Estonia is investigating whether Russia was behind a suspected arson attack at a Tallinn building used by Milrem Robotics, Prime Minister Kristen Michal said on 18 August.

Officials have not released evidence yet connecting Moscow to the fire.

The fire hit a site used by a defense contractor that makes unmanned ground vehicles, including THeMIS vehicles used in Ukraine. The Estonian investigation into the Milrem fire comes amid suspected or confirmed arson plots against other European factories supplying Ukraine.

Estonian prosecutors said the fire, which began overnight into 15 August, may have been deliberately set. A resident reported suspicious activity nearby. Investigators identified suspects and asked a court to detain them. No one was injured, and Milrem CEO Kuldar Väärsi told the Estonian outlet Postimees that it was too early to assess the damage.

The company executive said the site was not an office building but declined to identify its contents or what was damaged, including whether unmanned ground vehicles were inside. The company has not said whether production or deliveries were affected.

Milrem’s THeMIS vehicles have operated in Ukraine since 2022. By 2023, the company had delivered 15 of the vehicles to Ukrainian forces and border guards. A Dutch-funded order for more than 150 additional vehicles followed in 2025. A new Dutch production line began making them in June 2026 and handed over its first vehicles for Ukraine.

Other factories supplying Ukraine have faced arson

In March, a fire damaged a Czech facility belonging to LPP Holding, which had supplied hundreds of AI-guided drones to Ukraine. Czech authorities investigated possible terrorism and later detained a fourth suspect.

In January, Lithuania charged six people over an attempt to burn a factory supplying radio-wave scanners to Ukraine. Investigators said Russia-based organizers with GRU links coordinated the operation and connected the network to attempted attacks elsewhere in Europe.

Estonia has traced earlier attacks to Russian intelligence

Estonia has also uncovered Russian-directed attacks on its own territory. In 2024, Estonia’s security service detained 10 people over a Russian-coordinated operation that included damaging cars belonging to then-Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets and a journalist and defacing monuments. Officials said the operation sought to spread fear and tension. Journalists from The Insider, Re:Baltica, and Delfi reported how the GRU recruited Baltic residents for vandalism and arson.

In 2025, an Estonian court found that a Moldovan national working for the GRU burned a supermarket as a trial run before firebombing a Ukrainian restaurant in Tallinn. His cousin filmed the second attack.

Those cases explain why investigators are examining a possible Russian role in the Milrem fire, but they do not establish who caused it.

Ukraine has brought another 103 servicemembers home from Russian captivity in the first stage of a new prisoner exchange, the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported on 19 August 2026. Most of the returning defenders are wounded or seriously ill after captivity that, for some, reached back to 2022, the year of Russia's full-scale invasion. The United States and the United Arab Emirates helped organize the swap, the headquarters said.

Who came home

The freed group covers nearly every branch of Ukraine's forces. It includes members of the Armed Forces, the Navy, Territorial Defense, the National Guard and the State Border Guard Service. Alongside soldiers and sergeants, several officers were released.

The Coordination HQ detailed the composition. The Defense Ministry accounted for 92 of those freed, and the Interior Ministry for 11. Two of the returnees are officers, the rest enlisted personnel and NCOs. Interior Minister Ivan Vyhivskyi said his ministry's 11 broke down into five National Guardsmen and six border guards.

The defenders had been captured across the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Sumy directions, as well as at Mariupol. The single largest share, 72, fell on the Donetsk front. The youngest freed defender was born in 2000, and the oldest is 59.

Years behind Russian bars

The captures span the entire full-scale war. One of those freed had been held since 2022, 16 since 2023, and 48 since 2024. Another 31 were seized in 2025 and seven this year. By the same tally, the International Committee of the Red Cross had confirmed the captivity of 102 of the group before the handover, with a single case verified through other sources.

A previous swap in late June returned 160 defenders, all of them held since 2022.

Wounded and ill

The released defenders will undergo full medical examinations, receive physical and psychological rehabilitation, and obtain the state payments provided by law. The head of the President's Office, Kyrylo Budanov, said doctors were already doing everything necessary for the returnees, most of whom came back with wounds and serious illness.

Their condition fits a wider pattern Ukrainian officials have described, in which Russia starves most captives and executes many surrendered soldiers on the battlefield.

"We remember everyone still in captivity"

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the freed included men who had defended Mariupol. 

"We remember every man and every woman still held captive. We are doing everything possible to bring all our people home," he said.

The Security Service of Ukraine noted the swap ran through the joint center it operates to coordinate the search and release of prisoners. Oleh Ivashchenko, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) and head of the Coordination Headquarters, met the returning defenders in person. 

Polish prosecutors have charged a 46-year-old woman over a nationality-based attack on two Ukrainian siblings in Bydgoszcz, days after police detained her and a 34-year-old man, whom they questioned as a witness, Polish Radio's Ukrainian Service reported the detentions on 18 August 2026, with the charges filed the same evening.

The detentions came four days after the alleged attack in a park near Bydgoszcz’s main railway station. The Bydgoszcz-North district prosecutor charged the woman with insulting the siblings and violating a minor's bodily integrity on nationality grounds. She denied intentionally insulting or assaulting the children and gave police a different account of the encounter.

The case comes amid rising reports of suspected hate crimes against Ukrainians and worsening relations between Warsaw and Kyiv. Police received 180 such reports in the first half of 2026—about one a day. At that pace, 2026 would end more than 30% above 2025 and nearly 35% above 2024.

Prosecutors charged only the woman; the 34-year-old man detained with her was questioned as a witness, even though the mother and the consulate described both adults as aggressors. The prosecutor placed her under police supervision, imposed a no-contact order, and set bail at 5,000 zł ($1,340). The destruction of the boy's toy drone was treated as a misdemeanor because the toy was worth just over 100 zł ($27).

The siblings—a 14-year-old girl and her 12-year-old brother—were playing with a toy drone in the park when the adults confronted them about using it, their mother told police. The Ukrainian consulate said the adults also insulted and threatened the children after hearing them speak Ukrainian.

