Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya denied reports that Moscow could launch another mass mobilization after September’s parliamentary elections, saying none was planned or expected “as far as I know,” The Moscow Times reported

Russia has avoided another draft since its 2022 mobilization triggered protests and an exodus, relying instead on contract soldiers. Ukraine says those recruits no longer replace battlefield losses, and Moscow may mobilize several hundred thousand people after the elections. That could replenish its forces and support new offensives, although Ukrainian intelligence sees no preparations now.

Nebenzya’s remarks followed a question about more than 20,000 people crossing Russia’s Verkhny Lars border checkpoint into Georgia in one day amid fears of post-election mobilization, Meduza reported.

His comments extend a series of Russian denials. Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev dismissed reports of another mobilization as “nonsense” in late July. The State Duma’s defense committee said a mass compulsory call-up was not under consideration because the army was recruiting contract soldiers, The Moscow Times reported.

Russia has avoided another mass draft since its September 2022 mobilization triggered protests and an exodus. Officials had also denied that mobilization was planned shortly before President Vladimir Putin announced it, Meduza noted.

Russian government seeks new wartime penalties

Moscow is separately seeking penalties for people and companies that ignore mobilization and military-supply orders issued by regional authorities. The bill would not itself order a new call-up.

The government submitted it to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, on 20 August, The Moscow Times reported. Companies could face fines of up to 1 million rubles or suspension for up to 90 days.

Russian law already punishes such defiance in areas under martial law but imposes no nationwide penalty elsewhere in Russia, according to the bill. Its authors said a “significant number” of violations had been recorded.

Ukraine says a new draft could provide troops for a northern offensive

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 August, citing Ukrainian military intelligence, that Russia planned to mobilize several hundred thousand people after the elections and roughly the same number in 2027.

HUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, later assessed that a post-election mobilization could enable Russia to build a strike force for a northern offensive by February 2027. Its deputy chief, Vadym Skibitskyi, stressed, however, that the agency currently sees no evidence that such preparations have begun.

Now held in a POW camp in western Ukraine, Anton does not consider himself a traitor. He calls Putin “my President” and said he joined Russia’s army to defend “my land,” the BBC reported.

The BBC interviews show what more than a decade of Russian rule has produced in occupied Donbas. Moscow has replaced Ukrainian schools, media, and public institutions while presenting the occupied regions as permanent parts of Russia. It also recruits residents or forces them to fight against Ukraine.

The BBC said prisoners could refuse and were interviewed without guards or cameras.

Almost all its Ukrainian-born interviewees from territories occupied since 2014 said they had enlisted willingly. Anton said he was not a traitor and called Vladimir Putin “my President.”

His friends also volunteered. Messages announcing their deaths followed: “Dead, dead, dead.”

Forced conscription of Ukrainians in occupied territory

One prisoner from Donetsk Oblast told the BBC he had been forced to fight. He wanted only to return to his wife and children.

The BBC cited an official intelligence-based estimate that Russia forcibly conscripted more than 50,000 Ukrainians in occupied areas. It noted that other estimates were higher.

Ukrainian veteran Pavlo Pshenychnyi told Hromadske that occupation authorities used planted drug evidence to push him into Russia’s army. They threatened him with up to 12 years in prison.

Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits occupying powers from compelling protected residents to serve in their armed forces.

Anton and the Russification of occupied Ukrainian territory

Russia took control of Anton’s home while he was still in primary school. By adulthood, he called himself Russian and dismissed his Ukrainian surname as irrelevant.

Putin’s 2025 policy decree set a 95% target for “all-Russian civic identity” by 2036 and ordered the integration of occupied Ukrainian regions into Russian education, culture, and media.

Kherson-based outlet MOST reported that Russia will introduce compulsory textbooks on 1 September, presenting four occupied Ukrainian regions as historically Russian.

Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation reported in 2025 that more than 100 teenagers from occupied Luhansk attended a Russian military camp. They received firearms, drill, and guard-duty training.

