The robots Ukraine wants to throw into its deadliest fights should cost as little as $10,000 each, Mykhailo Fedorov says. The former defense minister has set out the first stage of his Army of Robots: cheap, simple humanoid-like machines that would take over an infantry's most dangerous jobs, with tens of thousands needed, he said on Telegram, citing his own interview with Forbes.

On 26 September, Fedorov, who continues to work on military tech reforms despite his sudden and unexpected dismissal, announced the creation of the Army of Robots.

Humanoid robots would carry ammunition and pull out the wounded, lay and clear minefields, scout, hold positions, and strike, taking the roles that today cost soldiers their lives.

Potential need amounts to thousands

"Our main goal is to save lives. A human should not take risks where a machine can do the job," Fedorov says.

At the first stage, it will not be a classic humanoid but a simpler humanoid-like robot that can be produced quickly and scaled up, he adds.

Such a machine should perform some of an infantryman's tasks directly on the battlefield.

Today, such platforms cost $40–70 thousand on average. For mass use in war, Ukraine needs something much cheaper: the target is $10–20 thousand per unit, he believes.

"The potential need is tens of thousands of such machines," Fedorov continues.

Next come prototypes

The former defense minister adds that he and his team are already working with teams that have ready-made MVPs and are designing solutions.

"Next come prototypes, simulations, model training, and finding the right combination of hardware and software," he explains.

The Army of Robots is not a single product but an ecosystem that will unite companies, startups, engineers, R&D, and capital around the robotization of the front.

"Our task is to get from prototype to mass product as quickly as possible," he adds.

Ukraine has cracked the riddle of strange metal "whiskers" that appeared on Russian jet-powered drones striking Kyiv, and they don't appear to be some clever new sensor. They are a simple mechanical detonator, a metal tube, and a rod that, on impact, closes a circuit to set off the warhead, Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, presidential adviser, says, ending online guessing about the strange devices.

Photos of Russian drones with long metal prongs jutting from the nose had set off speculation about what they were for. The answer, Flash explains, is low-tech: when the prong hits something, the contact closes, and the charge goes off, with no sensors or electronics.

That simplicity sits against a more worrying trend: Russia is steadily upgrading what its drones carry, from the mix of warheads on the jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 to a new charge designed to sever power pylons.

A contact closes the circuit

"It's all mechanically simple, no sensors or complex detectors," Flash says, commenting on the "whiskers".

It is the kind of crude, cheap fuze that suits a weapon meant to be built and spent in the thousands, where cost matters more than finesse.

Russia upgrades the warheads

Russia's jet drones, now built at roughly 3,000 a month, have become the dominant threat in its nightly campaign. The day when Flash published his "whiskers" post, Russia hit Kyiv with another round of drone strikes, hitting a school, a café, and warehouse buildings across the capital. The children inside the school were in its shelter. Fires broke out across two districts, and one person in the city was wounded.

On 28 September, Russia struck Kyiv's Academy of Sciences, which has a century-old history.

On the same day, Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesperson, said Ukraine must "pay a price" for its actions in recent months and calls Russia's intensified strikes "part of this price."

Russia hit Kyiv with another round of drone strikes from the evening of 30 September into the morning of 1 October, striking a school, a café, and warehouse buildings across the capital, the city's mayor and emergency services said. The children inside the school were in its shelter and came through unharmed. Fires broke out across two districts, and one person in the city was wounded.

Children across Ukraine now start the school year in bomb shelters, as Russian drones, missiles, and glide bombs keep hitting schools, homes, and hospitals far from the front—part of a civilian toll the UN says has already outrun all of last year's.

A school full of children, all in the shelter

A Russian drone hit a school in Kyiv's Solomianskyi district on the morning of 1 October and started a fire, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said, adding that the children were in the shelter. More than 100 students and about 60 staff were sheltering inside, and none were hurt, police said. The jet-powered drone damaged the building's facade at third-floor level, RBC-Ukraine reported.

A café and warehouses among the sites hit

On the evening of 30 September, a Russian strike started a fire at a café on the ground floor of a residential building in Solomianskyi, while warehouse buildings burned in the northern Obolonskyi district. One person was injured in the warehouse fire and handed to medics, RBC-Ukraine reported.

42 sites damaged across Kyiv Oblast

Across Kyiv Oblast, Russian attacks over the previous 24 hours damaged 42 sites and injured six people, regional authorities reported.

Kyiv is now under Russian air attack daily. On 28 September, Russian drones hit the city center in daylight, including the National Academy of Sciences, and earlier waves struck filling stations and other everyday sites across the capital.

Russian glide bombs that struck central Sumy on 29 September damaged a 19th-century church, the city cemetery around it, and a bronze statue of Christ, NV reported, citing the diocesan outlet Pravoslavna Sumshchyna. The same strike hit a school and nearby homes. Russia kept up its attacks across Ukraine over the following night and day.

Russia continues its terror campaign against Ukrainian civilians, and churches are among its routine targets, from a church its incendiary drone burned to the ground in Donetsk Oblast to one its drone damaged in western Ukraine's Lviv. Its strikes keep landing in city centers where people live, study, and pray, as when a drone hit Kyiv's Academy of Sciences in broad daylight.

The church near the epicenter

Russia struck Sumy with four guided aerial bombs. The blast damaged the Church of Saints Peter and Paul, a national-level architectural monument that stood near the epicenter. The church belongs to the Sumy Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

Almost the entire building was damaged, said the rector, Archpriest Mykola Holyk. The blast wave knocked out windows and broke nearly every pane.

Plaster fell and the ceiling collapsed in several places. It tore out doors and wooden fittings, knocked some icons from their places, and holed the roof in many spots. Large and small fragments of the bomb pitted the walls.

Local patrons paid to build the church between 1843 and 1851, in the late classicist style.

A cut across Christ's chest

In front of the church stands a bronze statue of Christ, placed in the late 19th century on the grave of Dmytro Sukhanov, a merchant and former mayor of Sumy. Bomb fragments left a cut across the statue's chest. The statue is a local landmark of monumental art, the outlet Tsukr noted. The strike also damaged about 50 graves in the Central City Cemetery beside the church.

"The godless enemy continues to kill civilians, endanger children, and destroy schools, homes, hospitals, churches, and cemeteries," the diocese said.

The same attack hit a school where students were sheltering, and a residential area where two people were killed and six injured, three of them children. In September, Russian strikes on Kyiv also damaged two churches belonging to the same Moscow-linked church, the Exaltation of the Cross on Podil and the Pokrova Church on Priorka.

Another day of Russian strikes

Overnight on 1 October, Russia launched 107 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine, 63 of them jet-powered, the Air Force said. Air defenses downed or suppressed 87, and drones hit 11 locations. In Sumy, a guided bomb hit private homes, injuring two women and damaging about six houses, city military administration head Serhii Kryvosheienko reported. On the morning of 30 September, a Russian strike set a shopping center in Sumy Oblast's Romny district on fire, and crews fought the blaze until late that night, the State Emergency Service said. In Kyiv on the morning of 1 October, a drone hit a school in the Solomianskyi district while children sheltered inside, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said. More than 100 students and about 60 staff were in the shelter, and no one was hurt, police said. A warehouse fire in Kyiv's Obolon district injured one person.

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Over the past 24 hours, Russian mortar fire killed two men in Sumy Oblast's Seredyna-Buda hromada, and 15 people were injured across the oblast, the regional administration reported. A morning drone attack killed a 50-year-old man in Mykolaiv Oblast, and drones killed a 44-year-old man in Nikopol district, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. In Kherson Oblast, Russian attacks killed one person and injured four. Eight people were hurt in Kharkiv Oblast, six in Kyiv Oblast, five in Donetsk Oblast, and three in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, according to regional authorities.

A Russian air force Tupolev Tu-95 Bear bomber crashed on takeoff, apparently from Ukrainka air base in Amur Oblast in Russia's Far East. The Russian defense ministry said the plane was on a training flight without munitions and blamed a technical fault. The crash, while reportedly accidental, is still a win of sorts for Ukraine. Every bomber the Russians lose is a bomber they can't immediately replace—and sortie for missile strikes on Ukrainian cities.

The problem for Ukraine is that Russia still has bombers to spare. It'll take more than a few crashes or drone raids on Russian bomber bases to cut into Russia's capacity to bombard Ukraine.

That's why Ukraine needs missile-armed fighters, ground-based self-propelled guns, speedy interceptor drones, and long-range surface-to-air missiles such as American-made Patriots, among other air defenses. The Ukrainians can't prevent missile attacks by destroying bombers or waiting for bombers to crash; they need to shoot down missiles as they near their targets.