“They twisted a child’s arm, broke a toy drone, and threw fragments at the boy,” Ukraine’s Consulate General in Gdańsk said.

The consulate said the fragments scratched the boy but caused no serious injury.

Other attacks on Ukrainians in Poland

The Bydgoszcz case is one of several recent assaults involving Ukrainian victims.

Police detained two women on 14 August over an attack on Ukrainian men outside a Poznań restaurant the previous day. A video showed one woman insulting, spitting at, and striking the men.

In July, three men allegedly beat a Ukrainian couple in Wrocław after asking whether they were Ukrainian. In Łódź, a man allegedly attacked a passerby he mistook for Ukrainian, breaking his nose and jaw.

The violence has prompted public protests. On 9 August, the Committee for the Defense of Democracy organized “Don’t be indifferent” rallies in 22 cities. Two days earlier, Warsaw organizers delivered a petition with more than 11,000 signatures calling for government action against attacks on Ukrainians.

Deepening Polish-Ukrainian rift and decline in relations

The rise in anti-Ukrainian violence in Poland has unfolded amid worsening political relations between Kyiv and Warsaw. Polish support for accepting Ukrainian refugees fell from 94% in March 2022 to 48% by early 2026, while politicians increasingly use Ukraine as a wedge issue.

Historical disputes over the Volhynia massacres and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) have also strained relations. The rift sharpened after Zelenskyy signed a decree granting a Ukrainian special forces unit the honorary title “Heroes of the UPA.” Polish President Karol Nawrocki announced on 19 June that he had decided to revoke Zelenskyy’s Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state honor.

Un commentaire à chaud sur la vidéo enregisrée par l’ancien ministre de la défense Fedorov, où il formule une critique du fonctionnement politique du pays et appelle à des élections.
Vous entendrez parler de crise politique, de fragilisation de l’équipe présidentielle, de l’émergence d’un opposant politique. Rien de cela n’est faux, on rentre dans une zone de turbulence. Mais pour moi, le vrai sujet n’est pas forcément là.

Les critiques que l’ancien ministre fait dans sa vidéo ne sont pas nouvelles. Elles sont partagées par un grand nombre d’Ukrainiens: nécessité de faire vivre la démocratie, critique de la gestion d’équipe par le président, inacceptabilité de la corruption en temps de guerre. Comme je l’ai dit à plusieurs reprises, les Ukrainiens savent faire la part des choses entre ce qu’ils reprochent à leur président et à leur parlement, et la nécessité de soutenir leurs institutions pour préserver la souveraineté de l’Etat. Mais tout le monde sait que le jour où les élections se tiendront, ce bilan va peser.

Sur le fond, les critiques de Fedorov ne sont pas le signe d’un dysfonctionnement politique, mais plutôt d’un fonctionnement assez sain. Un acteur politique de premier plan se positionne comme une alternative à Zelensky. Ce n’est pas un militaire mais un civil; ce n’est pas non plus quelqu’un d’étranger à la défense de l’Ukraine. C’est une personnalité qui a des soutiens dans la société; il est populaire dans les milieux tech des forces armées et de la société. Fedorov a clairement la posture d’un canddiat à la prochaine présidentielle. Et c’est tout ce que l’on peut souhaiter à une démocratie: une pluralité de candidats portant des projets sérieux. Que cet opposant potentiel soit issu du cercle même des proches de Zelensky est aussi, finalement, très banal dans un fonctionnement démocratique. Il y a peut-être une crise politique, mais pas de crise systémique.

Ce qui est nouveau dans l’adresse de Fedorov, c’est cependant l’idée que les élections sont possibles. L’argument politique est recevable: la guerre s’est installée dans la durée, refuser la tenue d’élections, c’est aussi donner à la Russie une victoire en la laissant rythmer le timing du jeu politique ukrainien. Mais Fedorov ne parle pas seulement du principe. Sans rentrer dans le détail, il dit: la tenue d’élections est possible. L’Ukraine doit retrouver un processus d’alternance démocratique, sans attendre la sortie de loi martiale.

Et là, il faut se rappeler qui est Fedorov: ancien ministre de la numérisation qui a transformé une bureaucratie d’imprimante et de papier en un système modernisé et rapide. Ancien ministre de la Défense qui a accompagné l’innovation et l’esprit d’initiative qui permettent aujourd’hui à l’armée ukrainienne d’accomplir des choses que personne n’avait anticipées. S’il travaille vraiment à un projet permettant de tenir des élections en temps de guerre, nous avons tout intérêt à suivre le sujet de près. J’imagine que le vote électronique sera au coeur de ce projet – collègues spécialistes du sujet, réglez vos radars, car ce sera riche d’enseignements.

J’attends la suite avec intérêt plus qu’avec inquiétude. Une fois de plus, l’Ukraine pourrait être là où personne ne l’attend.

Ukraine's anti-corruption bureau and anti-corruption prosecutors opened a special operation against an alleged criminal organization reaching into the Office of the President, the two agencies said on 19 August 2026. Detectives said a sitting and a former lawmaker led the group, released a wiretap recording that points to the presidential administration, and seized a document laying out a plan to shape public opinion around the anti-corruption fight. Media reports place a deputy head of the President's Office among those searched, though investigators have not confirmed any names.

A case named after a Hollywood film

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP) ran searches on the morning of 19 August and unveiled the operation hours later. The two agencies said they had exposed an alleged criminal organization run by a sitting and a former member of parliament, with senior Office of the President officials taking part, the bureau said. It promised further details later.

The operation carries a mocking name, Forest Gump, drawn from the suspects' own words. In a 47-second recording of intercepted conversations, one man ties the label to how the group allegedly hid money. 

"We've got Saving Private Ryan, right? But only an idiot would register the theft of money—and their tuition on top of it—on their own children. That's why, Forest Gump," he says.

Other fragments reference cash and the presidential administration directly. "Well, there are four bags of money there," one voice says on the tape. Another adds: "If we do this, you can drive to the Office of the President yourselves. Believe me. I can see it."