The center described the camp as part of a wider effort to spread Russian war propaganda and hostility toward Ukraine.

Petro Yatsenko of Ukraine’s POW Coordination Headquarters told the BBC that these prisoners were strongly pro-Russian. He said their national identity was “very blurred.”

Ukraine still considers them Ukrainian and treats Russia’s control of their home regions as temporary, the BBC noted.

Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) sees no battlefield signs that Russia is preparing for a ceasefire, deputy chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi said in an interview with RBC-Ukraine on 18 August 2026. The agency expects no peace agreement before the end of 2026.

Russia’s General Staff plans to capture the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by year-end, Skibitskyi said. Meanwhile, HUR estimates that Russian personnel losses exceeded contract recruitment in June and July, leaving Moscow unable to create new military formations without mobilization.

HUR estimates Russia lost more troops than it recruited in both June and July. Losses exceeded new contract personnel by 3,000 in June and by at least 1,000 in July, leaving recruitment unable to replace battlefield losses. The agency says Russia’s operational reserve is only about one-tenth the size of the part already engaged in combat against Ukraine.

Russia has set a 2026 target of recruiting 409,000 personnel. Without mobilization, however, Moscow cannot create new formations or turn existing brigades into divisions because it lacks personnel, Skibitskyi said. The recruitment plan for Russia’s unmanned-systems forces is only 30% complete, and the command is trying to fill the gap with personnel from other military branches, he added.

If Russia mobilizes after its September parliamentary elections, it could assemble a powerful strike group by around February 2027, according to HUR. Skibitskyi did not rule out its use for a northern offensive. At present, however, HUR sees no conditions, indicators, or troops for such an operation.

Russia previously targeted September for Donbas

In April, Skibitskyi told the Financial Times that Moscow aimed to capture all of Donbas by September, after missing its deadlines to take Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. Russia was transferring 20,000 troops from strategic reserves to sustain the offensive, although this amounted to less than one month's worth of its battlefield losses.

By early August, DeepState reported 36 square kilometers of additional Russian-controlled territory across Ukraine in July, a figure that included map corrections for May and June. Without those corrections, Russia gained about 88 square kilometers.

DeepState reported limited progress near Rodynske and Kostiantynivka and toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the heart of Ukraine’s “fortress belt.” At that pace, Russia had “no chance” of capturing all of Donetsk Oblast even by 2027, the group said. It cautioned that another wave of mobilization or a wider deployment of North Korean troops could change the forecast.

486 Africans recruited into Russia’s armed forces are dead, while Ukraine is holding 35 citizens from 17 African countries as prisoners of war, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne in findings published on 16 August 2026. Its overall tally rose only slightly from May, climbing from 2,965 recruits from 36 countries to at least 2,982 from 37.

Russia’s recruitment in Africa is part of a broader effort to enlist foreigners for its war. A joint human-rights investigation found that Russia had recruited at least 27,000 people from more than 130 countries since 2022. The system helps Moscow replenish its forces while shifting battlefield risk onto foreigners, many of whom are drawn in by financial pressure, deception, or coercion.

The largest groups of recruits came from Kenya, Egypt, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Algeria, and Mali, the ministry told Suspilne.

Russia’s wider recruitment pipeline in Africa

Russian security services use a “broad arsenal of manipulative methods,” the Ukrainian MFA said. Recruiters promise civilian jobs, education, high salaries, Russian citizenship, or migration benefits. In many cases, foreigners must sign Russian-language military contracts under threat of deportation or imprisonment.

The FIDH–Truth Hounds–KIBHR report found recruiters using social media and intermediaries to advertise civilian jobs. Of 16 foreign POWs interviewed, 13 said they had been promised they would not fight. Most reached combat positions within weeks.

The human toll on African recruits

Kenyan engineer Francis told journalist Dmytro Karpenko, who interviews prisoners captured while fighting for Russia, that he thought he had accepted a security job. In Russia, he received a military uniform instead. After two weeks of training, he reached the front and was captured.

