities intended for civilian use, including Hmeimim Airport and the fourth commercial berth at the port of Tartus, SANA reported.
Russia supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. After the dictator’s defeat in 2024, Russian troops began leaving the country en masse, including from military facilities, CNN reports. However, Moscow sought to retain control over two strategic facilities: Hmeimim Air Base near Latakia and the naval base in Tartus. The new memorandum sets out a new format for Russia’s presence in Syria, including at these two facilities.
According to the report, Syria will integrate the facilities it receives under the memorandum into the country’s civilian administration. Russian military bases will be converted into joint training centers. The two sides also agreed to review the role of facilities currently used for military purposes.
Also under the memorandum, the countries are to implement these changes within three months. According to the journalists, “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the agreement the most important development since talks began about 18 months ago, saying it paves the way for a new stage in Syrian-Russian relations.”
Since 2015, Russia has engaged in direct military intervention and supplied Bashar al-Assad’s regime with weapons. At the peak of its military activity in Syria, Russia maintained a presence at about 90 military facilities across the country, according to a joint investigation by OSINT groups GeoInsider and SONARROW.
In 2024, Assad lost power and fled to Russia, leaving the status of Russian military bases in Syria uncertain. Although the new government, led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, had been on the opposite side of the Syrian civil war from Russia, it decided not to sever ties with Moscow completely. In 2025, Syria said it wanted Russia “by our side.”
Despite the new government’s “pragmatic” approach to relations with Russia, Moscow’s military presence in Syria gradually began to shrink. Two particularly important strategic facilities for Moscow were the port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base. In particular, Tartus is important to Russia because it is Russia’s only naval facility in the Mediterranean. After Assad fled, Moscow began negotiations with Syria over the status of its military facilities.
The negotiations over the military bases are not the only contentious issue in Russian-Syrian relations. The issue of Assad’s extradition also featured in talks between Damascus and Moscow after he fled to Russia, per Al Jazeera. On 4 August, Reuters reported that Syria had signaled to Washington that it was prepared to significantly reduce imports of Russian oil amid talks over sanctions relief. Russia has emerged as Syria’s main supplier of oil, with shipments reaching about 60,000 barrels per day this year.
When Sweden’s Anton Källberg walks into the arena on Tuesday to face Vladimir Sidorenko at Europe Smash, the match carries a weight that reaches beyond the table.
Sidorenko is Russian, and unlike the Russian players who spent recent years competing as neutrals, he now takes the table representing Russia, under its flag and anthem.
Flags and anthems are written into international sport precisely because they carry national and political meaning.
The change follows a July decision by the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) to lift the restrictions on athletes holding Russian passports. It took effect on 28 July, and Russian players can now enter under the same ordinary rules as everyone else.
For critics, the question is hard to avoid: what has changed in Ukraine to justify the change in sport?
Russia’s full-scale invasion has not ended. Yet the penalty imposed in its wake—that Russian athletes compete without representing the Russian state—has now been lifted in international table tennis.
The Swedish Table Tennis Association has openly opposed the move. Its chairman, Tomas Eriksson, said in July that he saw no change in Ukraine that would justify shifting Swedish sport’s position toward Russian participation. The association has said it will not boycott the tournaments.
That tension now lands on Swedish soil.
Källberg and Sidorenko were drawn against each other at Europe Smash, held in Malmö from 8 to 16 August.
For Swedish supporters of Ukraine, the evening presents a real dilemma. Nobody needs to aim hostility at Sidorenko himself, and no one is claiming individual Russian athletes bear responsibility for their government’s actions. The question is what an athlete is asked to represent.
A neutral athlete competes as an individual. Someone introduced beneath a national flag stands in, however indirectly, for a state. Flags and anthems are written into international sport precisely because they carry national and political meaning.
So restoring the Russian flag is more than an administrative tweak. It is a statement—and a pointed one while Russia’s war on Ukraine continues.
The dispute has an unmistakable Swedish dimension. ITTF is headed by Petra Sörling, the Swedish official who was re-elected president of world table tennis in 2025 for another four-year term. She is a former president of the Swedish Table Tennis Association.
That does not make the reinstatement hers alone to decide; the ITTF Executive Board considered the issue on 10 July. But leadership carries responsibility. ITTF has justified the change by citing equal treatment and proportionality—yet proportionate to what change in circumstances? With Russia’s war on Ukraine still ongoing, the federation has yet to explain what has materially shifted to make the earlier restrictions disproportionate now.
On the evening of 11 August 2026, all of it narrows to something plainer: two players and a table, in front of a Swedish crowd.
Källberg deserves what any Swedish athlete would want at a major home tournament: loud, passionate backing from the crowd. And those who object to the return of the Russian flag have every right to voice it, peacefully, from the same seats.
Sport does not stand outside the world around it. International federations prove as much every time they raise a flag or set a country’s name beside an athlete.
If those symbols matter when a nation celebrates victory, they matter when a governing body decides who may use them.
And until the reasons for restricting Russia’s national representation have gone, the question facing table tennis stays simple: Why should the restriction disappear first?
Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.
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Le Marché public de Rimouski accueillera, ce samedi 8 août, entre 10 h et 16 h, au parc de la Gare, le micro-atelier artisanal local, Les Grands Pins, qui se spécialise dans le travail du cuir et du bois.
Leurs fabrications entièrement faites à la main sont principalement des objets pratiques et pensés pour l’usage au quotidien.
La Ferme Coopérative du Moulin et La Bleuetière du Bas-Saint-Laurent feront aussi leur première apparition de la saison et décoreront leurs étalages de fruits et de légumes frais.
Les autres exposants :
On se voit au marché !
The United States is reorganizing its Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), shifting greater responsibility for coordinating military assistance to European allies while maintaining support for Kyiv, US European Command (USEUCOM) announced on 3 August.
The changes affect the division of responsibilities between SAG-U, US military components, and NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). According to USEUCOM, the reorganization is intended to improve the efficiency of military assistance while transferring leadership of key elements of the mission to allied countries.
Established in November 2022 following Russia's full-scale invasion, the headquarters oversees long-term security assistance for Ukraine, including coordinating equipment deliveries, training Ukrainian forces, and sharing battlefield lessons learned with US and NATO militaries.
USEUCOM said the reorganization "will not impact US support for Ukraine" and would free US resources for other global priorities while recognizing Europe's growing role in supporting Ukraine's defense.
"Allies have shown that they can take the lead in support of Ukraine's defense," USEUCOM commander Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich said.