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The document found in the search

During the searches, NABU said, agents recovered a document containing an "anti-crisis" communications plan built around the work of a temporary investigative commission in Ukraine's parliament. The bureau described it as a set of communication steps and messages aimed at managing the public situation around that commission.

The plan maps out a media campaign across Telegram, social platforms, talk shows, and named Ukrainian and international outlets. It casts the commission head as the main voice, frames the effort as “audit, not attack,” and aims to build trust in the commission while shielding the President and Cabinet.

Who investigators are said to be targeting

Media reports say the investigative actions include searches at Iryna Mudra, a deputy head of the Office of the President. A source told Ukrinform that detectives were working at Mudra, who oversees judicial reform and the creation of a special tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine. NABU said it would not comment on the ongoing actions for now.

Beyond Mudra, the case reportedly involves member of parliament Vadym Stolar and former lawmaker Maksym Mykytas, along with Justice Ministry officials, RBC-Ukraine reported. 

The raids reach a state-linked bank

NABU also searched Sens Bank's supervisory board, including suspended chair Mykola Hladyshchenko, sources told Ekonomichna Pravda — a thread running back to the "Mindich tapes," where those under investigation discussed lining up the bank's board seats as their own "quotas." The recording also echoed that case's reported detail: a former minister's son schooled at a Swiss college costing up to $200,000 a year, which the tape's "children's tuition" line appears to touch.

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The Mindich tapes: anti-graft recordings expose Zelenskyy associate’s $100M nuclear operator protection racket

Echoes of the Mindich tapes

The operation lands atop a major graft scandal of Ukraine's wartime politics. In November 2025, NABU unveiled the Mindich tapes, documenting a $100 million kickback network around state nuclear operator Energoatom and reaching President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's former business partner. The case later widened to touch other parts of Ukraine's defense and energy sectors. It followed a summer 2025 attempt to curb the anti-corruption bodies' independence, which mass protests forced the authorities to reverse.

Ukraine's weapons marketplace DOT-Chain Defense has compressed delivery times from months to weeks after one year of operation, the country's Defense Ministry reported. For the fastest product categories—electronic warfare gear, ground robots, interceptor drones—orders now reach units within 24 hours.

Ukraine's war against Russia's invasion has pushed Kyiv to rebuild military procurement from the ground up, trading slow bureaucratic pipelines for digital platforms where frontline units pick and receive their own weapons faster than Western militaries have managed. Domestic manufacturers now make 90% of newly authorized systems.

Fastest deliveries measured in hours

The Defense Ministry and the Defense Procurement Agency DOT have jointly driven the acceleration, according to the ministry's statement.

"Delivery times for drones and other systems have shrunk from months to a matter of weeks, and often to days," the ministry said.

Beyond that general compression, several categories saw delivery within a single day. Electronic warfare systems, ground robotic platforms, reconnaissance and bomber drones, interceptor drones, and FPV drones on both fiber-optic and radio control all reached units within 24 hours. Ammunition for unmanned systems arrived within six days.

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Over the first year, the platform shipped more than 1.2 million drones and other systems. Units now choose from 1,181 products made by 300 domestic manufacturers.

How the marketplace works

DOT-Chain Defense supplements centralized state supply rather than replacing it, the ministry noted. Combat units use allocated funds to browse and order the equipment they need for their section of the front. The marketplace handles contracts, payments, and delivery.

The platform's drone constructor tool lets units customize drone configurations before ordering. A dedicated training course on using the marketplace recently launched inside the Army+ mobile app.

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Broader procurement picture

The one-year milestone caps a period of rapid scaling across Ukraine's defense procurement. The country contracted about $8 billion worth of drones in the first half of 2026—double the same period last year, according to the Defense Ministry.

More than 400 combat units now shop for weapons through the marketplace's companion Brave1 Market program using points earned for confirmed battlefield activity. Washington modeled its own Unmanned Aircraft Systems Marketplace on the Ukrainian original earlier this year.

The 1st Corps of Ukraine's National Guard, known as Azov, says it destroyed 67 Russian fuel tanks holding 4,221 tons of fuel in occupied Donetsk Oblast, in an operation it named Hell-2. The unit released video of the strikes on 17 August, saying it had spent a month tracking where Russian forces moved and stored the fuel before hitting it.

Fuel is the blood of Russia's war, which is why its forces increasingly hide storage sites and route deliveries through improvised logistics hubs. Strikes on those hubs strip Russian units of what they need to move, supply, and fight. There have already been cases of Russian forces concealing fuel in grain trucks in occupied territories.

Azov warned the Russian forces before the strike

Azov says it flagged the fuel sites a month before hitting them, and struck when the Russians kept using them anyway.

“A month ago, we warned the occupier: ‘Azov sees your movements and will strike at the right moment.’ But some units of the Russian Armed Forces continued to store fuel in occupied Donetsk Oblast,” Azov said.

Azov emphasizes that it does not attack civilian gas stations or civilians. The operation targeted facilities used to supply Russian occupation forces. At the same time, according to Azov fighters, Russian military infrastructure remains a legitimate target.

The Russians didn’t get the message the first time

Hell-2 is likely a follow-up to the Hell operation, during which the first series of strikes, Azov also targeted the fuel logistics of Russian forces in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

On 12 July, Azov reported striking a secret Russian fuel base in Novoamvrosiivka. Drone operators from the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard conducted reconnaissance and used Hornet drones to strike the facility. The strikes damaged fuel tanks and the base’s infrastructure and blocked the railway track.

According to the report, the Russians used the facility as a logistics hub to supply their occupation forces. After the strike, they were forced to abandon the base and move their logistics operations from the occupied territory into Russia.

Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) have retaken Andriivka-Klevtsove, a settlement on the border between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, and captured 30 Russian soldiers, the SOF said on 17 August.

The operation is part of Ukraine’s broader eight-month counteroffensive on the Oleksandrivka axis, during which Kyiv says its forces have recaptured 745 square kilometers and 26 villages across Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The offensive has pushed Russian forces back from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast after months of Russian advances toward the region.