Nigerian recruits Hamzat Kazeen Kolawole and Mbah Stephen Udoka died in an assault after receiving little or no training, Ukrainian military intelligence said. Botswana reported “heartbreaking calls” from its citizens describing “perilous conditions” at the front.

Ukraine’s response to Russia's recruitment campaign

Ukraine’s diplomatic missions regularly inform African officials about the recruitment of their citizens and run awareness campaigns, according to the ministry.

The MFA and Ukraine’s POW Coordination Headquarters also launched Stop Russian Recruiters, a website that explains recruitment methods, shares victims’ accounts, advises people at risk and their families, and accepts reports about recruiters.

A 12-year-old with a high fever died without medical care in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast, Hola Prystan official in exile Svitlana Linnyk told Ukrinform on 13 August 2026.

No medicine or medical worker was available locally, and the child’s mother could not reach an ambulance pickup point, she said.

The child's reported death comes amid a wider humanitarian crisis in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast. UN and OSCE monitors found drone attacks, mines, and movement restrictions obstructing medical aid and evacuations around Oleshky and Hola Prystan, two occupied communities across the Dnipro from Kherson city. About 6,000 civilians, including 200 children, remained in and around the two communities as of May. Similar medical shortages span occupied Ukraine, while access to free medicines has been tied to having a Russian passport.

The Hola Prystan community where the child died has no operating hospital or rural medical post, Linnyk said. Only two pharmacies remain: one in the city of Hola Prystan and another in the nearby village of Nova Zburivka. Both are selling their remaining supplies.

The nearest hospital is in Skadovsk, an occupied Black Sea port about 60 kilometers by road from Hola Prystan. Nova Zburivka’s ambulance has not operated since 2025. 

Russian occupation authorities have distributed no humanitarian aid for at least eight months to villages surrounding Hola Prystan, or for over a year in the city itself, Linnyk said. 

Linnyk said a Moscow Patriarchate priest occasionally brought supplies but gave them only to Russian passport holders. This reflects a broader pattern of tying basic services in occupied Ukraine to accepting Russian citizenship.

Ukrainian children face a medical system stripped bare 

The medical dangers surrounding the 12-year-old’s death are not confined to Hola Prystan.

In April 2025, Ukraine’s National Resistance Center reported that occupation officials were administering vaccines to children under six in Luhansk Oblast. It described the vaccines as uncertified and of unknown origin.

That November, the Center said a Russian inspection found Crimea’s main children’s hospital lacked breathing bags and cardiac monitors. It said infant mortality on the occupied peninsula had risen 9% over the previous year.

Aid comes with a Russian passport

Hola Prystan is not the only occupied community where access to care has depended on Russian citizenship.

In 2023, Russian-installed officials in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast threatened to deny medical care to residents without Russian passports. A 2025 Kremlin policy later tied free medicines for chronic illnesses to Russian citizenship.

Ukraine’s Health Ministry reported in July 2024 that Russian forces had destroyed 214 medical facilities. It said the full toll remained unknown because authorities had limited access to occupied territories. 

About 16,000 foreign volunteers from at least 72 countries serve in Ukraine's Defense Forces, Military Ombudsman Olha Reshetylova said. Reshetylova said nearly 40% are citizens of Latin American countries.

The figures show the scale of foreign volunteers' participation in Ukraine's military as Russia's invasion strains Ukraine's manpower. Reshetylova's office monitors their rights and uses complaints to identify recurring problems.

Reshetylova announced the figures during a 4 August meeting of the heads of Ukraine's foreign diplomatic missions.

"Ukraine values [foreign service members'] contribution and understands their responsibility to uphold their rights," she said.

Since 27 January 2026, her office has received more than 300 requests from foreign service members, their relatives, and authorized representatives—requests concerning pay, benefits, supplies, combatant status, medical care, and early contract termination. The office has proposed legal changes in response.