"SAG-U was always meant to be a temporary command. Its transition builds on the progress that we have already seen, helping to set conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine."
US Army Europe and Africa spokesperson Col. Michael Weisman similarly said the reorganization "does not diminish our support or commitment to Ukraine" and that Washington would continue coordinating assistance through USEUCOM and NSATU in line with US policy.
The announcement follows reports that the Pentagon plans to hand leadership of SAG-U to another NATO member over the coming year while retaining a US deputy commander, a move reported by Politico.
According to the outlet, the transition forms part of a broader effort by the Trump administration to shift more responsibility for European security onto NATO allies. The administration has previously reduced US leadership roles within NATO's command structure and has repeatedly called on European countries to assume a greater share of the burden for Ukraine's defense and the alliance's collective security.
USEUCOM likewise said the realignment reflects Europe's leading role in supporting Ukraine over the past year.
USEUCOM said SAG-U has distributed more than $2 billion in security assistance over the past three and a half years while coordinating military aid from allied and partner nations.
Syria has told the United States it is willing to drastically reduce imports of Russian crude oil as part of discussions over lifting Washington's remaining terrorism-related sanctions on the country, according to three sources familiar with the talks cited by Reuters.
The reported commitment would mark a significant shift for Damascus, which has remained heavily dependent on Russian oil since the fall of Bashar al-Assad despite pursuing closer ties with Western governments.
According to Reuters, senior Syrian officials told US counterparts they were prepared to reduce Russian oil imports during negotiations over removing Syria from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST), one of the last major sanctions designations still applied to the country.
US President Donald Trump announced in July that he intends to rescind Syria's designation, which has been in place since 1979, but the move remains subject to a congressional review period before taking effect.
Three sources told Reuters that the United States requested such a reduction and Damascus agreed, although they said Washington did not formally make it a precondition for lifting the designation.
A US State Department official told Reuters that Washington is encouraging Syria to work with "trusted corporate partners," particularly US companies, during the country's reconstruction and expects Damascus to comply with sanctions targeting Russia.
A White House official, meanwhile, said there was no formal link between removing Syria from the terrorism list and reducing Russian oil imports.
Removing the designation would eliminate one of the biggest remaining barriers to Syria's economic reintegration. While many US sanctions have already been lifted, the terrorism designation continues to restrict access to US assistance and complicate foreign investment, banking, and broader commercial ties, making its removal a key priority for Damascus.
Despite improving relations with the West, Syria remains heavily reliant on Russian energy supplies. Reuters reported that Russian crude shipments to Syria have risen by 75% this year to around 60,000 barrels per day, making Moscow the country's dominant oil supplier.
One Syrian source told Reuters that Syrian officials have argued they currently rely on Russian oil out of necessity rather than preference, saying the removal of the terrorism designation would allow Damascus to diversify its energy imports.
A Syrian energy official also told Reuters the government is already searching for alternative suppliers and expects a "radical change" in the country's energy sourcing.
Analysts told Reuters that replacing Russian crude quickly could prove difficult without creating fuel shortages or increasing import costs.
The reported discussions reflect a broader US effort to weaken Russia's remaining economic and strategic influence in Syria following Assad's removal from power.
Reuters noted that Washington has recently placed greater emphasis on reducing Moscow's role in the country, while Congress has directed the Pentagon to examine options for limiting Russia's military presence, including at its naval facility in Tartus and the Hmeimim air base.
The move also mirrors broader efforts to curb demand for Russian energy beyond the European Union. Last month, Georgia's sanctioned Kulevi oil refinery announced it had begun replacing Russian crude with supplies from Kazakhstan and Libya after the EU imposed sanctions over its processing of Russian oil, giving the company six months to complete the transition.
Belarus is expanding its military footprint on the Ukrainian border again, standing up a new brigade near the frontier, the commander of its Special Operations Forces said on state television. President Lukashenka insists the buildup is defensive and that Belarus will not be dragged into the war.
Russia has long treated Belarusian soil as a forward base and pressure point—a way to rattle Ukraine's north and NATO's eastern edge without spending its own overstretched army, sustained through drills, troop moves, and nuclear signaling.
The unit is the 37th separate air-assault brigade under Belarus's Special Operations Forces—its fourth such airborne brigade. It will be based near the city of Homiel, just across from Ukraine's Chernihiv Oblast and about 40 km from the frontier. The permanent move to that base is set for 2027. Colonel Aliaksandr Ilyukevich, who commands the Special Operations Forces, laid out the plan on Belarus's Defense Ministry VoenTV channel on 2 August, Militarnyi reported.
By his account, one battalion is already formed, with a second due this year alongside reconnaissance, air-defense, and artillery units. Ilyukevich had first described that battalion back in February on another Belarusian state channel. His August appearance restated it and attached the unit's new 37th designation.
Belarus has never put its own soldiers into Ukraine. It did hand Russia the launchpad for the 2022 drive on Kyiv, though, and it has kept the border militarized ever since—even hosting Russian hardware such as the drone relay stations Kyiv later pressed Minsk to pull.
A standing brigade on the frontier still does not add up to an imminent invasion. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) still judges a Belarusian ground assault very unlikely. However, every new unit in the north ties down Ukrainian troops and air defenses that Kyiv needs elsewhere, and it gifts Russia a threat it can activate without firing a shot—the same hybrid playbook Minsk runs against EU neighbors, funneling migrants toward Latvia.
© Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times
À l’occasion de la Semaine québécoise des marchés publics, le Marché public de Rimouski invite les citoyens qui n’ont jamais visité les installations du parc de la Gare à venir les découvrir et à faire le plein de produits régionaux auprès des exposants.
Voici ceux qui ont confirmé leur présence, ce samedi 1er août :
Pour l’occasion, venez visiter le kiosque d’éveil musical de M Piano et initier vos tout-petits au monde merveilleux de l’art et de la musique.
La bibliothèque de la Ville de Rimouski s’amène aussi au marché avec son BiblioCLub et sa panoplie d’activités sous la thématique de l’enquête et des énigmes du monde qui nous entoure.
Vous aurez également la chance de rencontrer des étudiants de l’Université du Québec à Rimouski qui seront présents pour discuter avec vous non seulement des ponts qui unissent l’alimentation et la chimie, mais également de l’utilisation des algues et le potentiel incroyable de cette ressource dans notre alimentation.