Russian forces infiltrated the settlement in small groups

Andriivka-Klevtsove, formerly known by its Soviet name Iskra, had been targeted by Russian forces attempting to gradually establish positions in the settlement.

According to the SOF, Russian troops had been infiltrating the area in small groups and occupying positions on the Oleksandrivka axis.

SOF forces cleared Russian positions and captured 30 troops

Operators from the SOF’s 3rd Regiment, working with an SOF psychological operations center, carried out a coordinated operation to clear Russian forces from the settlement.

Footage released by the SOF shows the ground phase of the operation, including Ukrainian special forces advancing through the settlement and forcing Russian troops from their positions.

Thirty Russian servicemen surrendered and were taken prisoner, according to the SOF. Russian troops who continued to resist were killed.

Ukrainian forces perform traditional “Chasing Away Vipers” ritual

After securing the settlement, Ukrainian special forces raised the Ukrainian flag and performed a traditional local ritual known as “Chasing Away Vipers.”

The ritual, included in Ukraine’s National Inventory of Elements of Intangible Cultural Heritage, is intended to symbolically drive evil and misfortune from a home.

The SOF said the ritual was used this time to “cleanse” the settlement of the Russian forces it described as “real vipers.”

Andriivka-Klevtsove adds to Ukraine’s gains on the Oleksandrivka axis

Kyiv announced on 12 August that Ukrainian forces had recaptured 745 square kilometers and 26 villages during the Oleksandrivka counteroffensive, which began on 29 January.

The operation was aimed at stopping Russia’s advance toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and pushing Russian forces back beyond its administrative border. Kyiv said Russian forces suffered at least 9,550 killed and more than 6,600 wounded during the operation.

The US-based Institute for the Study of War assessed that the Ukrainian advances showed Kyiv could still conduct significant tactical advances and restore limited mechanized maneuver on parts of the front.

Romania detected more than 100 drones involved in seven attacks on Ukraine’s Danube ports in recent days, interim Romanian Defense Minister Radu Miruță told Romanian channel Digi24 on 17 August 2026. He said the attacks were the most intense recorded recently and that Ukrainian forces destroyed most of the drones “a few dozen meters from Romanian airspace.”

Russia’s growing attacks on Ukraine’s Danube ports put a key export route at risk as Kyiv seeks other outlets while its Black Sea ports are under attack. They also put Ukraine's southern border region under pressure as Kyiv develops trade links with Moldova and Romania, and NATO routes more military aid through Romania.

The latest drone swarms remained over Ukraine, and officials found no indication that Romania’s threat level had risen, Miruță stated. The Romanian military nevertheless remained on alert as attacks intensified across the Danube.

Ukraine looks south for trade and military aid

With Russia hitting its ports, Ukraine is turning to Romania and Moldova to keep trade moving. Kyiv and Chișinău are discussing a rail link through Moldova to Romania’s Constanța port, though Ukraine estimates it could carry only about 10% of its grain exports.

The rail proposal comes as Russian port strikes have cut monthly agricultural exports by 20–30% and left up to 10 million tons of grain in storage without buyers, Agriculture Minister Taras Vysotskyi has said.

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NATO said in December that a second aid hub in Romania would begin operating in January. It was designed to supplement the main center in Rzeszów, Poland, and route supplies toward Ukraine’s southern and eastern fronts.

Romania faces repeated drone incursions

Russian drones targeting Ukraine have repeatedly entered Romania as Moscow attacks Ukrainian ports across the Danube. More than 40 such incursions had been recorded by early June, Romanian Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu said.

The most serious occurred on 29 May, when a drone hit an apartment building in Galați. Two people were injured, and about 70 residents fled or were evacuated.

Vladimir Putin suggested that the aircraft might have been Ukrainian, but Romania’s forensic investigation later identified it as a Russian-built Geran-2.

Romanian forces later shot down three drones in 72 hours in July, while Miruță said Spanish pilots and Romanian troops destroyed a fourth on 16 August.

Debris from drones intercepted over Ukraine has also washed onto Romania’s coast, prompting temporary access restrictions while specialists checked for explosives.

Bucharest is buying low-altitude radars and ground interceptors through the EU’s SAFE program. Miruță said drones often fly at 70 to 150 meters, and ground systems would be cheaper to use than fighter-launched missiles.

The head of UN Tourism, Shaikha Al Nowais, named medical tourism and Ukraine's IT sector as the country's strongest cards for winning back foreign visitors after the war, at a Kyiv briefing. Ukraine already holds everything a tourism economy needs, she said, from culture and landscapes to cuisine. Al Nowais, the first woman to lead the organization in its history, was making the first visit by a UN Tourism chief to Ukraine in a decade.

A UN specialized agency publicly treated Ukraine as a future destination rather than a war zone, as Kyiv tries to anchor its reconstruction to sectors that can earn hard currency and bring people back to emptied regions. Both sectors she named were among Ukraine's stronger performers before 2022.

Before the invasion, Ukraine was receiving about 13 million visitors a year, with tourism worth roughly 3 to 4 percent of GDP, RBC-Ukraine reported citing the numbers mentioned at the briefing.

"Bringing all stakeholders in the tourism process together with the state under one umbrella could unlock great potential," Al Nowais said.

A medical tourism hub before the war

Before Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine had a reputation as an affordable place for fertility treatment and surrogacy, dentistry, laser eye surgery, and cosmetic procedures, the US-based Medical Tourism Association said. Prices often ran a fraction of Western European ones. In the late 2010s, the country's medical tourism association counted tens of thousands of foreign patients a year. Because that trade rests on clinics and specialists rather than rebuilt infrastructure, Al Nowais said it could bounce back fairly quickly once the war ends.

A tech sector that grew through the war

Ukraine's IT exports reached about $6.8 billion in 2021, close to a tenth of all the country's exports, and the industry has been one of the few to keep growing through the war. The same ecosystem produced the Diia app, a state-services platform installed by more than a third of Ukrainian adults before the invasion, along with globally used products such as Grammarly and GitLab. A sector that has shown it can ship and scale under bombardment is, on Al Nowais's logic, well placed to build the booking, logistics and guide services a returning tourism market will need.