Reshetylova did not explain how the figure of 16,000 was calculated. In February 2026, a Ukrainian Ground Forces official said that more than 10,000 foreigners had served or were serving in Ground Forces units.

That cumulative figure covered a narrower part of Ukraine's Defense Forces and is not directly comparable with Reshetylova's estimate.

Foreign recruits bring combat experience and specialist skills

The International Legion, the main destination of most foreign volunteers, draws members from more than 50 countries. Its members include veterans of the war against ISIS, career soldiers, medics, and newcomers motivated by duty, adventure, experience, or personal loss. 

On the front line, Colombian veterans have played a significant role in aiding Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, bringing military and police experience gained fighting drug cartels and rebels in Colombia.

Some foreign service members also contribute specialist skills beyond infantry combat. British bomb-disposal expert Christopher "Swampy" Garrett cleared mines and trained more than 2,000 Ukrainian troops, police officers, and international volunteers.

Garrett was killed on 6 May 2025 while dismantling a Russian explosive device in Izium. 

Contracts, captivity, and the human cost

Beyond the battlefield, foreign service members can face contract disputes in Ukraine, prosecution at home, or imprisonment by Russia.

Finnish volunteer Leo Åland struggled to end his six-month contract. He was killed in combat after serving in Ukraine's military for just over four months.

In December 2025, a Swiss court convicted Avi M. of serving in Ukraine's military. Swiss law prohibits citizens from joining foreign armed forces.

Russia has prosecuted captured foreign members of Ukraine's military as mercenaries rather than treating them as prisoners of war. A Russian court sentenced British fighter James Scott Rees Anderson to 19 years following his capture in Kursk Oblast.

My name is Darina,” says an elfin teen, ponytail pulled through the back of her cap, and “next year I’ll be earning 150,000 rubles (nearly $2,000) a month.” Darina works at what she calls “the world’s largest drone factory,” helping to assemble versions of the Iranian Shahed drone. “My parents are proud of me. Wanna do the same?” She asks as she advertises a polytechnic in Tatarstan. The Russian government, in the face of war and looming demographic disaster, has been relaxing child labor laws since 2022, making it easier to put 14-year-olds to work. Now, legislators are open about the need to reform “outdated” restrictions on employing minors in industries that were “considered dangerous 20 years ago.” Drone production is not the only part of the war effort to which teenagers are being recruited. This month in a “content camp” in Moscow, soldiers and state media propagandists trained 120-plus teens on how to make videos, use AI, and grow their audiences as aspiring influencers. Vladislav Golovin, a former soldier and a leader of Russia’s Young Army Cadets National Movement, said the program had “created a huge team of kids who understand how to broadcast government values.” 

But many young people, subject to year-round conscription, subject to internet shut downs and subject to surveillance, have little desire to spread propaganda. Instead, according to Google Trends data, growing numbers of Russians are seeking information on how to emigrate. A new exodus would accelerate Russia’s deep demographic crisis. Already, up to a million people are thought to have left Russia since the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to one recent count, nearly 210,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in the war with Ukraine, with other estimates suggesting over 1.2 million casualties, including 325,000 deaths. And Russian fertility rates are the lowest they have been for 200 years. Anton Kotyakov, the labor minister, has told Vladimir Putin that the country faces a labor shortage of 11 million people by 2030.

So concerning is this crisis that Rosstat, the national statistics agency, has stopped publishing monthly demographic data. State officials and local governors have been told to compete to come up with the most innovative solutions to a seemingly intractable problem. The pressure on Russian officials and the Kremlin is leading to desperate measures, including guidance from the Russian health ministry that women who say they do not want to have children should be referred to a psychologist. Nothing the Russian state has tried has worked, from financial incentives (extended even to schoolgirls under 18) to banning advertising that supposedly promotes “child-free” lifestyles and so-called “LGBTQ propaganda.”   