Pour finir, nos amis Les Fruits Partagés se feront le plaisir de vous servir au Café du Marché. Passez voir cet organisme pour qui l’approvisionnement local pour tous n’est plus un secret.
On se voit au marché!
En cette première semaine des vacances de la construction, le Marché Public de Rimouski est l’endroit idéal pour vous arrêter. Que ce soit pour venir profiter de l’ambiance ou pour faire tes réserves avant de partir en chalet ou en camping, le Marché vous attend entre 10h et 14h au parc de la Gare, en ce samedi 25 juillet, tout en vitamine D !
La température parfaite pour faire valoir nos exposants de cette semaine :
En plus d’une foule d’exposants, le Marché public de Rimouski recevra, ce samedi, la visite de la Ruche d’art du Bic, un espace de création collectif situé au cœur du village du Bic.
Ils vous ont préparé un petit atelier de tissage sur carton qui vous permettra de partager, d’apprendre et de « tisser » des liens en famille, entre amis et entre voisins et voisines.
Au Café du Marché, vous aurez la chance de vous entretenir avec La Couverte – Construction Communautaire.
Cette belle coopérative basée à Saint-Anaclet-de-Lessard concentre ses efforts dans l’espoir d’incarner une alternative favorisant l’accès à la propriété dans un contexte de crise du logement et d’une hausse des coûts dans le secteur de la construction.
Une partie du charme du Bas-Saint-Laurent se trouve dans ces petites initiatives innovantes qui font vivre notre région autrement. Venez à leur découverte chaque samedi entre 10 et 14h !
On se voit au marché!
Le 3 février 2025, je rentre du judo et je descends récupérer Oscar à l’eclau. Il aime rester installé sur la plate-forme devant la chatière condamnée: bonne vue sur le jardin, et effluves de l’extérieur.
En arrivant, je suis surprise par un matou gris et blanc de l’autre côté de la vitre. Je le surprends aussi. Il a pas l’air commode: oreilles aplaties, balafré, bajoues de compét’ – et il souffle. “Toi, t’es pas castré, ça c’est sûr!”
J’ai le réflexe de prendre une photo, je récupère Oscar, je laisse quelques croquettes de l’autre côté de la chatière et je braque la caméra de surveillance dessus. Le lendemain, je verrai qu’il a mangé les croquettes.
Les chats errants n’ont pas une belle vie, contrairement à ce que voudrait faire croire le mythe populaire de la liberté et de “la nature“. Les bonnes âmes qui mettent une gamelle dehors ont bonne conscience et sont tout attendries, mais la réalité est une vie de bagarres, de dangers, de kilomètres parcourus poussés par leurs hormones, un risque de maladies plus élevé et évidemment, pas de soins médicaux. Non, il n’y a pas de soins médicaux dans la nature, c’est vrai, et le résultat c’est de la souffrance, encore de la souffrance, des vies qui se terminent misérablement dans les buissons, oui, dans la souffrance.
Il y a quelques années, j’avais tenter d’attirer un des matous errants du quartier, les oreilles déformées par la gale, le pas boiteux vu son âge avançant, pour le castrer. J’ai échoué. Je ne sais pas ce qu’il est devenu. Sans doute mort dans un coin.
Donc quand j’ai vu Juju, j’ai passé à l’action. Quand j’ai vu qu’il revenait, j’ai lancé l’opération “rendez-vous croquettes sur le rebord de la fenêtre”.
J’ai vérifié s’il était pucé, j’ai mis des affiches dans le quartier, j’ai mis des annonces sur internet. J’ai vu que je pouvais le toucher, même s’il avait peur. Une voisine aussi. J’ai préparer le terrain pour qu’on puisse le castrer quand je l’attrapais – vétérinaire, WCs aménagés pour pouvoir l’y enfermer quelques heures le cas échéant. Quand tout était prêt, j’ai attendu que l’opportunité se présente.
Elle s’est présentée le mercredi 26 février 2025, vers midi et demie. Dire que ça s’est bien passé serait mentir. J’ai pu le saisir mais au moment de l’approcher de la cage de transport, il a commencé à se débattre comme un beau diable. Je ne sais pas combien de temps ça a duré, mais j’ai tenu bon et lui aussi. La fenêtre était ouverte, je savais que si je le lâchais, il y avait toutes les chances que l’opportunité ne se représente plus. Lui luttait pour sa vie. A un moment il a failli m’échapper et je l’ai rattrapé par une patte. Il m’a mordue. J’ai réussi à fermer la fenêtre avec le pied et je l’ai laissé filer dans l’espace coworking.
Par chance, il s’était planqué quelque part d’accessible et était plus paralysé de peur que bête sauvage. Après avoir pansé mes doigts, je l’ai attrapé et mis dans les WC. La suite a été moins aventureuse: un peu d’aide pour le choper avec une couverture et mettre le tout dans la grosse grosse cage de transport que j’avais achetée pour les trajets Lausanne-chalet avec Oscar, direction véto, récupération, convalescence, apprivoisement.
Je n’avais pas prévu de le garder. Mon projet était de le remettre dehors, avec abri et gamelle à puce (j’en avais profité pour le faire pucer). J’avais prévu de le relâcher. Une personne de l’immeuble était peut-être intéressée à tenter de l’adopter. On ferait les choses en douceur.
Mais vu comment s’était passée sa capture, je me suis dit qu’il valait mieux le garder quelques jours dedans avant de le laisser filer. Pas dit qu’il revienne, après avoir eu la peur de sa vie. En plus, c’était quand même mieux pour lui après l’intervention.
On me demande régulièrement pourquoi “Julius”. Avant sa capture, j’avais vaguement réfléchi à un nom temporaire pour lui. Oscar était mon premier chat à avoir un “nom d’humain”, et ça m’a un peu inspirée. Je voulais un nom qui colle pour un matou barreur et un peu patibulaire. Victor? Julius? Je n’y ai pas beaucoup pensé, je ne cherchais pas vraiment de nom, j’avais juste pris quelques secondes pour envisager des possibilités, puis je n’y ai plus repensé. En le récupérant chez le vétérinaire, l’assistante me demande “quel nom mettre sur le dossier”. Je suis prise de court, je me souviens de “Julius”, je me dis “bah, s’il est sympa on pourra dire Juju”. Autant vous dire que “Julius” est inusité, même ça reste son “vrai nom”.