Ukraine's Acting Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha met her in Kyiv on 15 August 2026 to discuss tourism's place in reconstruction, and UN Tourism agreed to provide 500 scholarships for Ukrainians to study at its Online Academy, 200 of them reserved for veterans, with Kyiv setting the rest of the allocation.

Latvia's public broadcaster opened a new fundraising drive on 17 August to pay for the rehabilitation of wounded Ukrainian soldiers, LSM reported. The effort is timed to Ukraine's Independence Day on 24 August. Donations run through the charity Ziedot.lv.

Russia's invasion has produced a generation of wounded and traumatized Ukrainians whose recovery will outlast the war. The state already counts more than a million registered veterans, a number that climbs every month.

A new channel for Ukraine's wounded

The drive, called "Together with Ukraine in Thought and Deed!", runs from 17 August to 13 September 2026. Latvian Public Media (LSM) organized it with Ziedot.lv and the Ukrainian Embassy in Latvia. It is dedicated to rehabilitation. Organizers said every euro goes to that goal. Latvians can give online through Ziedot.lv, or by calling a national donation line charged at €5 including VAT.

"Fighting for the security of us all"

The campaign's ambassador is Odita Krenberga, an LSM journalist who has reported from the Ukrainian front line. She said only seconds separated her from death or serious injury, and that many others never got that chance. Russia has taken hundreds of thousands of lives and wounded even more, she said, calling it a painful injustice. Ukrainians, she added, are fighting "for the security of us all, for a safe Europe."

Wounds that take years to heal

Rūta Dimanta, who heads Ziedot.lv, said "the wounds of war take a long time to heal." They are not only physical, she said, but also the pain of loss, helplessness, and injustice. Soldiers must live with the deaths of comrades and the pain in their souls. The money cannot erase that, but it can fund recovery in Ukraine and Latvia, allowing them to carry on with their lives.

Latvia keeps giving

Since the war began, LSM and Ziedot.lv have raised more than €2 million across earlier appeals. The two partners have already sent Ukraine a locally built naval drone, and Latvia has funneled millions to front-line oblasts on the Russian border. Latvia has also pledged 0.25% of its GDP a year to Ukraine's defense—a bigger share than most larger allies give.

Ukraine brought the world's most battle-tested counter-drone experience to a NATO exercise. From 3 to 14 August, Ukraine took part in NATO's Baltic Trust 2026 exercise in Latvia, which focused on countering drones and other threats posed by uncrewed aerial systems, the General Staff reported.

The exercise responds to a mounting Russian threat against NATO's Baltic flank. Russia has probed the alliance's eastern edge so aggressively that NATO scrambled over the Baltic, jumping more than 250% in July.

Also, Moscow has increasingly launched drones on the Baltic States. Even on 14 August, the final day of the drill, a NATO fighter shot down a drone over Latvia after Russian electronic warfare pushed it off course, the second Baltic drone incursion that week. Baltic Trust 2026 was NATO's answer: about 650 participants from 24 countries building the counter-drone defenses that the threat demands.

The exercise tested systems working together

Baltic Trust focused on integration, not single technologies. Soldiers, specialists, and industry representatives jointly tested new technological solutions in conditions close to a modern operational environment, the General Staff said.

The core was whether the pieces work as one system. Participants checked how detection tools, command-and-control systems, and counter-drone measures can exchange data, form a common operational picture, and enable coordinated response.

Ukraine's experience is the draw

Ukraine's participation carries particular weight in this field. No NATO member has faced the scale of drone attack Ukraine confronts nightly, and its forces have built and continually adapt the detection, interception, and electronic-warfare methods that down Russian drones by the tens of thousands.

That makes Ukraine a source of hard-won practical knowledge for allies still preparing for threats Ukraine already lives with. Bringing Ukrainian experience into a NATO drill turns the country's battlefield lessons into shared allied capability, on exactly the drone warfare the alliance is scrambling to counter on its eastern flank.

The exercise builds collective defense

Baltic Trust served NATO's broader readiness. Jointly testing and integrating such solutions helps turn technological innovation into practical capabilities that strengthen readiness and collective defense.

Previously, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service Head Sergey Naryshkin accused NATO of escalating military activity near Russia’s borders. He warned that Poland and the Baltic states would be the first to suffer in the event of a war between Moscow and the Alliance.

Russians moving into occupied Mariupol are buying apartments built over Ukrainian homes destroyed during Russia’s 2022 siege, German broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) reported on 15 August 2026. Ukrainians who lived on the sites received none of the new units, a source told the outlet.

The construction is part of Russia’s wider Russification of occupied Mariupol. Occupation authorities have separately listed nearly 900 apartments for redistribution, including properties belonging to residents forced out by the siege.

Economist Vyacheslav Shiryaev said the new apartments are being bought primarily by newcomers, including Russian security personnel, officials, and military logistics workers. Some simply want to live by the sea but cannot afford property in occupied Crimea or Sochi, a Russian Black Sea resort, he said.

In Russia-occupied regions, borrowers with Russian citizenship are offered mortgages at 2% annual interest, DW reported.

Occupation authorities also ordered some residents out of apartments that had survived the attacks. Some were sent to hostels or accommodation on Mariupol’s outskirts instead of receiving replacement apartments, a source told DW.

Unable to enter occupied Mariupol, DW based its investigation on former residents’ accounts, satellite imagery, and online research.

Homes erased, residents pushed out

For former residents, homes destroyed in the siege are being replaced with apartments for newcomers.

Halyna Artemova, an English teacher, lived in one of the demolished apartment blocks for almost 40 years. A Russian missile struck the building in March 2022. Wounded by shrapnel, she escaped with her mother and son. A new high-rise now stands where her home once did.