A security camera on the ground recorded a large aircraft plunging toward the ground in Amur Oblast on Tuesday night. Video from the crash site confirmed it was one of the Russians' four-engine, propeller-driven Tu-95s, aging workhorses in Russia's escalating campaign of missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities.

The crash killed six crew and left one survivor injured, according to Russian state media. It is the first Tu-95 to go down in 11 years, Defense Express notes, and the first known non-combat loss of the type since the full-scale invasion.

It's potentially the 11th Tu-95 Russia has lost since widening its war on Ukraine in February 2022. Ukrainian drones caught two Bears on the ground at Engels-2 air base in Saratov Oblast in July and August. On 1 June 2025, Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb—coordinated strikes on Russian bomber bases by more than 100 small drones smuggled across Russia in trucks—destroyed as many as four Bears at Olenya air base on the Kola Peninsula and another four at Belaya air base in Irkutsk Oblast.

Now the Russian air force may be down to somewhere between 36 and 44 working Tu-95s, depending on the count, the youngest of which rolled out of the factory in the 1990s. That matters because the Tu-95 is, like the jet-propelled Tupolev Tu-22M bomber, out of production. Vendors have gone out of business. The skilled workers who assembled the types retired decades ago.

While the Russians can still build one or two Tupolev Tu-160 jet bombers every year, slowly growing a fleet that currently stands at around 18 active planes, that's far too few new bombers to replace combat losses as the wider war grinds through its 56th month.

Slow attrition

The Russians have also lost at least nine Tu-22Ms, and possibly far more: Defense Express estimates losses at up to 70% of the combat-ready fleet since 2022. All told, Russia's bomber force has shrunk to around 105 planes since the wider war began, or fewer.

Equally problematically for the Russians, the old Tu-95s and Tu-22Ms that carry out the majority of air-launched cruise missile strikes on Ukraine are wearing out from heavy use; not all are available for front-line use as more airframes spend more time in deep maintenance.

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But a Tu-95 carries as many as eight Kh-101 cruise missiles at a time; a Tu-22M carries up to three Kh-22s or Kh-32s. A Russian drone and missile strike might include just a dozen or so air-launched cruise missiles launched by a handful of bombers. A raid on 8 September involved just four Tu-95s and two Tu-160s.

The Russians don't need 105 bombers to sustain six-bomber raids once or twice a week, even as those bombers suffer more and more wear and tear. Ukraine would have to take out a lot more Russian bombers, and fast, to put a dent in Russian strikes.

Unless and until that unlikelihood happens, Ukraine will still need to defeat Russian raids inside Ukraine—by shooting down hundreds of incoming drones and missiles at a time. But that's getting harder as the Russians deploy faster jet-propelled Geran drones and more ground-launched Iskander missiles, combining them with the bomber-launched missiles in complex packages that routinely overwhelm ammunition-starved Ukrainian air defenses.

Residents who have recently escaped Russian-occupied Oleshky describe being subjected to threats, intimidation, and exploitation by Russian soldiers, according to the head of the Oleshky City Military Administration.

Oleshky is facing severe shortages of food, water, and medicine, with around 1,500 civilians, including up to 50 children, still trapped in the Russian-occupied city with no safe way out.

Tetiana Hasanenko told Ukrinform on September 29 that people escaping the city on foot were severely weakened and had lost up to 15 kilograms. She said those who managed to leave described not only hunger, but also abuse by Russian troops.

“They were really fleeing from hunger and from abuse,” Hasanenko told Ukrinform.

Russian troops threaten residents for food and alcohol

According to Hasanenko, Russian soldiers are entering residents’ homes, taking them over, and forcing the civilians living there to feed them despite having little food themselves.

“They move in and demand that people feed them and give them alcohol,” she said, adding that some of the soldiers appeared to be drug or alcohol users.

She described one family’s account in which a Russian soldier allegedly locked them in a shower while in an apparently intoxicated state and threatened to throw a grenade at them.

Another woman reportedly told Ukrainian officials that a Russian soldier threatened to kill her because the homemade wine she gave him was sour.

“They move in and demand to eat and drink,” Hasanenko said.

Residents face hunger and mines

The accounts come as Oleshky in Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast faces a severe humanitarian crisis. Ukrainian authorities say around 1,500 people remain in the occupied city, including up to 50 children, with residents lacking reliable access to food and water.

Those trying to escape face minefields around the city. Hasanenko said some residents have attempted to leave on foot and that there are people who have failed to return after entering mined areas.

She said one family tried to return because children had been left behind at home but never made it back.

Recent escapees have reportedly lost 10–15 kilograms, with some leaving only after becoming severely weakened by hunger.

Russian troops accused of using civilians as cover

Hasanenko also said Russian soldiers are deliberately living in civilian homes to protect themselves.

By occupying homes and remaining among local residents, she said, Russian troops are effectively using civilians as a “human shield” because they fear for their own safety.

Ukraine has been seeking an organized evacuation of civilians from Oleshky and has said the International Committee of the Red Cross is prepared to participate if Russia agrees to the necessary arrangements. Russia has not confirmed its readiness to allow such an evacuation.

A former Wagner fighter captured by Ukraine has described alleged training sessions in Mali where Russian mercenaries used African prisoners as live subjects, deliberately inflicting severe injuries so recruits could practice battlefield medicine and killing.

Training built around real victims

The fighter told Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Karpenko that Wagner instructors brought captured Africans to training sessions and turned them into human practice targets.

“We gathered for medical training, and they brought in a captured terrorist. They tied a block of TNT to his leg. They set it off, everyone moved away, and of course his leg was blown off,” he said.

The recruits then practiced stopping the resulting bleeding. According to the fighter, the prisoner was later shot in the artery near his armpit so they could practice the same procedure on his arm.

The prisoner died after the training.

In another session, he said, instructors had a prisoner's leg chopped off with an ax so recruits could practice applying a tourniquet under realistic conditions.

“They cut off his leg. Then they put on the tourniquet – everything as if it were an extreme situation, so everything would be realistic,” he said.

‘Here, strike the heart’

The alleged exercises also included training in how to kill.

The fighter said another prisoner was drugged before recruits were taught how to kill someone with a knife.

“They showed us how to kill with a knife to the heart. They chose two people who were willing and said: ‘Here, strike the heart,’” he said.

The fighter said all three prisoners died during the exercises.

From Mali to Ukraine

The testimony comes from a Russian mercenary who joined Wagner in 2023 and was sent to Mali that September via Syria. He said around 120–130 recruits traveled with him and that Wagner paid them $3,000 a month.

Wagner was a Russian paramilitary formation that operated as a deniable arm of the Kremlin in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. After Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in 2023, the group's independent role was largely dismantled, with many of its fighters and operations brought under Russian state control. Its African operations were increasingly taken over by Russia's state-run Africa Corps.

The mercenary remained in Mali until April 2024. After returning to Russia, he signed a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry in August 2025 and was assigned to the 14th Separate Special Forces Brigade, which is subordinate to Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU.

He was subsequently captured by Ukrainian forces.

A record of alleged abuses

The account has not been independently verified, but it adds to years of allegations of serious abuses by Wagner and other Russian personnel in Africa.

Wagner fighters have long faced allegations of abuses in Africa, including killings and violence against civilians. In Mali, the group became a key part of Russia’s military presence after the country’s military junta turned to Moscow for support, with Wagner fighters operating alongside Malian forces. Ukrainian intelligence has also documented and targeted Wagner’s activities in Africa.

The pattern of alleged abuses has continued under Russia’s Africa Corps, the Kremlin-controlled force that replaced Wagner in Mali. Human Rights Watch reported in August 2026 that Africa Corps fighters summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, beat dozens of others, and burned and looted homes in central Mali. In June, the group also carried out airstrikes that killed eight civilians, including three children.

Bulgaria gave Ukraine 110 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers. They are 1960s vehicles, too thinly armored to carry infantry anywhere near a front line patrolled by explosive drones. So Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps found another use for them during Operation Vivaldi, its counteroffensive north of Lyman. Fill one with anti-tank mines, rig it for remote control, drive it at a Russian bunker, and set it off.

Packing potentially dozens of TM-62 anti-tank mines, the speedy BTR-60s become what's called vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, or VBIEDs. Once a favorite weapon of insurgents battling US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, VBIEDs have found a new niche in Russia's wider war on Ukraine as unmanned demolition systems.

