Ukraine is stitching together a layered answer to Russia's faster, jet-powered Shahed drones, leaning on electronic jamming, fighter jets, and a new class of homegrown interceptors, RBC-Ukraine reported. Each tool has limits, and the new interceptors still bring down only the occasional jet drone. The bottleneck now is money and factory output, not ideas.

Russia is pouring faster jet-powered drones into the air war as winter nears, a campaign Western analysts say is meant to wear Ukraine's defenses down—and holding those skies now turns on which side can keep out-producing the other's cheap weapons.

Fighter jets help, but they run on imported rounds

Electronic jamming can work against some of the drones, and Ukraine is also sending combat aircraft up after them. But aviation has a catch: the jets need air-to-air missiles and cannon rounds, and for the F-16 and Mirage those are imported and not always in stock. Flying over Kyiv adds danger to the civilians below and to the pilots, so Ukraine would rather catch the drones out on the approaches.

New interceptors are landing hits—just not enough

The newest piece is a wave of Ukrainian interceptor drones built to chase the jet versions, which fly three times faster than the propeller Shaheds. Ukrainian crews have been downing the jet Gerans in a recent run: on 19 September, presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov, known as Flash, confirmed one Geran-5 shot down, and in late September, operators of the National Guard's Separate Artillery Brigade brought down a Geran-4 with the Bullet interceptor made by General Cherry, the first Geran-4 that drone has downed, Ukraine's National Association of Defense Industries said. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said several prototypes have proven themselves in combat.

Across all methods, Ukraine now intercepts about 57% of the jet drones Russia launches, Zelenskyy said on 28 September—a rate that has climbed but still trails the 90%-plus it manages against slower Shaheds. Kills by the new interceptors specifically remain isolated. In August, Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said jet drones can make up as much as two-thirds of the drones in some raids—though not every time. One promising route is reworking Ukraine's own long-range strike drones into interceptors. Kyiv is in talks with partners over the money; on 28 September, Ukraine's Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara asked the EU to help finance the interceptors so enough reach the front quickly.

Hitting the launch sites and jamming the controls

Ukrainian forces strike the Russian airfields the jet drones launch from, RBC-Ukraine's sources said, though the raids have not forced Russia to abandon the attacks. On 20 August, military intelligence hit drone storage and launch sites at Primorsko-Akhtarsk, one of the launch bases RBC names, and at occupied Donetsk airfield. Ukraine also keeps going after the Belarusian relay towers Russia strings into a mesh network to steer the drones in, RBC's sources said.

Ukraine's air defenders now have purpose-built interceptors for Russia's jet-powered attack drones—weapons whose speed and altitude make them difficult for conventional defenses to catch, Militarnyi reported. A crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Regiment downed a Geran-5 over Chernihiv Oblast with a newly delivered interceptor, according to the Serhiy Prytula Foundation.

Russia's long-range drone and missile attacks have become central to its effort to wear down Ukraine's air defenses and grid before winter, and the war in the sky now turns on which side scales its answer faster.

The Chernihiv intercept

The crew, callsign Yastrub (Hawk), made its first successful engagement with the new interceptor, hitting the jet drone at 425 km/h and above 3 km, the foundation said, releasing footage of the strike. The Prytula Foundation supplied the interceptors and said it has contracted several manufacturers to counter the jet threat.

"Our task is to scale this up and strengthen units," it said.

Why it kept slipping through

Russia first used the Geran-5 in January 2026. HUR's own specifications put its warhead at 90 kg, cruise speed at 450–600 km/h, and range at 950 km, with a ceiling of 6 km. That mix of jet speed and high altitude kept it clear of machine guns, shoulder-fired missiles, and the cheap interceptors built to swat slower piston-engine Shaheds.

Ukraine's military intelligence estimates Russian plants now turn out around 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month, according to HUR. A monitoring Telegram channel, Polkovnyk HSh, reports a newer variant that steers by ground imagery instead of satellites, which would blunt jamming—though HUR has not confirmed it and lists no such system among the drone's components. Separately, Russia moved the jet engine inside the fuselage, a change aimed at more speed and range.

Where the fight stands

Ukraine intercepts about 55% of Russia's jet drones, against more than 90% of the older models, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 26 September. Since the start of September, Russia had launched more than 2,730 jet drones, and Ukraine had downed or suppressed more than 1,500, he added. Zelenskyy also said Russia plans to spend $12 billion in 2027 on jet drones and loitering munitions alone. Ukraine already has several interceptor prototypes in combat use, and the 1020th crew's kill is one of several jet Geran intercepts Ukrainian units and drone makers have logged this month.

Russia is likely attempting to force Ukraine to capitulate by spring 2027 through a large-scale campaign of long-range strikes, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said in its 27 September report. Russian President Vladimir Putin's new theory of victory relies heavily on the mass use of jet-powered drones and ballistic missiles against Ukraine, the institute assesses.

Russia keeps shifting to faster jet-powered drones that Ukraine's defenses struggle to stop, forcing it to spend scarce missiles on them. Russia's use of jet-powered drones rose eightfold from June to August, with Moscow launching around 7,700 such drones since their initial deployment, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said on 23 September. But Putin likely does not expect the campaign to last indefinitely, and he may hold off on a new mobilization until he sees whether the strikes work, ISW assesses.