Yevhen Sosnovskyi, a photographer, and his wife had lived in a neighboring building for 20 years. It caught fire during the attack, and Russian troops drove residents out without allowing them to take food or clothes.

Sosnovsky photographed his apartment before and after the attack, preserving a record of the home they lost. A parking lot now covers the site.

“They’re building on human bones, and fast, to eradicate the traces of their crimes,” Sosnovsky told DW.

Russia remakes a city it destroyed

The new housing is part of a wider Russian effort to reshape Mariupol after its forces destroyed and occupied the city. The UN assessed that up to 90% of the city’s residential buildings were damaged or destroyed.

On 16 March 2022, Russia bombed the Mariupol Drama Theater, where civilians sheltered beneath a large “CHILDREN” sign. An eyewitness described chaos, blood, and survivors using torn blankets as bandages.

In the wake of its destruction of the city, Moscow plans to move about 114,000 of its citizens into occupied Ukraine, with Mariupol as one of the main destinations.

Entry-level employers are finding it harder—and more expensive—to recruit young men. On Work.ua, one of Ukraine’s largest job platforms, the number of male candidates aged 18 to 22 who responded to vacancies fell 19% between July 2025 and July 2026, Lesia Prymakova told Ukrainska Pravda. The decline reached 29% in hospitality and retail.

At the same time, advertised entry-level pay moved close to Work.ua’s overall median. The median salary for vacancies open to students rose 24%, while pay for jobs requiring no experience increased 23%.

The candidate pool shrank after the government eased wartime travel restrictions for men aged 18 to 22 last summer, following an initiative by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The government said the change was intended to discourage families from taking boys abroad before their 18th birthdays, when the previous rules would have prevented them from leaving.

Hospitality and retail feel the squeeze

Restaurant owners tied the decline in young applicants directly to the eased travel rules. Sommelier Oleh Kravchenko, who owns Kyiv wine bar Win Bar, said two of his staff, a bartender and a cook, were preparing to leave the country, and that the bar had begun hiring more women, whereas server positions had earlier been held only by men.

He said his payroll had risen 5 to 10% and that he now raised wages at least every six months, even as rent, utilities, and food costs also climbed. Olena Borysova, who owns the GastroFamily group behind the Bilyi Naliv chain, said young applicants had become rare over the past year.

Ukraine’s labor shortage extends far beyond this age group. Ukraine’s full-time workforce fell from 7 million in 2021 to 5.3 million by late 2025, while the National Bank expects the net outflow of workers to continue into 2027.

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Ukraine’s economy posted its sharpest contraction since the wartime recovery began

Against that backdrop, 48% of companies reported labor shortages in a survey cited by Ukrainska Pravda, without attributing them specifically to the travel change, and Work.ua put the overall median advertised wage up 20% year on year. These are nominal advertised salaries; annual inflation stood at 7.7% in July, so the real increase is smaller.

No one knows how many stayed abroad

No reliable count shows how many young men remained abroad. Social Policy Minister Denys Uliutin cited an estimate from European partners that some 400,000 men aged 18 to 22 left Ukraine between August 2025 and April 2026. However, the estimate does not identify unique individuals or subtract those who later returned, Vasyl Voskoboinyk, head of the NGO Office of Migration Policy, told Ukrainska Pravda.

Voskoboinyk estimated that around 300,000 men in this age group had been working, equivalent to about 2% of Ukraine’s labor force, and said their departures had not caused a broader labor-market collapse.

Available education data show no comparable decline. The Education Ministry recorded a 28% year-on-year rise in university applications, while Kyiv-Mohyla rector Serhiy Kvit said the academy had not seen mass withdrawals. Applications count submissions rather than enrolled or retained students, so the increase indicates continued demand for places rather than a settled outcome.

Voskoboinyk said it was still too early to determine whether the policy had reduced departures among 16- and 17-year-old boys, its stated long-term aim.

Employers widen who they recruit

Employers are recruiting more broadly to fill the gap. Olena Kolesnikova of the Federation of Employers said firms were increasingly willing to hire from groups they had previously overlooked, with 94.4% open to internally displaced people, 91% to veterans, and 88% to people with disabilities.

Keeping young people in Ukraine, she argued, would take more than pay. "The right question is not how to keep young people from leaving, but how to make it worthwhile for a young person to start a career and build a life in Ukraine after they finish studying," she said.

Slovak company STV Machinery has produced the first two prototype hulls for the BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle after a 36-year break in production. The plant in Dubnica nad Váhom began developing an updated design in 2024, and a contract with an unnamed foreign customer was signed in late 2025, with serial production scheduled for 2026 to 2027.

The Slovak outlet Future Army reported this on 15 August, citing STV Group's director of special projects, Pavel Beran. He said one prototype is being used to test final assembly and the integration of weapons systems, while the second is undergoing physical and stress testing. The company will not disclose the customer's identity, citing security and business-ethics considerations.

Ukraine has a substantial need for armoured vehicles. Its forces already use and modernise the BMP-1, and cooperation with Western manufacturers could help replenish the fleet faster. In 2024, for example, Ukraine and Germany's Rheinmetall agreed to produce the Lynx IFV and to expand defence cooperation.

The Slovak plant has returned to BMP-1 production

According to Militarnyi, the new hulls remain outwardly similar to the Soviet BMP-1 design but have been reworked to more modern requirements. STV Machinery revised the design to meet NATO standards for ergonomics and materials, and strengthened the armour using more modern materials.

Future vehicles will offer a choice of powerplant, with Western-made engines among the options. STV Machinery, the Slovak firm, will produce the hulls and other components, after which its Czech sister company STV Group will carry out full assembly and testing.

The exact size of the order is not yet known, though earlier reports suggested production could eventually reach up to 100 hulls a year.

The company has not named the customer. Defense Express suggested as early as December 2025 that it could be Ukraine. One scenario the outlet floated was the supply of hulls or turretless vehicles, which would allow other combat modules to be fitted.