"To break through the enemy's defenses, the 3rd Army Corps employed its own invention, Soviet BTR-60s converted into robotic kamikaze complexes," the corps stated. "They were used to demolish the enemy's strongest fortifications." If an enemy strongpoint is too heavily protected to bomb from the air but exposed to attack from the ground, send in a VBIED.

The Russians were the first to deploy vehicular IEDs in the current war, but the Ukrainians may have mastered the tactic. It's one thing to rig an explosives-filled MT-LB tractor or T-55 tank to roll straight forward without direct human control, as the Russians once did. It's another to rig an explosive BTR-60 to maneuver before going off, as the 3rd Army Corps' VBIEDs clearly did.

On 28 September, announcing the close of Vivaldi's third phase, the 3rd Army Corps released drone footage depicting one of the explosive BTRs blasting a Russian strongpoint north of the town of Lyman. The sheer scale of the explosion is testimony to the VBIED's destructive potential. And the trail the BTR leaves in the grass in the heavily edited video indicates the Ukrainians can steer their VBIEDs around obstacles and guide them to precision strikes.

Why it gets there

A slow wheeled vehicle crossing open ground toward a fortified position should not survive the trip. In most sectors it would not. What makes the tactic work north of Lyman is a condition the 3rd Army Corps built into Vivaldi before its assault groups moved: Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare threw a protective dome over the battle area, blinding Russian drones so they could not read the operation's design or strike what was moving through it.

Robots have played critical roles in each phase of Vivaldi. Surveillance drones have watched from overhead. One-way attack drones have pummeled Russian positions and supply lines. Heavy bomber drones have not only dropped bombs, they've also airlifted explosive unmanned ground vehicles into position so the UGVs can roll right through the front doors of Russian bunkers.

The self-exploding BTR-60s are too big to airlift, but that's the point. A small UGV might carry a few tens of kilograms of explosives. A remote-controlled BTR-60 can easily haul hundreds of kilograms.

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The arithmetic

It's not impossible to take out a VBIED before it strikes, of course. Mines, anti-tank missiles, and even concentrated gunfire can stop a vehicular bomb in its tracks. But losing one of the aged BTR-60s costs Ukraine very little. The vehicles are too thinly armored for use as front-line infantry transports anyway. You might as well convert them into bombs.

That is the whole case for the tactic. A manned fighter jet lobbing a precision glide bomb is the preferred approach to bunker-busting. But it costs tens of thousands of dollars an hour to keep a jet in the air, and a single glide bomb can cost tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's unclear how much it costs to convert a BTR into a VBIED. It could be just a few thousand.

And it reduces Russian fortifications without risking any Ukrainian lives. That's the philosophy underpinning all of the 3rd Army Corps' robot-first tactics. "This is exactly the direction of the corps' development set by Brig. Gen. Andrii Biletskyi," the corps stated, "to reduce the number of fighters in the most dangerous areas and replace them with robots."

Vivaldi began in mid-April under an information blackout that held for five months. The corps says it has regained control of 176 sq km across three of a planned four phases, around half of that de-occupied outright, and taken more than 250 Russian prisoners. Those figures are the corps' own and have not been independently verified.

Sometimes the robots doing that work are 60-year-old APCs modified for an explosive one-way mission.

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Russia plans to sharply increase military spending in 2027 while expanding the authorized size of its armed forces, according to budget documents seen by Reuters and a report by Novaya Gazeta Europe.

The developments point to Moscow preparing to expand its war effort into next year, even as its battlefield gains remain limited and its campaign increasingly relies on missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. It is also doing so as the Russian government faces a widening budget deficit and falling projected oil and gas revenues.

Russia plans 27% increase in 2027 defense spending despite widening budget deficit

Russia plans to spend 17.1 trillion rubles ($202.6 billion) on defense in 2027, according to government documents reviewed by Reuters. That is about 27% more than the 13.5 trillion rubles originally budgeted for defense in 2027 and would be the highest level of military spending since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The documents project total defense spending of 50 trillion rubles over the next three years. The actual amount Russia will spend on defense in 2026 is classified, Reuters reported, while some military-related spending can be recorded under other parts of the state budget.

The planned increase comes alongside worsening fiscal pressures. Russia has raised its forecast for the 2026 budget deficit to 3.2% of GDP, from an earlier estimate of 1.6%, according to Reuters. Overall government spending is expected to rise 13.2% this year to 48.6 trillion rubles, or 20.9% of GDP.

The government also expects to increase net borrowing by 26% in 2026 to 5 trillion rubles and withdraw 459 billion rubles from its National Wealth Fund, Reuters reported. Its forecast for 2026 oil and gas revenues has been cut to 7.6 trillion rubles from 8.9 trillion.

Russia is reportedly planning new tax increases for 2027 to help cover the growing deficit. A new windfall tax on metals and mining companies is expected to bring in about 200 billion rubles a year, according to the documents. State debt is projected to rise to 21.7% of GDP in 2027, above the 20% level Russian authorities have previously considered safe.

The draft budget is expected to be submitted to Russia's parliament by October 1.

Army staffing also reaches new high

At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin has again increased the authorized size of the country's armed forces.

Putin signed a decree raising the official staffing level of the Russian Armed Forces to 2.44 million people, including 1.55 million military personnel, Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on September 28. The increase is 15,500 personnel compared with the previous decree issued in August.

It is the fourth increase in the authorized size of the Russian military in 2026 and the seventh since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to Novaya Gazeta Europe. Before the invasion, the authorized force stood at 1.90 million people, including 1.01 million military personnel.

Russia shifts more of the war into the air

The increases in military staffing and spending come as Russia continues to pursue its maximalist war aims despite limited battlefield progress. The Institute for the Study of War assessed on September 27 that Russia's frontline has remained largely static in recent months and that the Kremlin is increasingly relying on long-range missile and drone strikes as part of its effort to force Ukraine to capitulate during the winter of 2026–27.

ISW assessed that Putin may be trying to make Ukraine's infrastructure and air defense capacity buckle under sustained Russian strikes rather than relying solely on further territorial gains. The institute also said the Kremlin may delay a large-scale mobilization while it assesses whether its expanded long-range strike campaign can achieve its objectives.

The planned increase in military spending and the repeated expansion of the armed forces show that Moscow is preparing to sustain and expand its war effort into 2027, even as its forces make limited territorial gains in Ukraine.

Ukraine likely neutralized Russia's drone defenses north of Lyman before sending armor into the third phase of its Vivaldi counteroffensive, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed. An intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and electronic warfare paved the way, the think tank said.

Drones have made this front so deadly that armor now mostly fights from kilometers back. That is what makes Ukraine's armored push onto fortified positions near Lyman stand out. Russia has already shifted its effort south toward Sloviansk after losing the Lyman pincer.

Armor reached Russian bunkers without drawing drone strikes

To break the strongest Russian fortifications, Ukraine used old Soviet BTR-60 armored personnel carriers rebuilt as remote-controlled explosive vehicles, the 3rd Army Corps says.

Ukrainian forces drove them up to heavy Russian fortifications without coming under Russian drone strikes, ISW noted. The think tank said this indicates Ukraine neutralized or otherwise negated Russia's drone defenses in the area.

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Strikes on fuel starved Russia's jammers

Ukraine achieved tactical drone overmatch through extensive shaping operations and an intermediate-range strike campaign, ISW said. Those strikes targeted the Russian drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems that would otherwise have hunted the advancing vehicles.

The 3rd Army Corps reported on 17 September that strikes on Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast had degraded Russian fuel supplies to the front, ISW wrote that day. The corps said that strained Russia's ability to use drones and EW against Ukrainian drones. EW systems consume a lot of power, and Russian troops run them on diesel generators, ISW explained.

Deputy corps commander Maksym Zhorin credited strict information silence and a "Protective Drone" system of EW assets, according to the same assessment. He said it helped neutralize around 20,000 Russian drones. The corps had earlier described mapping Russian command posts and striking them to sow panic.

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Five settlements and 2,000 Russian losses

The corps liberated Nove, Ridkodub, and Katerynivka and restored control over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka, it said on 28 September. The phase added 51 km², bringing the total since the offensive began to 176 km².

Russian losses reached 2,000 personnel, and more than 250 Russians were taken prisoner, according to the corps. Corps commander Andrii Biletskyi said a feint from Shandryholove toward Zelena Dolyna drew Russian reserves away from the real target, Nove.

The first two phases had reportedly cleared more than 125 km² north of Lyman.

1960s-vintage, Soviet-made T-62Ms aren't the oldest tanks in the Ukrainian inventory. That dubious honorific belongs to Ukraine's ex-Slovenian M-55S tanks, which are based on Soviet-made T-55s from the 1950s.