Mon projet initial de le remettre dehors a été mis au rebut dès le premier soir. Juju était terré au fond de sa cage de transport, n’en était pas sorti. J’ai tenté une caresse. Sous ma main, j’ai vu se fermer ses yeux, sa posture se détendre, et sa tête se poser. J’ai gratté un peu sous le cou, et il a tendu le menton pour en profiter. Cet instant-là, j’ai décidé que je n’allais pas prendre le risque de le remettre dehors, et qu’il valait la peine de tenter de le resocialiser pour adoption. Surtout que j’avais quelqu’un sur les rangs. Je me suis dit qu’un chat qui se détendait sous les caresses d’une main inconnue après la journée qu’il avait eue, il avait du potentiel.
La tentative d’adoption n’a pas fonctionné. Juju est un nocturne — et aussi, ce que je n’avais pas réalisé à l’époque, il y avait certainement une minette en chaleur dehors, ce qui expliquait les bagarres terribles qui avaient déchiré nos nuits de février, et simplement, la présence de Juju, qui normalement ne venait pas par ici. Le jour, il restait planqué, craintif, prudent. La nuit, l’appel de l’extérieur et probablement des hormones l’amenait à miauler, miauler, miauler, miauler. De plus, après des années d’errance, il y avait quand même pas mal à reconstruire pour qu’il surmonte sa crainte de l’humain. C’est un gros investissement et mine de rien, ça nécessite des compétences en matière de comportement qui ne sont pas toujours simples à acquérir sur le tas.
Je l’ai récupéré, en bas dans ma salle de réunion, ou au moins, s’il passait la nuit à miauler, même si ce n’était pas rigolo pour lui, il n’empêchait personne de dormir.
Je ne prévoyais pas de le garder. J’avais Oscar, et j’avais décidé que tant qu’Oscar était là, je ne prendrais pas de deuxième chat. J’avais aussi décidé qu’après Oscar, je m’octroierais une “pause chat“, après avoir enchaîné des années de soins pour deux très vieux chats. J’ai donc commencé à réfléchir au profil de la maison d’accueil ou de l’adoptant qu’il lui faudrait. Et je suis arrivée à la conclusion, dans un contexte où choisir l’option la moins lourde pour moi était un critère important, que partir du principe que je gardais Juju serait paradoxalement beaucoup plus simple à gérer que de lui chercher un foyer à la hauteur de ses besoins.
Cette décision prise et sa garde organisée, je suis partie au chalet le 17 mars avec Oscar pour profiter de mes vacances tant attendues, les premières depuis bien trop longtemps… Mais ça, c’est une autre histoire 
!
Juju s’est super bien bien adapté. C’est un chat super câlin, super tolérant, qui aime les caresses et les genoux. Il ronronne bien. Il est plutôt bonne pâte. Il me fait penser à Quintus, côté tempérament. Un peu plus craintif. Mais il apprend à faire confiance si on prend le temps de lui montrer qu’il n’a rien à craindre. Ses oreilles aplaties, c’est leur position naturelle. Elles doivent avoir été implantées bizarrement. Comme dit une copine “il est en mode avion”. Elle l’a aussi surnommé “le chavion”.
Il continue à courir le quartier chaque nuit, parfois jusqu’à Prilly Centre et même en-dessous, parfois juste autour du pâté d’immeubles. Son tracker m’a montré que son coeur de territoire n’était certainement pas ici, mais plus au sud. Avec le temps, il va moins par là-bas, et reste plus proche d’ici. Il n’aime pas les trajets en voiture, pas du tout. Il est plutôt chill avec les autres chats, pas dans le genre “je suis le roi” comme Oscar (qui le poursuit sans merci quand il en a l’occasion… Juju a appris qu’il suffisait de s’éloigner un peu vu la vitesse de déplacement de papy), mais si on vient le chercher dans son espace vital, il le défendra. J’ai déjà perdu le compte des abcès et mises sous antibios.
Seule ombre au tableau: il s’est bien enrobé. C’est un euphémisme. J’ai honte, vraiment. Comme dit sa véto “au moins vous êtes pas dans le déni, c’est déjà ça!” Comme je n’ai pas envie d’avoir un nouveau chat diabétique tout de suite (et aussi parce que le diabète n’est pas la seule menace qui pèse sur le chat obèse), on va prendre ça en main plus sérieusement. Il a déjà des croquettes Metabolic, mais cela ne semble pas tout à fait suffisant. Pour marquer le coup, ce matin je lui ai appris à monter sur la balance (merci les Churu).
Allez Juju: bon attrapiversaire!
Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) on July 7 published what it claimed was a Russian army order to increase its military presence at a base in Armenia, two days after HUR's warning of such a move was denied by Yerevan.
HUR first made the claim on July 5, saying Russia was increasing its forces at the Gyumri base to exert greater influence in the South Caucasus and "destabilize the global security situation."
Armenia's Foreign Ministry denied the claim on the same day.
In a post on social media on July 7, HUR published a document which it said was a "order from the commander of the troops of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces on the 'replenishment' of the Russian military base in Armenia."
"The telegram lists a list of measures for the urgent “replenishment” of the units of the Russian unit by selecting personnel from among the servicemen of the 8th, 18th, 49th and 58th combined arms armies of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces," HUR said.
The news comes amid a major deterioration in Russian-Azerbaijani relations after a deadly June 27 operation in Russia's Yekaterinburg, where Russian security forces killed two Azerbaijani nationals and injured several others in a raid linked to a 2001 murder case.
Armenia has had a historically close relationship with Russia but the relations between Yerevan and Moscow have recently deteriorated.
Russia's leverage over both Baku and Yerevan has diminished dramatically since Azerbaijani troops captured Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-controlled region in Azerbaijan, in 2023.
Russian peacekeepers later withdraw from the region, and now Baku and Yerevan are negotiating a permanent peace deal.
Armenia, which has lambasted Moscow for failing to help it during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is drifting closer to the West.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has suspended the country's membership in a Russian-led military alliance and announced plans to join the European Union. Recently there has also been a crackdown on the pro-Russian opposition in Armenia.
The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy
Russian state-funded propaganda media outlet Sputnik will cease operations in Azerbaijan, Russia Today media group CEO Dmitry Kiselyov said on July 3, according to the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti.
"We regret to say that, as of today, the conditions for Sputnik Azerbaijan to continue its activities in this country are not in place," Kiselyov said.
The move comes amid a major deterioration in Russian-Azerbaijani relations.