Why Slovakia is building the BMP-1 again

The Dubnica nad Váhom plant previously built licensed versions of the BMP-1, known locally as the BVP-1. Serial production there ran until 1989, after which the plant went more than three decades without making new hulls for the vehicle. The site is the same, but the manufacturer is not: the original vehicles came off the ZŤS Dubnica nad Váhom line in the Czechoslovak era, while today's hulls are made by STV Machinery.

At the same time, the BMP-1 remains a vehicle of the 1960s. Even a modernised hull does not change the platform's fundamental limitations, particularly its level of protection. So if Ukraine really is behind the order, it is likely more a way to rapidly increase the number of armoured vehicles than a long-term replacement for modern Western IFVs, Defense Express noted in 2025.

Also Defense Express stressed that the customer's identity remains only speculation, adding that the buyer could turn out to be another country that operates or once operated the BMP-1, and that firmer detail will have to wait for the company.

Former Polish prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński accused groups in western Ukraine of desecrating remains and stealing WWII-era victims’ jewelry. The leader of the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) wrote on X on 14 August 2026 that his party would demand Polish government intervention.

Kaczyński’s claim comes amid growing anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland and a dispute with Kyiv over how Polish wartime victims are remembered. However, Kaczyński’s X post named no location and provided no public evidence, while authorized Polish-Ukrainian teams continue exhuming and reburying Polish victims.

“Illegal excavations at the sites of former Polish villages in Eastern Galicia are turning out to be real,” Kaczyński wrote, referring to a historical region now largely in western Ukraine.

He called the alleged looters “black diggers,” a term for people who dig through burials or archaeological sites for valuables. He said they were pilfering the graves of Poles killed in the World War II-era Volhynia massacres and alleged that local Ukrainian officials were allowing it.

Kaczyński said PiS would appeal to Poland’s state authorities, including the Foreign Ministry, and demand “explanations and a response.”

The evidence described by PiS has not been made public. Onet reported that it was unclear which incidents he meant and that neither government had responded at the time. PiS spokesperson Rafał Bochenek later told the publication Interia that citizens had sent photographs allegedly showing damaged graves and listings for excavated objects. Interia published neither.

Polish-Ukrainian teams continue authorized exhumations

Meanwhile, Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), the country's state historical institute, said Ukraine authorized its latest excavations at Ostrówki and Wola Ostrowiecka in Volyn.

From 13 July to 7 August, Polish and Ukrainian specialists recovered 55 victims, including 26 children. They also secured more than 300 personal items and pieces of clothing. The remains are due to be buried at Ostrówki cemetery on 30 August.

The excavation followed a wider thaw. Ukraine lifted its moratorium on Polish searches, while joint teams exhumed and reburied 42 people at Puźniki in 2025. Both countries have exchanged lists of sites for further searches.

Historical disputes deepen the Polish-Ukrainian rift

Relations between Kyiv and Warsaw worsened after Ukraine gave a military unit the honorary title “Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)."

The UPA fought for Ukrainian independence but is held responsible in Poland for the World War II-era massacres of Polish civilians. Polish President Karol Nawrocki later stripped President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state honor.

Violence is also rising on the Polish streets. Reports of suspected hate crimes against Ukrainians in Poland rose by more than 30% in the first half of 2026, even as anti-xenophobic voices became more visible online. Kaczyński’s claim adds an unverified criminal allegation to the dispute.

Ukrainian forces have used British drones to attack targets inside Russia for the first time, adding two UK-built systems to Kyiv’s arsenal, The Sunday Times reported on 15 August, citing Ukrainian military sources. The newspaper explicitly identified oil refineries in Volgograd and Yaroslavl among the targets struck during the previous six months.

Ukraine still relies mainly on domestically produced drones. But the British systems give Kyiv cheaper weapons that can be replenished and launched in volume. They help sustain Kyiv's attacks on Russian oil, logistics, and military targets without running down limited stocks of Western long-range missiles.

The Sunday Times called this a new phase in UK–Ukraine military cooperation. A senior British defense source said the deployments showed London was “not nervous anymore” about Russian pressure.

What British support adds to Ukraine’s homegrown drone force

Britain has supplied Ukraine with two systems with very different ranges. The Nyan, a jet-powered one-way attack drone made by BAE Systems subsidiary Callen-Lenz, can travel more than 150 miles. The second is catapult-launched and has a range above 600 miles; The Sunday Times withheld its manufacturer’s name on security grounds.

Long-range drones typically cost £50,000 to £100,000, compared with more than £750,000 to replace a Storm Shadow missile, the newspaper said. They can also be stockpiled and launched in swarms, helping Ukraine strain Russian air defenses without exhausting finite missile stocks.

The drones extend wider British support. In June, the UK announced funding for 150,000 Ukrainian-produced drones by the end of 2026. Ukrainian forces have also deployed British Rapid Ranger systems against Russian Shaheds and used UK-supplied Storm Shadows inside Russia, protecting Ukraine at home while widening its options across the border.

Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign reaches 52 Russian regions

Across Ukraine’s overall campaign, The Sunday Times reported almost 700 successful deep strikes between January and June. They reached 52 Russian regions and caused more than £35 billion (about $47.3 billion) in economic damage.

A senior Ukrainian military source said the British systems were proving successful. “When we launch them, we always say Slava Ukraini and God save the King,” the source told The Sunday Times.

Former UK Air Marshal Greg Bagwell predicted Moscow would “sabre rattle” and potentially declare British factories legitimate targets. Other defense sources warned of intensified cyberattacks or espionage against the UK.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) plans to abolish special border zones along several boundaries with Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia, according to draft orders reviewed by the Russian outlet Agentstvo.

The proposed changes would remove restrictions that currently treat movement between Russia and occupied parts of Ukraine much like crossing an international border. The FSB says the move follows Russia’s claimed incorporation of the occupied Ukrainian territories into Russia.

FSB seeks to remove border zones

The draft orders, as reported by Ukrainska Pravda, would invalidate previous FSB orders establishing border zones along the boundaries between Russia’s Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and the occupied territories of Ukraine.

A similar change is planned for occupied Crimea, where the current border zone along the boundary with occupied Kherson Oblast would be abolished.