The T-62M hasn't gotten better. The job has changed. These days, many tanks on both sides function as mobile artillery, angling their guns high to fire a few rounds at targets kilometers away. They rarely work as tanks, closing with the enemy and firing directly from a few hundred meters. The threat from tiny explosive drones has pushed armor back from the gray zone, and at that distance a T-62M is not much less effective than a T-64BV. Or, for that matter, than a far more precious Leopard 1, Leopard 2, or M-1.

That is one reading of a war that has changed shape, and nobody has published a study of it. Ukraine's T-64, Leopard, and Abrams fleets have all taken heavy documented losses. Oryx, which logs a loss only where photos or video exist, lists no Ukrainian T-62Ms at all.

These tanks, all captured from the Russians, are also available. And that matters in a military struggling to sustain its tank force. As Russia's war on Ukraine grinds through its 56th month, Ukraine is running low on its newest and best tanks. Older and less capable ones fill in ... for lack of a better alternative.

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Observer Stevius, who closely tracks developments in the Ukrainian armor corps, recently highlighted the ongoing importance of former Russian T-62Ms to the Ukrainian war effort. "Captured T-62Ms still out there!"

Specifically, Stevius noted an ex-Russian T-62M belonging to the Ukrainian National Guard's 19th Brigade participating in a recent competition for best tank crew in the National Guard. According to Stevius, at least two other Ukrainian units have operated the survivors of at least 45 T-62Ms that Ukrainian troops have captured. Most of the captures took place during the Ukrainian counteroffensives in eastern and southern Ukraine in late 2022.

Lesser tanks

The 40-ton, four-person T-62M is Ukraine's second-oldest tank, and where the slightly older M-55S got a deep upgrade in 1990s Slovenia, the T-62M has not. In its DNA it is still a vehicle of the early Cold War. The Ukrainian army's 110th Mechanized Brigade temporarily operated T-62Ms before swapping them out for much newer and more capable T-64BVs. Where the T-62M has a 115-millimeter main gun loaded by hand by a fourth crew member, the T-64BV has a more powerful 125-millimeter gun loaded by a fast mechanical autoloader.

The fast-firing capability of the made-in-Ukraine T-64BV was central to the Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade's successful defense of the city of Chernihiv during the early weeks of the wider Russian invasion starting in February 2022. The Ukrainian tanks engaged passing Russian tanks at point-blank range, and out-shot them.

That is the kind of fight the T-62M would lose. It is a kind of fight fewer tanks now get.

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Surely some of the 60-something-year-old T-62Ms in Ukrainian service have been withdrawn owing to wear and tear and a possible shortage of spare parts. But there's a good chance most of the 45 Ukrainian T-62Ms are still in, or near, the action.

But not all are still tanks. Seeing the value in the thickly protected hull and reliable chassis that carries the T-62M's turret and gun, Ukrainian volunteers and units have converted some captured T-62Ms into specialist vehicles that benefit from the tanks' sturdy bottoms but don't need their obsolescent tops.

A few ex-Russian T-62Ms have undergone conversion into recovery vehicles by losing their turrets and guns and adding a heavy-duty winch for towing other armored vehicles. Volunteers working with the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation turned another into a heavy infantry fighting vehicle. The recipe is simple. Just pop off the existing turret and replace it with a smaller one fitted with a 30-millimeter autocannon, in this case one pulled from a captured Russian BMP-2.

Potentially dozens of Ukrainian T-62Ms are still T-62Ms, however, and still adding bulk and firepower to units that otherwise might struggle to deploy any tanks at all.

Russia is likely attempting to force Ukraine to capitulate by spring 2027 through a large-scale campaign of long-range strikes, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said in its 27 September report. Russian President Vladimir Putin's new theory of victory relies heavily on the mass use of jet-powered drones and ballistic missiles against Ukraine, the institute assesses.

Russia keeps shifting to faster jet-powered drones that Ukraine's defenses struggle to stop, forcing it to spend scarce missiles on them. Russia's use of jet-powered drones rose eightfold from June to August, with Moscow launching around 7,700 such drones since their initial deployment, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said on 23 September. But Putin likely does not expect the campaign to last indefinitely, and he may hold off on a new mobilization until he sees whether the strikes work, ISW assesses.

Putin's modified theory of victory

Putin's modified theory of victory largely depends on Russia's ability to mass-launch cheap jet-powered Gerans that get through Ukrainian defenses often enough, the institute notes.

Even a Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger claimed on 27 September that the Russian strategy, which relies heavily on long-range strikes, is costly and cannot continue indefinitely, not least because Ukraine is hitting Russia harder too, according to the analysis.

At the same time, Putin stated on 25 September that Ukraine "must feel" Russia's "retaliatory" strikes. ISW assesses that this suggests he intends to intensify Russia's strike campaign in winter, as he has in previous winters.

If Putin is counting on Ukraine to break and capitulate this winter, he may be ignoring what the campaign will cost Russia over time, the institute notes. This strategy also counts on Ukraine's shortage of Patriot interceptors against ballistic missiles, and on the country's power grid and other vital systems giving way under months of strikes.

Until that approach runs out, Putin is unlikely to back down on his demands or agree to real ceasefire talks, ISW assesses.

Ukrainian interceptors could disrupt Russia's plan

A Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger claimed on 27 September that Russian forces launched predominantly jet-powered Geran-5 drones at Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv during the night of 26–27 September. According to the blogger, Russia's diverse arsenal of strike weapons and Ukraine's shortage of air defense assets allow Russian forces to maintain the current pace of strikes and expand the range of targets, ISW writes in its analysis.

At the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 26 September that Ukraine's interception rate for jet-powered Shahed drones currently stands at 55%. Of more than 2,730 such drones Russia had launched in September by then, Ukrainian forces had downed or suppressed more than 1,500, he added.

Ukraine is testing interceptor drone prototypes in combat conditions, Ukrainian Presidential Office head Kyrylo Budanov told Novyny.LIVE on 27 September. The mass deployment of interceptors capable of shooting down jet-powered Gerans could begin within several months, he added. Ukrainian companies have already successfully tested several interceptor drones capable of intercepting Russian jet-powered drones in field conditions, the institute notes.

At the same time, it remains unclear whether Ukraine will be able to scale up its interceptor program quickly enough and achieve sufficient success to disrupt the intensification of Russia's campaign during the winter, ISW notes.

Why Putin may hold off on a new mobilization

Expanding Russia's arsenal of strike weapons is cheaper than carrying out a second mobilization economically, militarily, and socially, a Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger cited by the institute claimed.

Putin may put off large-scale forced mobilization until he sees whether the strikes deliver, ISW assesses, though his officials have been laying the groundwork for it despite Kremlin denials. Still, the need to replace Russia's enormous battlefield losses could push him to order such a mobilization as early as this fall, ISW notes, as Ukrainian and other sources have repeatedly reported he is preparing to do.

Russia says it is punishing Ukraine, and it is not hiding it. Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesperson, says Ukraine must "pay a price" for its actions in recent months and calls Russia's intensified strikes "part of this price," according to UNIAN, citing Russian media.

Russia rarely admits its strikes are meant to punish a country rather than hit military targets, but Peskov did just that, casting the wave of attacks on Ukraine, which have struck apartment blocks, trains, and this week Kyiv's Academy of Sciences, as a "price" Ukraine has to pay. In the Kremlin's telling, Ukraine is being punished for its own deep strikes inside Russia.

Moscow calls the strikes a 'price'

Asked how Ukraine's strikes had affected Russia's position on peace talks, Peskov says Ukraine "will have to pay a price for the actions that have taken place in recent months," adding, "This is what is happening now."

Russia, he says, must ensure "no one gets the idea to announce plans to inflict devastating strikes on it."

Kyiv's deep strikes draw the reprisal

The "actions" are Ukraine's strikes deep in the Russian rear, targeting its assets, helping it to fund the war. Russian President Vladimir Putin complained last week of a large Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow during Russia's parliamentary election and a June strike on St. Petersburg during an economic forum, Reuters reported.

Ukraine has also battered Russian refineries with long-range drones and missiles, cutting fuel output enough to spark shortages and force Moscow to curb exports and buy fuel abroad.

The price falls on civilians

What the Kremlin calls a price has fallen largely on Ukrainian civilians. Through September, Russian strikes have hit trains, data centers, gas stations, and educational institutions, and on 28 September, a drone set fire to the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv as people inside fled through the windows.

Russia's low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation Rassvet went from a few minutes of connectivity over Ukraine to two stable windows lasting more than an hour each in just five months. The system was built by the Russian private company Bureau 1440 as Moscow's answer to Starlink.