Kiselyov's comments followed the detention of several Sputnik Azerbaijan employees by Azerbaijani police on June 30. Authorities said two of the detainees were operatives of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), prompting a formal protest from Moscow.
Kiselyov called the charges "far-fetched," saying the staff had worked to "develop cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia." He added that legal action would be taken to defend them.
Sputnik, a key pillar of the Kremlin's global propaganda network, has long been accused by Western governments and media watchdogs of spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives.
These developments follow a deadly June 27 operation in Russia's Yekaterinburg, where Russian security forces killed two Azerbaijani nationals and injured several others in a raid linked to a 2001 murder case.
On June 28, Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry issued a rare public rebuke, calling the operation "ethnically motivated" and part of a "systematic pattern" of unlawful treatment of Azerbaijani nationals in Russia.
The diplomatic rupture deepened further after Azerbaijani authorities arrested eight Russian citizens the next day, presenting them in court handcuffed and visibly injured. They were accused of participating in organized crime, cyberattacks, and drug smuggling from Iran.
The closure of Sputnik's bureau marks a new low in relations between the two former Soviet states, which have seen escalating tensions despite longstanding ties.
The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy
U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg denied on July 1 that he agreed to "work on" halting Ukraine's drone attacks on Russia, contradicting Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko's claim.
Speaking at a state event on Belarus's Independence Day, Lukashenko said he relayed Russian President Vladimir Putin's position to Kellogg during their June 21 meeting in Minsk.
According to Lukashenko, the Russian president is willing to consider a ceasefire in Ukraine if Ukrainian forces stop conducting drone strikes on Russian territory.
"I conveyed this position to the Americans," Lukashenko said on July 1. "We will work on it, said (the U.S. special envoy), in this direction."
Kellogg pushed back on the claim, writing on X that the quote was "taken out of context" and misrepresented the substance of their talks.
"At no point did I make comments related to Ukraine's prosecution of the war outside of a total ceasefire," he said. "In my conversation with Lukashenko, we discussed a full and unconditional ceasefire."
The June meeting between Kellogg and Lukashenko marked the highest-level U.S. visit to Belarus since former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's 2020 trip. Belarusian state media widely portrayed Kellogg's visit as a sign of thawing relations.
Shortly after the talks, Belarus released opposition leader and political prisoner Siarhei Tsikhanouski, who had been jailed since the 2020 presidential election.
Lukashenko has ruled Belarus since 1994 and remains a key ally of the Kremlin. His regime has allowed Russian troops and equipment to use Belarusian territory to attack Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek
Armenian authorities should "seriously" consider banning the broadcast of Russian television channels in Armenia, Armenian Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan said on July 1, citing concerns over interference and deteriorating ties.
"We must very seriously discuss the suspension of the Russian television channel broadcast in the territory of Armenia," Simonyan told reporters, according to Armenpress. He criticized recent content aired by Russian state broadcasters, which the Armenian government has denounced as harmful to bilateral ties.
The remarks come as Armenia continues to pivot away from Moscow's sphere of influence and seeks to bolster ties with the West.
Simonyan suggested that individuals connected to Armenian-Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan may be financing efforts to meddle in Armenia's internal matters.
"If there are channels that allow themselves to interfere in Armenia’s domestic affairs, perhaps we ought to respond likewise, by at least banning their entry into the homes of our society," he said.
Tensions between Armenia and Russia have mounted since Moscow's failure to intervene during Azerbaijan's military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, which resulted in the mass displacement of ethnic Armenians.
In April, Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed a law initiating the country's formal accession process to the European Union.
Though symbolic, the legislation marks a significant political shift, embedding European integration into Armenian law. The bill, passed by parliament in March, was backed by 64 lawmakers and opposed by seven.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has said that EU membership would require a referendum, while the Kremlin warned that joining both the EU and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is "simply impossible." The EAEU, established in 2015, includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan.
The Kyiv IndependentOleksiy Sorokin
Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko announced on July 1 that the Russian-made Oreshnik missile system will be deployed in Belarus by the end of 2025. Speaking at a ceremony marking Independence Day, Lukashenko said the decision was made in coordination with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting in Volgograd.
"The first Oreshnik positions will be in Belarus. You’ve seen how Oreshnik works: the same missiles, the same strikes — but without nuclear warheads, without radioactive contamination of the land and air. This weapon will be stationed in Belarus by the end of the year," Lukashenko said.
Lukashenko, who has ruled since 1994 and claimed victory in a seventh consecutive presidential election in January, argued that hosting such weaponry would not make Belarus a target, adding that such concerns are being "imposed from outside." He claimed that countries possessing nuclear weapons have historically avoided military aggression and said the presence of such systems in Belarus is intended solely as a deterrent.
He also said he had delivered a warning to U.S. officials, stating that while nuclear weapons in Belarus are securely stored in accordance with international standards, any unauthorized incursion into Belarusian territory would trigger a "swift and forceful response."
The Belarusian leader emphasized that any use of the Oreshnik system would not involve nuclear warheads and that maintaining modern military capabilities is critical for national defense.
Russia first launched the experimental Oreshnik missile during a strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro on Nov. 21. Putin claimed the attack was in retaliation for Ukraine's use of U.S. and British long-range missiles against Russian territory.
Although little is publicly known about the missile, defense experts believe Oreshnik is not a wholly new development but likely an upgraded version of Russia’s RS-26 missile, also known as the Rubezh, which was first produced in 2011.
Lukashenko reportedly thanked Moscow for supporting the deployment of advanced weapons systems to Belarus and said the introduction of Oreshnik would serve as a tool for domestic stability. "I’m confident that even those of our supporters who don’t yet understand this will come to realize it — without a war. That’s why Oreshnik will be on Belarusian soil. To prevent uprisings," he said.
The Kyiv IndependentThe Kyiv Independent news desk
Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a Belarusian oppositionist recently released from prison, thanked the U.S. on June 22 for brokering his release and appealed to President Donald Trump to help free other political prisoners in Belarus.
"President Trump now has the power and opportunity to free all political prisoners in Belarus with a single word. And I ask him to do so, to say that word," Tsikhanouski said in Vilnius during his first press conference after the release.
Tsikhanouski, a popular blogger who planned to challenge Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko in the 2020 presidential election, was arrested shortly before the vote and later sentenced to 18 years in prison on politically motivated charges.
The opposition leader and at least 13 other detainees were released from Belarusian prisons on June 21 after Lukashenko met U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, in Minsk.