Alongside “anti-woke” policies disguised as family values, is rising xenophobia and anti-immigrant rhetoric that has led to a marked decline in the number of foreigners living in Russia. The Kremlin’s anti-migrant policies include a new system to monitor migrant workers through biometric registration, location tracking, and intensified police oversight. The Russian parliament is currently debating enhancing the number of offences that can be punished by deportation or substantially increased fines. Much of it is targeted at Russia’s Central Asian migrants who make up an overwhelming majority of immigrant labor. Some Central Asian governments, notably Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have now urged their citizens to think twice about going to Russia for work. 

Russia has been publicizing political stunts such as its “shared values visa” in which applicants from 46, largely developed, nations are given temporary residence permits if they profess to support “traditional Russian values.” The visa, the Kremlin has said, is “Russia’s response to what it perceives as the harmful effects of Western neoliberal policies.” But only a tiny fraction of the immigrants Russia needs will be Westerners who apply for such a visa; instead, Russia has been diversifying its pool of migrant workers by looking further east. Around 72,000 work permits were issued to Indian nationals in 2025, up from just 5,000 in 2021. Russian officials have signaled they are ready to accept “unlimited” numbers of workers from South Asian countries like India, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar.

While the Kremlin is looking to South Asia and Africa to address its immediate need for workers (and soldiers), the ambition in the longer term is to boost Russian birthr rates, despite the signal failure of ongoing attempts. 

In the U.S., there have been several moves borrowed from the Kremlin’s playbook, including the restriction of abortion, the attempt to deny women birth control, and even alarm at the fall in teen pregnancies. But data released this month showed that women in the U.S. gave birth to 710,000 fewer babies in 2025 than they did in 2007, a reflection of two decades of steadily dropping birth rates. Russian demographer Salavat Abylkalikov, at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Germany, says “if the birth rate has fallen below the level of simple reproduction, it is almost impossible to raise it back.” Especially when financial incentives cover just a fraction of childcare costs. 

In any case, Abylkalikov says, “in Russia, death is much more profitable than birth: in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, the government provides around 1,000,000 rubles (about $12,000) for each child, but if one person goes to war and dies, the family receives up to 12 million rubles in total. That's more than $120,000. This is the economy of death.” The evidence, from countries like Russia, Hungary and the U.S., is that appeals to tradition, to religion and to female “responsibility” do not work, when support for families is limited. And while migration is an obvious fix to demographic questions everywhere, it’s politically toxic.

Russia knows it is hurtling towards demographic doom but can do little to halt the momentum. Its policies are riddled with inconsistencies — a strong line in anti-migration rhetoric and bullying, while being forced to import workers and soldiers from Asia and Africa; a patriarchal view of women’s roles, mostly confined to the domestic, while increasingly reliant on women to take the jobs of the men who are fighting and dying in Putin's war; and encouraging more women to give birth, while employing children to build drones. With family values like these, no wonder young Russians are hesitant to procreate.

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Someone recently asked me what mark out of 10 I’d give for the efforts of governments to tackle financial crime. It got me thinking about that one bright spot of recent times — the West’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago — and how it is now looking. Back in 2022, a lot of us were pleasantly surprised by the speed and ambition with which Western governments sanctioned the Russian government, state-owned companies and wealthy individuals. While Western pressure did not prevent the war, the asset freezes did impose a real cost on those conducting it. Four years on, however, those sanctions are beginning to look a bit shopsoiled. If they began at 7/10, they’re now scoring a lot lower.

There are reasons for this: Donald Trump does not appear particularly interested in Ukraine; the now former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has been snarling things up; and so on, as laid out in this analysis from Tom Keatinge. To make things worse, Trump’s latest adventure in Iran has pushed the oil prices sharply higher, earning more money for Russia while also giving Trump cover to lift sanctions, a temporary measure he has recently extended.