As of now, it is nowhere near matching SpaceX's 10,000-satellite network—but the gap between what Russia has now and what it needs is closing, and the tools that could slow it down mostly sit unused. When Ukraine and SpaceX bricked Russian-obtained Starlink terminals earlier this year, Russian assaults froze across the front—proof that cutting satellite command-and-control links matters more than disrupting guidance. Russia is now building its own links. The most consequential tool that could slow that down is Western sanctions against Bureau 1440 itself.

Four years of Western sanctions have failed to cut Russia off from the foreign components its missile and drone factories rely on: parts manufactured after sanctions were imposed still reach Russian assembly lines within months. Rassvet is a new version of the same problem. The system is still being built and relies on imported components whose exact origin is disputed—some experts point to American and European parts reaching Russia through sanctions-evasion networks, others say the core hardware is built from off-the-shelf Chinese components. Its manufacturer remains unsanctioned by any Western government, while some of the infrastructure needed to expand production has already been struck by Ukraine.

Six minutes in March, two hours by August

In March 2026, Bureau 1440 launched its first operational batch of 16 Rassvet satellites from Plesetsk Cosmodrome. Each pass over Ukraine created a window of six to 10 minutes, Serhii Beskrestnov, callsign Flash, a Ukrainian presidential adviser on defense technology, estimated at the time.

By late August, the picture had changed. Tracking data from N2YO showed four passes a day and two stable communication windows lasting more than an hour each. Satellite communications expert Volodymyr Stepanets said that 12 of the 16 satellites from the first batch had reached their operational altitude of 550 km, three were still ascending, and one had burned up—likely due to a manufacturing defect. A second batch of 16 went into orbit in July, though those satellites struggled to reach their target altitude and some may reenter the atmosphere.

The second batch may be climbing faster than the first did at the same stage. Still, Russia is far from the 200–250 satellites Beskrestnov considers necessary for stable, round-the-clock coverage, and the altitude of roughly 550 km is still short of the roughly 800 km the constellation is designed to reach.

What Rassvet would change on the battlefield

Russia is unlikely to have any civilian use in mind for these communication windows. The satellites transmit in the Ka and Ku bands—high-frequency signals that are difficult to jam and difficult to detect.

Right now, Ukraine's electronic warfare can push Russian drones offline: a Shahed flying low through a jammed zone loses its link and drifts off course. A satellite relay overhead would change that. The drone holds its course, receives updated coordinates mid-flight, stays below radar, and strikes. The constellation could do this for long-range strike and naval drones alike—letting them operate through electronic warfare at very low altitudes, where Ukraine's air defenses struggle to see them.

Bureau 1440 has also developed user terminals small enough to fit on Geran-type attack drones and cruise missiles. Gerans have struck Ukrainian territory, including Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast, almost continuously over the past month. A terminal on a Geran would turn a one-way munition into a weapon that can be redirected after launch. Unlike the Starlink terminals Ukraine relies on, which are geographically restricted, Russian terminals are expected to face no such limits—the same terminal that connects a Geran over Kyiv Oblast would work over Berlin or Paris.

The sanctions lever—and the gap in it

Rassvet's parent company, IKS Holding, is one of Russia's largest hardware and software developers. The US sanctioned the holding, its then-owner Anton Cherepennikov, and the subsidiaries Kryptonit and KNS Group on 24 February 2023. Cherepennikov died under unexplained circumstances, but the company keeps operating.

Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) says the holding serves as a personnel reserve for the Federal Security Service (FSB). The first deputy CEO of IKS Holding is Boris Korolyov, son of FSB First Deputy Director Sergei Korolyov, according to the SZRU. He took the post at 27 in 2023, after Cherepennikov's death.

More importantly, though, is the company that actually builds the satellites—Bureau 1440—and its leadership. Ukraine has placed the company on its own sanctions list, but Kyiv's unilateral designations carry limited trade enforcement power, because these people and this company are absent from Western lists. At Euromaidan Press's request, the US-based research organization C4ADS confirmed that Bureau 1440 and its leadership sit outside every Western sanctions regime, and called designating the manufacturer the single most visible and effective step available.

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From the Ukrainian side, Viktoriia Vyshnivska, a senior analyst at the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO), told Euromaidan Press that sanctions on Bureau 1440 are not a magic button—but they are not pointless, either. Because Bureau 1440 uses Western equipment, designating the company would directly affect trade in those boards and components, she said. Any Western manufacturer that kept doing business with the company would also risk investigation and legal consequences.

Given the reach of Russia's sanctions-evasion networks and its close ties with China in joint production and technology sharing.

"We shouldn't expect a magical effect," Vyshnivska said.

But sanctions would make direct trade impossible and raise the cost and difficulty of sourcing Western components.

Even if the useful window is short, making supplies more expensive and harder to find is the point.

Many of the goods Bureau 1440 uses are already banned from sale to Russia under EU export controls, Vyshnivska noted. Yet Bureau 1440 itself is still absent from the sanctions lists. Her recommendation: Bureau 1440, its current owners, its parent company, the key related entities and individuals, and its main suppliers should all be designated.

Diplomacy: Ukraine goes to the ITU

Beyond that, Ukraine is trying to act on its own on several fronts.

The first is diplomacy. On 28 August, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Ukraine had sent a formal note to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN agency that coordinates radio frequencies, demanding that Ukrainian territory be excluded from Rassvet's service areas across all frequency bands. The system's use over Ukraine "has nothing to do with civilian purposes," he wrote on X.

Days later, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Ireland, Sybiha handed partners a list of nine legal entities linked to the project and urged them to impose sanctions.

The EU had already moved once: its 21st sanctions package, adopted on 23 July, targeted the Rassvet network. But the main gap is not closed, and that round stopped short of the manufacturer, leaving Bureau 1440 and its chief executive off the lists.

Hitting the supply chain with weapons

Another lever is direct strikes. In mid-August, Ukrainian-made Flamingo cruise missiles struck an industrial zone in Samara that houses the Progress Rocket Space Center—the only plant in Russia that serially assembles the Soyuz-2.1b rockets used to launch Rassvet into orbit. Satellite imagery published by the Ukrainian Telegram channel Exilenova+ showed a collapsed roof section 85 meters long and 35 meters wide over Building 106A, the hall where crews wire the rockets' control systems and cabling. The channel reported two missile hits on that hall.

If the hall was destroyed, production could stop entirely, and switching to other Russian launch vehicles would take significantly longer and add complexity. Drones also attempted to strike Plesetsk Cosmodrome, from which both 2026 batches were launched.

Both targets—the factory that builds the rockets and the site that launches them—are needed if Russia is to expand Rassvet production.

The timeline: 5.5 to eight years, if nothing changes

Russia plans to expand the constellation to 292 satellites by the end of 2027, Deputy Chief of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence (HUR) Vadym Skibitskyi said. Moscow's longer-term goal is 924 satellites by 2035.

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With 32 satellites already launched in two batches, 260 more are needed. At 16 satellites per launch, that requires roughly 17 launches. At a four-month interval between launches, deploying them would take roughly 5.5 years even if every launch succeeded and every satellite reached its target orbit. That most likely won't fully work out: one satellite from the first batch is already lost, two from the second batch may be lost as well, and none of them has yet reached the required altitude.

Russia also depends on the scarce Soyuz-2.1b rocket. The rocket has averaged only six to eight launches per year since 2022—most committed to GLONASS navigation satellites, ISS resupply, and military payloads—limiting Russia to a theoretical maximum of roughly two Rassvet-dedicated launches per year, or 128 Rassvet satellites over four years at that rate.

There is still time to shut this project down or slow it. Vyshnivska put the useful window to slow Rassvet at about a year. Russia, by Ukrainian calculations, needs five to eight years to see it through.

A Russian strike on an apartment building in Kharkiv injured dozens of people, many of them children, early on 28 September, regional prosecutors reported. Through the rest of the day, Russian drones hit Kyiv, Dnipro, and other cities, killing civilians in several of them.

Russia has moved much of its aerial campaign to jet-powered drones that fly too fast for the cheap interceptors Ukraine built against older models. Every switch to a faster weapon reopens gaps in city defenses that Ukraine had only just begun to close.

Two floors partly destroyed in a Kharkiv apartment block

Russia hit a nine-story building in Kharkiv's Saltivskyi district around 04:00. By early afternoon, the count had risen to 43 injured, including 11 children, prosecutors said.