Speaking at the press conference alongside his wife and opposition leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Tsikhanouski affirmed that both of them "will continue to support Ukraine and call all of the perpetrators accountable."
Tsikhanouski confirmed that he used to do business both in Ukraine and in Russia but refuted allegations of pro-Russian sympathies, affirming his support for Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelensky.
"I believe Crimea is Ukrainian. Zelensky has the hardest fate and a heavy load that no other president has. Zelensky is my hero," Tsikhanouski said.
He also said that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya remains the leader of the Belarusian opposition, and he will not challenge that.
Tsikhanouskaya stepped in as the opposition candidate in 2020 after her husband's arrest, but was forced into exile after Lukashenko declared victory in what was broadly seen as massive election fraud.
"Do you think that anybody who serves in prison automatically becomes a leader? We have 1,200 such leaders," Tsikhanouski added, referring to the number of political prisoners who remain in prison under Lukashenko's regime.
"Belarus can't be free until the Putin regime collapses. If it wasn't for (Russian President Vladimir) Putin, we would not be sitting here; it would have been over (after the Belarus' popular protests against Lukashenko) in 2020-2021," Tsikhanouski said.
Lukashenko, in power since 1994, is a close ally of Putin and has allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory for military operations against Ukraine.
The Belarusian dictator has maintained a tight grip over his country by electoral fraud, surveillance, and brutal crackdown on free press, civil society, and political opposition, prompting Western countries to impose sanctions on Belarus.
The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy
Editor's note: This item has been expanded with additional details.
Belarusian opposition leader and political prisoner Siarhei Tsikhanouski was released on June 21, shortly after dictator Alexander Lukashenko met in Minsk with U.S. President Donald Trump's special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg.
Tsikhanouski , a popular blogger who planned to challenge Lukashenko in the 2020 presidential election, was arrested shortly before the vote and later sentenced to 18 years in prison on politically motivated charges. Amnesty International recognized Tsikhanouski as a prisoner of conscience.
His wife, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, stepped in and became the main opposition candidate against Lukashenko.
At least 13 political detainees, including prominent blogger Ihar Losik, were also released on June 21, Belarusian independent outlet Nasha Niva reported.
The other released prisoners include three Polish citizens, two Latvian citizens, one Estonian citizen, a Swedish citizen, a U.S. citizen, and two Japanese citizens, according to Lukashenko's press secretary.
In a post on social media, Tsikhanouskaya welcomed the news but highlighted that "1,150 political prisoners remain behind bars."
My husband Siarhei is free! It’s hard to describe the joy in my heart.
— Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (@Tsihanouskaya) June 21, 2025
Thank you, 🇺🇸 @POTUS, @SPE_Kellogg, @JohnPCoale, DAS Christopher W. Smith, @StateDept & our 🇪🇺 allies, for all your efforts.
We’re not done. 1150 political prisoners remain behind bars. All must be released. pic.twitter.com/MhngqBHFq3
Kellogg's deputy, John Coale, said the released political prisoners had been transferred to Vilnius and expressed gratitude to the Lithuanian government for facilitating their relocation.
"President Trump's strong leadership led to the release of 14 prisoners from Belarus today. Thanks to the Lithuanian government for its cooperation and assistance — they remain a true friend and ally," Coale wrote on X.
According to official results of the 2020 election, Lukashenko won with 80% of the vote, while Tsikhanouskaya received just 10%. Evidence indicates that the election was heavily rigged, and Tsikhanouskaya could have realistically won the vote.
As a result, hundreds of thousands took to the streets in Belarus in 2020 to demand a fair election. Thousands were arrested, and many were beaten and tortured. At least seven demonstrators were killed during the protests.
Minsk has faced repeated Western sanctions since the brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests.
Lukashenko, in power since 1994, is a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and has allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory for military operations against Ukraine.
"You have caused quite a stir in the world with your arrival," Lukashenko told Kellogg during their meeting at the Palace of Independence, according to state-run outlet Belta.
"But I wonder why. Can't we have a normal dialogue and talk about our affairs – about relations between Belarus and the United States of America?"
Kellogg is the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Belarus in recent years, following former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's 2020 trip under Trump's first term.
Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Lukashenko's regime has played a key logistical role in supporting Moscow's campaign, offering its territory for troop deployments and weapons stockpiles.
The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy
Latvia's parliament adopted a bill on June 19 that prohibits citizens of Russia and Belarus from purchasing real estate in the country, Latvian media reported.
The bill — which carves out exceptions for EU and Latvian permanent residence holders, Belarusian refugees, and repatriates — establishes the new restrictions under the pretenses of protecting the country's national security.
In addition to citizens, the bill prohibits entities that are at least 25% owned by Russian or Belarusian nationals from purchasing property.
"This is a step to limit the influence and presence in Latvia of persons and companies that are adverse to the country,” said Agnese Krasta, an Estonian member of parliament and one of the authors of the initiative.
Latvia, which borders both Russia and Estonia, is widely viewed as one of the most likely targets for a future Russian attack on NATO or the European Union. As the war in Ukraine continues to rage on, Latvia has taken action to increase civil preparedness measures and has drafted plans to relocate a quarter of its population in the case of war.
EU intelligence and security agencies have warned of mounting Russian sabotage operations, including several arson attacks believed to have been coordinated by Moscow.
Latvia joins Finland in imposing a ban on Russians from buying, as Baltic and Nordic countries continue to impose restrictions on Russia over its aggression in the region.
In September 2022, Latvia imposed entry restrictions on Russian citizens as part of a joint agreement with Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland.
Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, Latvia has been one of Ukraine's most vocal backers.
The Baltic state ranks among Europe's top defense spenders, allocating over 3% of GDP to defense in 2025, according to NATO estimates.
The Kyiv IndependentDmytro Basmat
U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg will meet Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in the coming days, Reuters reported on June 17, citing four sources familiar with the matter.
Kellogg will meet Lukashenko in a visit to Belarus as peace talks to bring an end to Russia's war against Ukraine remain inconclusive, Reuters reported.
In February, U.S. Deputy Assistant State Secretary Christopher W. Smith visited Belarus alongside two other U.S. officials to conduct a prisoner swap in a similar unannounced visit.
Lukashenko has been in power since 1994 and has been accused of staging fraudulent elections in Belarus. The leader declared a seventh consecutive presidential election victory in January.
Kellogg has given the impression that the meeting could help reinitiate largely unsuccessful peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, two sources told Reuters.