Keatinge argues that European countries need to be far more focussed on going after Russia’s payment mechanisms, particularly digital. “The extent to which crypto activity supports Russia’s war effort is clear,” he writes, “yet repeated initiatives to elevate the importance of opening a concerted line of effort on this issue are ignored. This must change.”

I agree, though it won’t be easy, considering the diffuse crypto ecosystem, and the increasing sophistication of Russian involvement in it. As long as Telegram is willing to host markets, the markets will continue to function to some extent whatever Western countries do (see the story of Xinbi, a Chinese-language hub for illicit crypto.) However, it does look like someone somewhere has lost patience with the ease with which Russia is funding itself.

“The sanctioned Russia-linked cryptoasset exchange Grinex announced an immediate suspension of its operations, citing a ‘large-scale cyberattack,’” reports Elliptic. According to the statement, which Kyrgyzstan-registered Grinex posted on Telegram, it lost around $13 million worth of USDT in the hack, blaming the theft on Western intelligence agencies.

“Today the attempts to destabilise our fatherland’s financial sector hit a new level, with the direct theft of the assets of Russian citizens and companies with the involvement of complex cyberattacks,” the statement said. Grinex is the successor to Garantex, which was shut down just over a year ago after years of effort by Western law enforcement. I would be surprised if Western countries had decided to take direct action against Grinex, as the exchange claims they did. Westerners tend to be a bit too legalistic for this kind of smash-and-grab, and I would expect any operation to more closely resemble what worked a year ago, conducted with Tether’s cooperation.

Instead, I suspect this attack is the work of hacktivists, perhaps working for or with the Ukrainians. Whatever the answer, it is embarrassing for the Russians, shows their crypto-security is not impregnable, and has made a noticeable dent in trading volumes of the A7A5 ruble-denominated stablecoin, which has become a key sanctions evasion tool. Three birds with one stone.

The important point is that sanctions were never supposed to be permanent: they are a foreign policy tool, not a law enforcement one. Hundreds of billions of Russian-owned dollars are languishing in various frozen bank accounts, and Western countries need to start thinking about what to do with them. They can confiscate them, investigate them or — if they’re feeling brave — use their potential return as leverage to persuade wealthy Russians to break with the Kremlin. What they shouldn’t do is leave them as they are to gather dust.

Hopefully, now that Orbán is out of the way, European countries will be able to take firmer collective action but they also need to be imaginative, and to start behaving as if they actually want Ukraine to win, rather than just not lose.

A defeat for transparency 

Of course, the United States will have a lot to say about that too, and what it ends up saying about how to tackle the Russian crypto operations will depend on what happens in the midterm elections this year. So, it strikes me as a big deal that crypto firms are once more pouring tens of millions of dollars into campaign vehicles in their quest for, what they euphemistically refer to as, “regulatory clarity.” Among them, of course, is Tether.

If you’re wondering quite how it’s possible to spend that much money on elections, I draw your attention once more to the great Integrity Index, with its records for who’s been spending what. It boggles my mind that, for example, the three Democratic rivals to the Republicans’ Susan Collins for the Maine Senate seat have raised more than $17 million just for the primary. Collins herself has raised over $10.5 million. There really shouldn’t be that much money in politics.

Besides, when it comes to value for money, investing in court cases beats investing in politics every day of the week. I don’t know how much the (ironically) anonymous plaintiffs in the 2022 case against corporate transparency in Luxembourg paid their lawyers, but its effects just seem to keep compounding to the benefit of those who want to hide their wealth from society. 

The European Union’s retreat from revealing the ownership of shell companies has given cover for Britain’s tax havens as they resisted efforts from London to force them to open up their own corporate registries. It looks like those efforts may have finally failed. “We are committed to full transparency, but I don’t think there will be any turning back,” said the British Virgin Islands’ Junior Minister for Financial Services Lorna Smith in comments confirming that the islands are in fact very much not committed to full transparency.

A version of this story was published in this week’s Oligarchy newsletter. Sign up here.

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