A man of 43 and a girl of 14 remain in hospital with blast wounds, and the others have moderate or light injuries, Kharkiv Oblast head Oleh Syniehubov said. Three children lived in the apartment that took the hit. Their father carried them out himself, and none of them was seriously hurt.

The strike hit the second floor and destroyed the ceiling between the third and fourth floors. Rescuers brought 32 people out of the building. Across the district, the attack damaged 18 apartment buildings and blew out more than 1,500 windows. More than 100 volunteers are helping city services seal them, Syniehubov added.

A resident who fled Kramatorsk a year and a half ago said her family never heard the blast itself.

"We didn't hear any explosion. Glass came pouring down, and a column of smoke stood there," Yuliia Baldzhy told Suspilne Kharkiv. "The children were sleeping in another room, and my husband and I barely squeezed through, grabbed them, and got out."

Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov said the city had not taken a hit "of this level" in some time. Officials are still establishing the weapon. Syniehubov named guided aerial bombs (KABs) and counted six of them over the oblast in the past day. Prosecutors named a UMPB-5, a Russian munition, as the preliminary version. Terekhov said the city was checking whether it was a KAB or a Banderol, a small cruise missile.

Russia has hit Kharkiv high-rises with guided bombs before. In November 2024, one such strike injured 25 people, including an infant.

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Kyiv hit through the night and into the day

In the middle of the working day, a Russian jet drone struck the main building of the National Academy of Sciences in Kyiv's historic center. The attack killed a woman and injured five people, the Kyiv City Military Administration said. Three of them were hospitalized, Klitschko said. People climbed out of windows to escape the fire.

"Russia will definitely get a response to this," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said.

Overnight and into the morning, Russian drones hit a gas station in Obolon, a café by a gas station, office buildings, and a 16-story residential building in Podil. The attacks injured three teenagers in Podil, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said. A 17-year-old boy was hospitalized.

Nationwide, Russia launched 165 drones overnight, 79 of them jet-powered, the Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 112, and hits were recorded at 14 locations.

The capital is now under attack daily. On 27 September, Russian strikes injured nine people in Kyiv, and Russia hit a Kyiv data center twice. That evening, a Russian drone struck the Stolychnyi market in Sofiivska Borshchahivka, just outside the city, and killed two people. Zelenskyy wrote that one of the two killed in Kyiv Oblast was a citizen of Azerbaijan.

Deaths in Dnipro and Synelnykove

Around 11:15, a Russian drone hit a business center in central Dnipro, killing three people. The number of injured rose to 15, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast head Oleksandr Hanzha said. Rescuers led 47 people out of the burning building, regional council head Mykola Lukashuk said.

"Nearby are residential buildings, a park, a library, offices, shops. The center of Dnipro. In the middle of the working day, hundreds of people are here," Hanzha wrote.

In Synelnykove, a Russian strike on a logistics company's branch killed one person. It injured three others, including a 15-year-old boy now in hospital in serious condition.

Overnight, Russian drones also hit infrastructure in the Vasylkivka community and a market in Nikopol.

Strikes across other regions

In Kharkiv Oblast on 27 September, a Russian FPV drone killed a 67-year-old driver in Shestakove, prosecutors said. A drone on fiber-optic control also killed a 41-year-old woman in a car in Velykyi Burluk and injured a 46-year-old man.

Explosions sounded in Poltava overnight. In Rivne Oblast, a Russian attack damaged a detached house without injuring anyone. In Odesa Oblast, Russia struck a warehouse, and an evening attack injured a man of 62 and a woman of 63. Zelenskyy also listed a Palau-flagged ship hit in Odesa Oblast and an ice cream plant damaged in Zhytomyr Oblast, in the same post.

Russia has struck the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NAS) in Kyiv on the afternoon of Monday, 28 September. People inside the building are climbing out onto the windows to avoid being burned alive.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has damaged more than 4,650 educational institutions in Ukraine. Another 423 educational institutions have been completely destroyed, Ukrainian Ombudsperson Dmytro Lubinets reports.

The Academy was founded in Kyiv on 27 November 1918. Its first president was the eminent, world-renowned scientist Volodymyr Vernadsky.

As of 1 January 2026, the total number of people working at the NAS of Ukraine was 23,982, including 13,003 researchers. Among them are 2,332 doctors of science and 6,435 candidates of science.

Volunteers say the world looks away

According to Telegram channel "Lachen Writes": "There are injured and dead as a result of Russia's strike on the National Academy of Sciences."

Meanwhile, military volunteer Serhii Sternenko, whose fund has purchased 291,502 FPV drones and helped the Ukrainian military shoot down 12,954+ aerial targets, commented on it this way: "Just hell."

"The world just watches this. Europe is lifting sanctions on Russian oligarchs. Trump asks Ukraine not to hit Russia's oil refineries. Unpunished evil will come for them too," he wrote.

The toll remains unclear

Another journalist, Andrii Tsaplienko, who posted a video showing people trying to save themselves, added his own comparison for the drone strike.

"Footage reminiscent of 11 September at the World Trade Center," he wrote.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says a rescue operation is underway: the fire is being extinguished, and people who may have been inside the building are being searched for. He adds that "there will definitely be a response to this from Russia."

"And every one of Ukraine's partners must see, from this terror and these strikes, that support for Ukraine is truly support for people's lives, support for the principle that terror must never and nowhere be normalized," he stresses.

Russia must answer for all of this and feel real consequences. Thank you to everyone who is helping Ukraine!

Ukrainian drones struck two fuel depots in Krasnodar Krai overnight on 28 September, setting both on fire, Militarnyi reported. The targets were the NFB-Pavlovskaya depot in Pavlovskaya and the Edelveys-95 depot near Novotitarovskaya, about 25 km from Krasnodar.

Residents heard six explosions near the railway

A drone alert was declared in the region at 23:43. Residents of Novotitarovskaya then reported drones overhead and at least six explosions near the railway, Russian news Telegram channel Astra reported. Fires broke out at both depots. NASA FIRMS satellite data confirmed both blazes by 04:24, Militarnyi reported, citing imagery published by Ukrainian Telegram channel Exilenova+.

What the depots store

NFB-Pavlovskaya handles cargo operations with petroleum products, including wholesale trade in motor fuel and petroleum storage, Militarnyi reported.

Edelveys-95 is a similar facility. It specializes in wholesale distribution of diesel fuel (Euro-5 standard) and gasoline (AI-92, AI-95, and AI-100), Astra reported. Its capacity is 4,500 cubic meters, and it has its own rail siding for receiving and shipping fuel. The company has been selling petroleum products for 30 years, buying directly from Russia's largest refineries, according to its website.

Ilsky refinery struck days earlier in the same region

The overnight strikes came two days after SBU drones struck the Ilsky oil refinery in the same region on 26 September, triggering fires near the ELOU-AVT unit and the tank farm. Ilsky is one of the largest refineries in Russia's Southern Federal District, with a design capacity of roughly 6.6 million tonnes of crude per year, and has been struck more than 18 times since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.

Ukraine's sustained campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure has earlier pushed Russia's fuel shortages into Central Asia and forced Moscow to seek emergency refining deals abroad.

Ukrainian forces carried out one of the largest drone food delivery operations across the Dnipro to occupied Oleshky, dropping about 4,000 kg of supplies provided by partners at 100 locations across the city where people are trapped without food, electricity, or water, Kherson Oblast head Oleksandr Prokudin said on 27 September. Russian forces punish residents who receive aid—shooting down supply drones, confiscating packages, and beating people caught accepting food, he noted.

Oleshky—a city across the Dnipro from liberated Kherson—has been occupied since 2022. Russia sealed off the city in late 2025, and conditions worsened sharply in early 2026 as occupation forces cut off food supplies, prevented evacuation, and left the dead unburied. The drone flights are now the only humanitarian operation reaching the trapped population, making each sortie both a lifeline and a target for Russian forces that treat civilian starvation as a tool of control.

Multiple military units flew food across the Dnipro

Since March, Ukrainian forces have been systematically delivering food to Oleshky by drone in coordination with the 11th National Guard Brigade's Bolharychi unit and the 34th Separate Marine Brigade Borysfen, Prokudin said.

The latest operation expanded the effort: the 30th Marine Corps, the Hrim tactical group, the 34th National Guard Regiment, and the 79th Border Detachment joined alongside the Borysfen brigade and the Bolharychi unit.

"Instead of loud statements, we chose the path of concrete action," Prokudin wrote.

The deliveries fly across the Dnipro and drop food packages at pre-selected locations across the occupied city.

Prokudin said about 2,000 people remain trapped in Oleshky, including nearly 50 children. Ukraine's ombudsman and international monitors have put the figure at up to 6,000, with about 200 children.