Lukashenko is seen as a key ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin as Russia faces isolation in response to its full-scale war against Ukraine.
The White House has discussed ways to weaken Russia's influence on Minsk and bring Belarus closer to the United States, one of the sources said.
On Feb. 12, Smith drove to Belarus from Lithuania following a phone call with Lukashenko. The small U.S. delegation visited a border town where three political prisoners were transferred, including one U.S. citizen and two Belarusian citizens, the New York Times reported.
Lukashenko assured he was ready to decrease repression in Belarus, Smith said, adding that the U.S. wants Belarus to be less reliant on Russia.
Belarus has faced Western sanctions following a presidential election in 2020 that international observers condemned as fraudulent. The sham election garnered mass protests that rejected the results.
Minsk refused to invite a mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to observe the country's Jan. 26 presidential election.
Belarus further isolated itself from the West as it supports Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine.
The Kyiv IndependentKateryna Denisova
An uninsured Russian Aframax-class tanker has been illegally conducting ship-to-ship oil transfers in international waters near Greece and Cyprus since July 2024, Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) reported on June 16.
According to the agency, the vessel, operating without Western insurance, is part of Russia's expanding shadow fleet used to bypass G7 and EU sanctions on Russian oil exports.
HUR said such transfers "pose an environmental threat, allow the aggressor to conceal the origin of oil, evade international control, and ensure its supply to third countries in circumvention of sanctions."
Ukraine has identified the tanker as IMO 9247443 and listed it on the War&Sanctions platform, along with 159 other tankers allegedly belonging to Russia's shadow fleet and 55 captains involved in sanction-busting operations.
Despite price caps and Western restrictions, Russia continues to profit from oil and gas exports, which remain a vital revenue source. According to HUR estimates, roughly one-third of those profits are expected to fund Russia's war against Ukraine in 2025.
In May, the EU approved its 17th sanctions package, targeting nearly 200 shadow fleet vessels. The U.S. Treasury had earlier sanctioned over 180 tankers, which together accounted for nearly half of Russia's offshore oil shipments.
While the Biden administration ramped up pressure on Russia's oil trade early in 2024, U.S. President Donald Trump has since declined to impose new sanctions, despite Moscow's continued refusal to agree to a ceasefire.
The Kyiv IndependentAbbey Fenbert
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Europe must begin preparing for a gradual reduction in U.S. military support for both the continent and Ukraine, Tagesschau reported on June 13.
"Yes, that's right. That would be so, and we have to deal with that," Pistorius told journalists in response to a question about the U.S. potentially scaling down its support. He noted that the discussions focus on a reduction in U.S. backing rather than a full halt.
The comments come after U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that Washington would reduce the assistance allocated to Ukraine in the next year's federal budget.
"We now have to look at how much support drops and whether Europeans can compensate for it," Pistorius added.
While the U.S. has been Ukraine's leading military backer under former President Joe Biden, the Trump administration has yet to approve any aid packages and has become increasingly disengaged from peace talks.
Pistorius's comments come amid increasing uncertainty in transatlantic relations. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker confirmed on May 16 that the United States plans to begin discussions with European allies later this year about reducing its military presence on the continent.
Speaking at a security conference in Estonia, Whitaker said the talks would begin after the NATO summit in The Hague in June.
"Nothing has been determined," Whitaker said, according to Reuters. "But as soon as we do, we are going to have these conversations in the structure of NATO."
Whitaker emphasized that any drawdown would be closely coordinated to avoid creating security gaps. Still, he reiterated U.S. President Donald Trump's position that long-standing U.S. efforts to reduce its European military footprint must now be implemented.
"This is going to be orderly, but we are not going to have any more patience for foot-dragging in this situation," he said.
In February, Hegseth reportedly told NATO allies that "stark strategic realities" prevent the United States from being primarily focused on Europe's security. Leaks reported by the Atlantic in March revealed that both Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance privately criticized European defense spending, with Hegseth allegedly expressing his "loathing of European free-loading."
Trump called on NATO member states to increase defense spending up to 5% of GDP. Ahead of the upcoming NATO summit in The Hague on June 24–25, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that member states will have agreed to a new goal of increasing defense spending.
"We are headed for a summit in six weeks in which virtually every member of NATO will be at or above 2%, but more importantly, many of them will be over 4%, and all will have agreed on a goal of reaching 5% over the next decade," Rubio told Fox News on May 15.
Such a move would mark a historic shift, with NATO partners collectively accounting for more than half of the alliance's military capacity, according to Rubio.
Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, NATO members have significantly increased their defense spending, with countries like Poland and the Baltic nations aiming to reach the 5% target in the coming years.
The Kyiv IndependentKateryna Hodunova
Editor's note: This story has been updated to include Germany's announcement to supply Ukraine with $2.2 billion in additional military aid.
Germany will deliver new IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine under a three-year supply plan, President Volodymyr Zelensky said during a joint press conference with German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who added Berlin has no plans to provide Taurus long-range missiles.
The announcement comes amid escalating Russian aerial assaults, including a June 10 missile and drone strike on Kyiv, one of the largest since the start of the full-scale invasion.
"We are grateful for the supply of IRIS-T air defense systems," Zelensky said on June 12. "We understand that deliveries are currently being planned... for the next three years. This is very important assistance."
The IRIS-T is a German-made medium-range surface-to-air missile system capable of intercepting drones, aircraft, and cruise missiles.
Pistorius confirmed the delivery timeline but firmly ruled out the possibility of sending Taurus missiles — weapons Kyiv has repeatedly requested to strike deep into Russian territory.
"You asked me whether we are considering this, and my answer is no," Pistorius said.
Before taking office, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz signaled openness to lifting former Chancellor Olaf Scholz's ban on the missiles. That stance has not yet resulted in a policy shift.
Ukraine has already received long-range missiles — including ATACMS from the U.S. and Storm Shadow and SCALP from the U.K. and France. Initially restricted to use within Ukrainian territory, Western allies only began easing those limitations in late 2024.
Germany is Ukraine's largest military donor in Europe. Pistorius said that Berlin will provide 9 billion euros ($10.4 billion) in aid this year, with investments in defense production being considered. The total includes an additional commitment in military aid worth 1.9 billion euros ($2.2 billion).
"Today, we discussed that this aid will continue," he said. "We agreed on additional investments in production... both in Ukraine and in Germany."
Zelensky visited Berlin on May 28 for talks with Merz, part of an ongoing effort to bolster Ukraine's defense industry amid uncertainty over U.S. support under President Donald Trump.