Putin's modified theory of victory

Putin's modified theory of victory largely depends on Russia's ability to mass-launch cheap jet-powered Gerans that get through Ukrainian defenses often enough, the institute notes.

Even a Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger claimed on 27 September that the Russian strategy, which relies heavily on long-range strikes, is costly and cannot continue indefinitely, not least because Ukraine is hitting Russia harder too, according to the analysis.

At the same time, Putin stated on 25 September that Ukraine "must feel" Russia's "retaliatory" strikes. ISW assesses that this suggests he intends to intensify Russia's strike campaign in winter, as he has in previous winters.

If Putin is counting on Ukraine to break and capitulate this winter, he may be ignoring what the campaign will cost Russia over time, the institute notes. This strategy also counts on Ukraine's shortage of Patriot interceptors against ballistic missiles, and on the country's power grid and other vital systems giving way under months of strikes.

Until that approach runs out, Putin is unlikely to back down on his demands or agree to real ceasefire talks, ISW assesses.

Ukrainian interceptors could disrupt Russia's plan

A Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger claimed on 27 September that Russian forces launched predominantly jet-powered Geran-5 drones at Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv during the night of 26–27 September. According to the blogger, Russia's diverse arsenal of strike weapons and Ukraine's shortage of air defense assets allow Russian forces to maintain the current pace of strikes and expand the range of targets, ISW writes in its analysis.

At the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 26 September that Ukraine's interception rate for jet-powered Shahed drones currently stands at 55%. Of more than 2,730 such drones Russia had launched in September by then, Ukrainian forces had downed or suppressed more than 1,500, he added.

Ukraine is testing interceptor drone prototypes in combat conditions, Ukrainian Presidential Office head Kyrylo Budanov told Novyny.LIVE on 27 September. The mass deployment of interceptors capable of shooting down jet-powered Gerans could begin within several months, he added. Ukrainian companies have already successfully tested several interceptor drones capable of intercepting Russian jet-powered drones in field conditions, the institute notes.

At the same time, it remains unclear whether Ukraine will be able to scale up its interceptor program quickly enough and achieve sufficient success to disrupt the intensification of Russia's campaign during the winter, ISW notes.

Why Putin may hold off on a new mobilization

Expanding Russia's arsenal of strike weapons is cheaper than carrying out a second mobilization economically, militarily, and socially, a Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger cited by the institute claimed.

Putin may put off large-scale forced mobilization until he sees whether the strikes deliver, ISW assesses, though his officials have been laying the groundwork for it despite Kremlin denials. Still, the need to replace Russia's enormous battlefield losses could push him to order such a mobilization as early as this fall, ISW notes, as Ukrainian and other sources have repeatedly reported he is preparing to do.

Ukraine's defense forces intercepted 55% of Russia's jet-propelled drones in September—more than 1,500 out of over 2,730 launched—Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his 26 September evening address.

Russia's full-scale aerial campaign has shifted from propeller-driven Shaheds Ukraine learned to shoot down at over 90% to jet-propelled models that fly faster, resist jamming, and often slip past existing defenses.

55% and climbing

Zelenskyy said military intelligence had briefed him on Russian weapons production—not just jet Shaheds but other technological systems. The documents detail what Moscow is preparing for next year: the volumes and the financing. "We are preparing our countermeasures, and for every line item there must be a Ukrainian answer," he said.

Several effective interceptor prototypes are already in combat.

"Interceptors have been identified that can become the main tool of our defense. Production, components—all of this we are scaling up. There will be an answer," Zelenskyy said.

The goal is to match the interception rate for regular propeller-driven Shaheds, which exceeds 90%. At 55%, the jet-drone rate is climbing but still leaves nearly half reaching their targets.

$12 billion for one category

Russia plans to spend $12 billion in 2027 on jet drones and loitering munitions alone, Zelenskyy said. "This concerns not only Ukraine and not only us," he added, warning that multiple intelligence agencies have information Russia wants to expand its war to other countries and regions.

He said this is why Ukraine is pushing for stronger sanctions and the Drone Deal format. Ukraine has signed 11 such agreements, the latest with Finland at the UN General Assembly this week, and is preparing a 12th with what Zelenskyy called "a strong country."

The warning came as Russia struck a Kyiv data center twice on the morning of 27 September, injuring three people including two children, Zelenskyy wrote. Overnight strikes killed three people in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and one man in Kyiv.

In total this week, Russia launched more than 2,200 strike drones, roughly 1,650 aerial bombs, and 38 missiles—a significant share of them ballistic—at Ukraine, he said.

Jet drones are now Russia's main aerial weapon

Russia's jet-propelled Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones have become the dominant threat in Russia's aerial campaign against Ukrainian cities. By August, production of jet Geran-4/5 models exceeded that of propeller-driven Geran-2s, according to Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR). Russian factories produce roughly 3,000 jet models per month alongside about 2,800 of the older type. The Geran-5 is technically a drone but functions as a small cruise missile—faster, harder to jam, and increasingly guided by AI and mesh networking that complicate interception.

Ukraine's answer has been interceptor drones—cheap, fast enough to chase a Geran, and guided by machine vision. A Ukrainian interceptor recently scored its first kills against jet Gerans and is heading into mass production, though a presidential adviser warned that speed alone cannot catch them—machine vision and automatic guidance decide the chase.