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Russia shoots down supply drones and beats residents for receiving food

Russian forces try to disrupt the deliveries. Soldiers shoot down drones carrying food, confiscate or resell packages meant for children and elderly residents, and detain people caught receiving humanitarian aid, Prokudin said. Residents are thrown into basements and beaten.

"Deliberate blocking of aid and creation of famine among the civilian population are war crimes with no statute of limitations. Everyone involved in these actions will face inevitable accountability," Prokudin wrote.

Ukraine prepared an evacuation list, secured the ICRC's readiness, and coordinated a ceasefire on its side, but Russia has not confirmed its readiness to open a route, Ukraine's ombudsman said.

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O'Flaherty warned on 25 September that the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky is deteriorating rapidly. Civilians, including children, are trapped without food, medicines, medical care, running water, or electricity, and reports indicate a high risk of death, he said. Under international humanitarian law, Russia as the occupying power is obliged to provide the population with food and medical supplies, O'Flaherty noted, and called for an immediate local ceasefire, unimpeded humanitarian access, and safe evacuation of civilians.

Ukraine has employed a new tactic during its major Operation Vivaldi in Donetsk Oblast. During the 3rd Army Corps' offensive, fighters from the world's first experimental unit of unmanned ground-strike vehicles, "NC13", have upgraded their kamikaze ground drones with grenade launchers.

Vivaldi is the counteroffensive the corps is running near Lyman in northern Donetsk Oblast. Over its first two "seasons," the 3rd Army Corps and attached units have retaken more than 125 square kilometers, half of it de-occupied outright, and inflicted more than 3,000 casualties on Russian forces.

Through this offensive operation, the 3rd Army Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Andrii Biletsky, disrupted Russian forces' plans to encircle the fortress-belt cities in Donetsk Oblast from the north and south. Among them are Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka. These cities have helped hold back Russian forces since 2014.

From intensive training to the world-first operations

The NC13 unit has been through Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and other of the toughest sections of the front.

Among its achievements: the world's first robotic assault carried out without infantry involvement, resulting in the capture of two Russian soldiers, a sabotage operation in the enemy's rear — blowing up a crossing and disrupting an offensive — using UGVs alone, and Ukraine's first fully robotic defense of a position for 45 days without involving infantry.

"No one in the history of warfare has used this kind of tactic before," the soldiers commented on the offensive.

The defenders say that a lack of combat experience is no barrier to joining the unit. Every recruit goes through an intensive training course led by experienced instructors.

Grenade launchers were developed based on the Soviet RPG-22

During the operation, UGVs equipped with two Bullspike grenade launchers attacked Russian positions, then detonated directly inside their shelters. The occupiers believed they were being attacked by an entire assault group. In reality, they were being torn apart by robots from the 3rd Assault Corps.

"Yes, the UGVs carry out three tasks at once: they strike, they exert psychological pressure, and they clear the position. And most importantly, this happens without risk to our infantry," the force says.

The Bullspike grenade launchers were developed based on the Soviet RPG-22 anti-tank grenade launcher, which was previously manufactured under license by a Bulgarian defense company.

According to data from the manufacturer's website, the Bullspike RPG has a maximum aimed firing range of 350 meters, a direct-fire range of 150 meters, and armor penetration of 400 mm, Militarnyi reports.

The total weight of the launch unit, together with the 72.5 mm PG-22 grenade, is 3.4 kg. The length of the launcher is 780 mm.

The manufacturer states that the Bullspike-AT round is designed to destroy tanks, self-propelled artillery, and other armored vehicles, as well as to target enemy personnel located in bunkers, field fortifications, and urban-type brick fortifications.

The robots were controlled by operators from a safe shelter dozens of kilometers from the line of contact.

Earlier, for the first time in the world's history, the 3rd Army Corps dropped ground robots behind Russian lines from the air. The soldiers behind the mission say their heavy drones delivered kamikaze unmanned ground vehicles more than 10 kilometers into the Russian rear during the "second season" of Operation Vivaldi, letting Ukrainian troops flank them and clear another 40 square kilometers.

Swiss voters overwhelmingly rejected a neutrality initiative that would have banned Switzerland from adopting sanctions against warring states and blocked cooperation with NATO, Swiss public broadcaster SRF reported. The measure failed by 70.2% to 29.8%, with zero cantons voting in favor.

Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine has expanded beyond the battlefield into a campaign of sabotage, political influence, and pressure on European institutions. Every European country that has adopted sanctions or cooperated militarily with Ukraine faces some variant of the same push—to weaken the sanctions regime and fracture the coalition. Russia expressed sympathy for the initiative—which backfired. Opponents warned the measure would benefit Moscow.

What the initiative would have done

The initiative, formally titled "Safeguard Swiss Neutrality," sought to enshrine neutrality as "permanent, armed, and comprehensive," bar cooperation with military alliances unless Switzerland was under direct attack, and ban economic sanctions against warring states—with only UN-mandated measures exempted.

Switzerland currently adopts sanctions autonomously and has largely followed EU sanctions against Russia since the full-scale invasion in 2022. The Swiss government's own explanatory materials stated the initiative would affect sanctions against Russia, SRF reported.

Blocher's Russian connection

Former Federal Council member Christoph Blocher, 85, launched the initiative in autumn 2022—six months into the full-scale war and the same year his daughter Magdalena Martullo-Blocher, who controls Ems-Chemie, decided the two Russian plants would stay. He led the campaign through the organization Pro Schweiz.

Ems-Chemie produces plastics, adhesives, sealants, and technical fibers. Two subsidiaries, operating under the Eftec brand, continued working in Russia after the full-scale invasion, Swiss magazine Republik reported earlier this month. Company and government documents contain strong indications that Eftec products may have been purchased by KamAZ, UAZ, GAZ, and AvtoVAZ—sanctioned companies tied to military vehicle production and financial support for Russian soldiers deploying to Ukraine. Ems-Chemie denies supplying them.

The Federal Council and Parliament both recommended rejection. In the National Council, 124 members voted against and 65 in favor. In the Council of States, the vote was 29 to 10 against.

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Drones over Swiss military bases

Unidentified drones were spotted over Swiss military installations this year. In about 20% of sightings over military sites, authorities cannot identify who is responsible, army chief Benedikt Roos said earlier this month. Asked whether Switzerland is a target for Moscow, he said yes—the country holds critical infrastructure vital to Europe that anyone seeking to destabilize the continent could target.

Across Europe, pro-Russian forces continue to push back against sanctions. Germany's far-right AfD won 43.8% in the Saxony-Anhalt state election on 6 September—its strongest result ever, though every other party refuses coalition. In France, Marine Le Pen leads first-round polling for the 2027 presidential election at 36%. Slovakia's Robert Fico earlier demanded the EU lift Russian energy sanctions.

Russia has combined kinetic and political pressure across Europe—drone incursions into NATO airspace, arson at defense-linked sites, and sabotage of critical infrastructure—alongside support for political forces that oppose sanctions and military cooperation with Ukraine. Switzerland's own intelligence service assessed earlier this year that Russia is waging a long war against the West and escalating it.

Ukraine's defense forces intercepted 55% of Russia's jet-propelled drones in September—more than 1,500 out of over 2,730 launched—Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his 26 September evening address.

Russia's full-scale aerial campaign has shifted from propeller-driven Shaheds Ukraine learned to shoot down at over 90% to jet-propelled models that fly faster, resist jamming, and often slip past existing defenses.

55% and climbing

Zelenskyy said military intelligence had briefed him on Russian weapons production—not just jet Shaheds but other technological systems. The documents detail what Moscow is preparing for next year: the volumes and the financing. "We are preparing our countermeasures, and for every line item there must be a Ukrainian answer," he said.

Several effective interceptor prototypes are already in combat.

"Interceptors have been identified that can become the main tool of our defense. Production, components—all of this we are scaling up. There will be an answer," Zelenskyy said.

The goal is to match the interception rate for regular propeller-driven Shaheds, which exceeds 90%. At 55%, the jet-drone rate is climbing but still leaves nearly half reaching their targets.

$12 billion for one category

Russia plans to spend $12 billion in 2027 on jet drones and loitering munitions alone, Zelenskyy said. "This concerns not only Ukraine and not only us," he added, warning that multiple intelligence agencies have information Russia wants to expand its war to other countries and regions.

He said this is why Ukraine is pushing for stronger sanctions and the Drone Deal format. Ukraine has signed 11 such agreements, the latest with Finland at the UN General Assembly this week, and is preparing a 12th with what Zelenskyy called "a strong country."