The Kyiv IndependentKollen Post
The Council of the EU on June 12 approved fresh tariffs on fertilizers and remaining agricultural goods from Russia and Belarus, aiming to reduce Russian export revenues.
The measures target those goods that have not yet been subject to additional customs duties and will enter into force on July 1. The tariffs on fertilizers will increase gradually over the next three years.
The step comes as the EU readies additional sanctions against Russia as it continues to wage its all-out war against Ukraine.
"Polish Presidency motto is 'Security, Europe!' and these measures increase our economic security by reducing dependencies from Russia," said Michal Baranowski, the trade undersecretary at the Polish Economy Ministry.
"We are further reducing Russia’s export revenues and therefore its ability to finance its brutal war. This is united Europe at its best," he said in a statement.
The new tariffs will apply to goods that made up around 15% of all agricultural imports from Russia in 2023. Fertilizer tariffs will focus on certain nitrogen-based products, the Council said in a statement.
Russian fertilizers accounted for more than a quarter of all of the EU's imports in this sector in 2023, worth almost $1.5 billion.
Apart from stifling Russia's trade revenue, the step also aims to reduce the EU's dependence on Russian and Belarusian goods, protect European farmers, and diversify the supply.
The EU adopted higher tariffs on cereals, oilseeds, and some other products from Russia and Belarus in May 2024. Earlier this year, the European Commission proposed imposing similar measures on all remaining agricultural products from the two countries.
The Kyiv IndependentKate Tsurkan
Il n’a jamais été simple de parler du Bélarus en France sans tomber dans le cliché. La formulation « dernière dictature d’Europe » a encore été reprise par les médias aujourd’hui pour évoquer le scrutin présidentiel qui s’est tenu dimanche, et j’en veux un peu aux journalistes pour cette paresse intellectuelle.
« Dernière dictature d’Europe » était une formule confortable pour se rassurer sur le processus de démocratisation qui aurait été en voie de généralisation sur le continent européen; certes, à des vitesses variables, mais quand-même quasiment certain. Le Bélarus faisait alors office d’épouvantail et de dernier bastion d’un monde en cours de disparition. Cela empêchait de voir les dynamiques réelles sur place (et de s’interroger par exemple sur la manière dont la stabilité, les politiques sociales et le progrès économique pouvaient atrophier la sensibilité politique). Cela faisait aussi du bien à l’égo européen.
Nous n’en sommes plus là aujourd’hui, bien évidemment, et dans un contexte de montée d’attractivité des autoritarismes, le Belarus est plutôt un cas d’école qui devrait attirer notre attention. Dire que l’élection présidentielle qui vient de s’écouler était un simulacre, c’est à la fois vrai et stérile, parce que c’est une manière de dire « point, à la ligne, on passe à autre chose » qui neutralise toute volonté de compréhension.
Malheureusement, la guerre conduite par la Russie contre l’Ukraine m’a empêché d’être suffisamment vigilante sur le Bélarus pour livrer une analyse approfondie. Ce que je dis est à prendre avec des pincettes; ce sont des pistes à creuser.
Un régime politique autoritaire fonctionne grâce à un certain dosage de coercition et d’adhésion; il doit non seulement mettre en place une répression suffisamment forte pour bloquer les oppositions, mais aussi distribuer suffisamment de bénéfices pour susciter l’adhésion. Plus le ratio est en faveur des bénéfices, plus le pouvoir est stable; plus il penche du côté répressif, plus le régime est fragile. Pendant longtemps, le régime politique du Belarus s’est attaché à distribuer beaucoup de bénéfices à la population, notamment à travers des politiques sociales, des politiques de développement et une promesse de stabilité et de prévisibilité. Les Bélarusses vivaient – économiquement – plutôt mieux que beaucoup de leurs voisins, et en avaient conscience. Le prix politique à payer apparaissait donc comme acceptable.
Evidemment, le soutien de la Russie était et reste l’exosquelette du régime bélarusse, aussi bien d’un point de vue politique qu’économique.
Les protestations massives de 2020 étaient intervenues dans le contexte d’une certaine fragilisation du modèle, et notamment d’une perception du régime comme moins protecteur, mais aussi en décalage avec les demandes de la société. Les répressions violentes qui ont suivi et qui se sont maintenues tout au long des années suivantes ont fait basculer le ratio répression/bénéfices en faveur de la répression. Cette période violente va compter dans l’histoire politique bélarusse: on ne le perçoit pas encore, mais elle a donné naissance à une expérience différente, moins marginale de l’opposition politique, de la répression et de la prison. Elle a aussi permis de structurer une opposition à l’étranger et de lui donner des canaux de prise de parole. Derrière les apparences de « il ne se passe rien », le Belarus est en réalité bien plus prêt qu’en 2020 à entamer une transition politique, avec une nouvelle génération de citoyens jetés avec violence dans la politique.
Cependant, et paradoxalement, c’est la guerre en Ukraine qui a redonné de la stabilité au régime bélarusse. En effet, dans un contexte où la Russie essaie de toutes ses forces de faire du Bélarus un cobelligérant, il y a des choses que Loukachenko a réussi à protéger. Certes, des unités armées russes et des complexes d’armement sont désormais basés au Belarus, qui sert de base aux attaques contre l’Ukraine. Cependant, aucune unité armée bélarusse ne combat aux côtés de la Russie contre l’Ukraine. Pensez au paradoxe: des soldats nord-coréens, mais pas de soldats bélarusses, alors que le pays se déclare être le plus proche allié de la Russie. Le territoire du Bélarus reste un territoire en paix. Cela, les citoyens savent qu’ils le doivent en partie à Loukachenko… mais aussi en partie aux Ukrainiens qui ne désespèrent pas de retourner les Bélarusses contre Moscou, et qui ne les perçoivent pas de la même manière que les Russes.
La politique menée par Loukachenko vis-à-vis de la Russie a été caractérisée par un de mes anciens collègues bélarusses par la formule suivante: « on dit oui à tout, puis on bureaucratise au maximum le processus pour finalement ne rien faire ». C’est aussi une stratégie que les Bélarusses appliquent au quotidien vis-à-vis de leur Etat. Il y a une certaine résilience stratégique de la société bélarusse qu’on ferait bien de souligner. Ne nous laissons pas tromper par cette apparence de calme plat: le Bélarus n’est pas la Russie et suivra une dynamique qui lui sera propre.
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