The warning came as Russia struck a Kyiv data center twice on the morning of 27 September, injuring three people including two children, Zelenskyy wrote. Overnight strikes killed three people in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and one man in Kyiv.

In total this week, Russia launched more than 2,200 strike drones, roughly 1,650 aerial bombs, and 38 missiles—a significant share of them ballistic—at Ukraine, he said.

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Jet drones are now Russia's main aerial weapon

Russia's jet-propelled Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones have become the dominant threat in Russia's aerial campaign against Ukrainian cities. By August, production of jet Geran-4/5 models exceeded that of propeller-driven Geran-2s, according to Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR). Russian factories produce roughly 3,000 jet models per month alongside about 2,800 of the older type. The Geran-5 is technically a drone but functions as a small cruise missile—faster, harder to jam, and increasingly guided by AI and mesh networking that complicate interception.

Ukraine's answer has been interceptor drones—cheap, fast enough to chase a Geran, and guided by machine vision. A Ukrainian interceptor recently scored its first kills against jet Gerans and is heading into mass production, though a presidential adviser warned that speed alone cannot catch them—machine vision and automatic guidance decide the chase.

Ukraine has destroyed a record 76 Russian air-defense systems this month, and September is not over. The tally beats a record that had stood since July 2023 and reflects a systematic Ukrainian campaign to hunt down Russia's air defenses, opening the skies over occupied territory and inside Russia, the analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko said on Telegram.

Ukraine is methodically peeling apart Russia's layered air defense, and September has been its worst month yet: 76 systems destroyed, past the 73 lost in July 2023, by Kovalenko's count, with days still to go.

It is part of a campaign in which Ukrainian drones and special forces have hunted Russian radars and missile launchers across occupied territory and Crimea, and each one destroyed opens a corridor for the next strike.

The record falls with days to spare

Kovalenko credited Ukraine's Defense Forces' sustained hunt for Russian anti-air, which he said pays off twice: it clears the defenses that would otherwise stop Ukraine's strikes, making later attacks on occupied territory and on Russia itself more effective.

Each kill opens a corridor

Ukrainian drone and special-operations units have picked off Pantsir, Tor, Buk, and pieces of S-300 and S-400 systems across occupied territory and Crimea, sometimes several in a single night throughout 2026.

As Russia pulls its scarce long-range systems back to guard Moscow, fewer are left to cover occupied Ukraine, widening the openings for the next wave of Ukrainian strikes.

Russia cannot replace the losses

Over the full-scale war, Kovalenko said, Russia has lost more than 1,673 air-defense systems of every kind, from radars to surface-to-air missiles and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.

That, he argued, is a level Moscow can no longer make good with a defense industry already stretched thin by the war.

"Such a quantity of equipment Russia will never be able to restore and compensate," he thinks.

He added that this means it would no longer be able to return to the pre-war level of closing the sky, neither technically nor technologically."

Last winter, eight Ukrainian companies told the defense minister that their interceptors were ready to knock Russia's jet-powered drones out of the sky. They were not. A fast-flying drone is the easy part of the design, while combat testing exposed what the interceptors lacked in key features to chase an evading jet-powered Geran, presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov, known as Flash, said in an interview with NV.

Ukraine's answer to Russia's fast, hard-to-stop jet drones was supposed to be cheap interceptors, and last winter, their makers said they had them. But a jet Geran flies 450 to 500 kilometers an hour, up from the Geran-3's 320, varies its speed to slip past defenses, and will dodge harder once interceptors appear.

Catching one takes maneuverability, machine-vision target-lock, and fuel to loiter and search, not just speed, Flash said. Ukraine's cheap interceptors have already downed about half of Russia's slower drones, but the jet-powered systems have stayed a step ahead.

Eight makers said "ready"

At a meeting last winter called by Mykhailo Fedorov, then-defense minister, all eight interceptor makers reported the same thing: "everything's ready, the solution exists, it flies, we tested it, speed is sufficient," Flash recalled.

The mistake, he said, was that no one checked on them week to week. There were also too few jet Gerans in the skies then to test against.

"On the range, they showed: it flies. That was the problem," explained Flash.

Speed is the easy part

The engines are not the obstacle, Flash continues, since they can be bought abroad, and neither is a plane that flies fast in a straight line. The hard part is a machine agile enough to chase a jet-powered Geran, which is far more maneuverable than the propeller kind and will start changing altitude and throwing evasive maneuvers once interceptors appear.

Because an operator's aim frays at such speeds, he said, the decisive pieces are automatic target capture by machine vision and automatic terminal guidance.

"Building a construction that just flies fast is the easiest part," he added.

Mass orders must wait

That is why Ukraine cannot simply order thousands to blanket the country, Flash said: it first needs a proven design that works for any crew, from Security Service specialists to territorial defense soldiers, and is simple to launch, operate, and maintain.

Once such a sample exists, he said, scaling up is only a question of money. Meanwhile, the work is moving: a Ukrainian interceptor recently notched its first kills against jet Gerans and is heading toward mass production.

The person who built Ukraine's "Army of Drones" is now building an "Army of Robots". Myhailo Fedorov, the former defense minister, has launched a private-sector push to robotize the war, wanting machines to take the deadliest jobs, evacuating the wounded, laying and clearing mines, and fighting, so soldiers come home, he wrote, announcing the effort at the IT Arena conference in Lviv.

The pitch rests on a track record. Fedorov's Army of Drones, launched in 2022, helped make drones the weapon behind more than 95 percent of Ukraine's battlefield hits. Over 700 makers now building them, and he is betting robotization is the next such leap.

Army of Robots is meant to be an ecosystem, not a company: investing in defense-tech firms, standing up R&D, testing with troops, and scaling fast, whatever works. Fedorov is running it from outside government, having left the defense ministry in July and started building a defense-tech company backed by Palantir chief Alex Karp.

Robots take the deadliest jobs

Fedorov's vision is a battlefield where machines go first. A sensor spots a threat, then a robot enters the danger zone, he says. Humanoid robots would carry ammunition and pull out the wounded, lay and clear minefields, scout, hold positions, and strike, taking the roles that today cost soldiers their lives. For now, it is a vision more than a fielded capability: Fedorov is describing where he wants the battlefield to go, not a robot force already in the fight.

The Army of Drones sets the model

The aim, Fedorov says, is to gather the best engineers, combat experience, and capital and point them at one goal: making robots fight instead of people. The obstacle is Russia, which he said has learned to quickly copy and scale military technology, so Ukraine must keep inventing the next cycle before the enemy does.

"Russia will stop only when we can break its backbone," he says, arguing that it will take Western capital, world-class engineers, and private initiative.

Russia's best defenses against ballistic missiles ring Moscow, leaving much of the rest of the country exposed to Ukraine's growing missile arsenal. That concentration is why Ukraine's homegrown ballistic missiles could cause Russia real trouble beyond the capital, even as Russia's air defenses show gaps elsewhere, expert Vadym Kushnikov says, Ukrainian Radio reports.

Russia has the systems to stop ballistic missiles, Kushnikov continues, but it has massed the best of them around Moscow: the S-500 "Prometey", with interceptors adapted from the A-135, the Soviet-era shield built to defend the capital from missiles.

Other regions, by his assessment, are left more open to Ukraine's massed and combined strikes. That matters now that Ukraine's own ballistic missile, such as the Sapsan, is entering combat.

The best defenses ring Moscow

"If you analyze the characteristics, Russia today has concentrated its most modern S-500 complexes, with 77N6-N and 77N6-N1 interceptors, in Moscow Oblast," Kushnikov says.

Elsewhere, he said, Russia is short of air-defense complexes, the S-400 among them, a shortfall he said is visible in satellite imagery.

Ukraine's ballistic program grows

Ukraine's deep-strike arsenal has been shifting from foreign-supplied systems to homegrown ones. Alongside its Neptune and Flamingo cruise missiles, it now fields the Sapsan, an Iskander-class ballistic missile with a range of about 500 kilometers, which President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed was in combat late last year.

A domestic ballistic missile will let Ukraine strike deep inside Russia without waiting for a Western green light.

Production faces hard hurdles

Building them is the hard part. Ukraine's rocket-engineering tradition runs deep, Kushnikov suggests, but its production sites, mostly in the east, are direct targets of Russian strikes.

The missiles also depend on components that are difficult to make, chiefly solid-fuel rocket engines and the guidance that steers a warhead flying at five times the speed of sound along a ballistic arc.

"The combination of all these factors is exactly what our engineers have worked on for years, building the Ukrainian ballistic shield," he adds.