The existing rules effectively impose additional controls on people entering and leaving the occupied territories, making movement subject to procedures similar to those used at Russia’s state border.

In the draft orders, the FSB justifies the changes by referring to the alleged “admission into the Russian Federation” of the occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts.

Russia illegally claimed to annex those territories, along with Zaporizhzhia Oblast, in September 2022. The move has been rejected by Ukraine and the international community, and Russia does not control all of the territory it claims to have annexed.

Border zone would remain around Crimea's islands

The FSB proposal would not completely eliminate the border zone in occupied Crimea.

A restricted zone would remain “within the boundaries of the Black Sea islands belonging to the Russian Federation,” according to the draft. The FSB’s regional directorate would determine where and when people could enter the zone and would install warning signs.

The proposed changes would remove the existing border zones along Russia’s boundaries with occupied Ukrainian territories, while retaining a border zone around certain Black Sea islands in occupied Crimea.

Russia treats occupied territory as part of its territory

The planned changes reflect Moscow’s effort to incorporate occupied Ukrainian territories into Russia’s administrative and legal system.

In September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed so-called “accession treaties” claiming to incorporate Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts into Russia. Russia’s parliament subsequently approved the claims.

The treaties purported to define the boundaries of the annexed territories according to the borders they had on the day Russia claimed to admit them into the Russian Federation, despite Russia not controlling the entirety of those regions.

Russia previously used similar measures to formalize its control over occupied Crimea after illegally annexing the peninsula in 2014.

A Kyiv court has sentenced an unemployed man to 15 years in prison with confiscation of his property for carrying out arson attacks on behalf of Russian intelligence, Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) said on 13 August. The man was recruited while looking for "easy money" on Telegram channels and carried out two arson attacks in Kyiv before fleeing to Odesa, the SBU reported.

Russian intelligence increasingly recruits Ukrainians through Telegram for arson and sabotage. It targets people seeking quick money and treats them as disposable operatives, paying small sums for a single task and discarding them once they are caught.

The Russian agent carried out two arson attacks

According to the SBU, the man first set fire to a relay cabinet belonging to a railway signaling system. Russia intended the attack to disrupt freight logistics, including supplies to areas near the front.

The agent later burned a volunteer’s SUV used to deliver humanitarian aid and evacuate civilians from areas affected by Russia’s war. He carried out the attacks at night, using a flammable mixture and filming each incident on his smartphone before sending the footage to his Russian handler.

The SBU arrested him in Odesa in July 2025, where he had attempted to hide after carrying out the attacks. Investigators seized his phone, which contained evidence of his cooperation with Russia.

A court found him guilty on two counts — sabotage committed under martial law, and intentional destruction of property by arson — both carried out as part of a group acting on prior conspiracy. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison with confiscation of his property.

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Easy money, hard time: other Telegram recruits jailed too

The case follows several similar convictions. In a May case, an agent received 15 years for burning a railway relay cabinet near a Dnipro station in an attempt to disrupt frontline logistics. The SBU said the unemployed local, recruited through Telegram, filmed the arson and reported it to his handler, then was caught before he could carry out a planned series of attacks on the city's critical infrastructure.

In June 2026, another agent was sentenced to 15 years for preparing to burn an electrical substation in Kropyvnytskyi.

In July, SBU investigators reported that a GRU agent in Zaporizhzhia received 15 years for preparing explosives for Russian-organized attacks.

Drones have pushed armored vehicles off the roads to Ukraine's front line, a Ukrainian brigade commander told RBC-Ukraine. Denys Perch, who commands the 107th Territorial Defense Brigade, says the drone-saturated belt has grown so deep that pickups no longer reach forward positions. The one enemy weapon his jammers can't touch is the fiber-optic drone.

The war has become a contest over who can pull people off the battlefield fastest, as cheap drones make any human movement near the front a target. Ukraine keeps out-inventing Russia at the front, but Russia copies each advance and floods the line with it at state scale.

When armor becomes the target

Until recently, armored vehicles still drove supplies to logistics hubs near the front. That is now almost impossible. Perch says that when a large, armored machine appears, Russian forces treat it as a prize target and swarm it with dozens of drones and munitions. Perch would sooner park his armor than seat soldiers inside it.

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A kill zone that keeps widening

On the busiest sectors, Perch says, the kill zone—the drone-ruled strip around the contact line—now runs 15 to 20 kilometers deep. Some positions take three days to reach on foot. Where troops once drove most of the way and walked the last stretch, they now walk it all.

Robots take the drive

Under Perch, the brigade climbed, by his account, from around 22nd to third among Ukraine's Territorial Defense forces on the military's strike-results leaderboard, the home-guard units now fighting on the front. Ground robots—unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs)—do the work that armor cannot. They haul supplies and evacuate the wounded, though the robot often can't be brought back. His brigade runs over 1,500 logistics missions a month by heavy bomber drones alone, and still more by first-person-view (FPV) drones and robots. Russia hunts those bombers, he says, with interceptors that scramble the moment they hear one take off, so his crews mix high and low flight to slip past. Perch expects robots to move from supply runs into combat, hitting Russian troops in their rear.

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Ukraine wants robots doing 100% of frontline logistics. In June, they ran nearly 17,000 supply and evacuation runs

The drone his jammers can't touch

Both armies now field fiber-optic drones—machines guided by a hair-thin glass thread instead of radio. No signal means nothing to jam. Ukraine learned to block radio and digital drones, cutting their controls and video, Perch said. The glass-fiber ones his electronic warfare cannot reach, because there is no radio link to attack. His brigade still has no counter to them, Perch said, and he wants a technical fix that stops them.

During President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent visit to Serbia, he was asked whether Belgrade could continue to count on Ukraine’s position on Kosova. Zelenskyy reaffirmed that position, saying that Ukraine respects Serbia’s territorial integrity and international law and that its stance on Kosova’s “unilateral declaration of independence” remains unchanged.

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Zelenskyy’s Kosovo comments in Belgrade prompt flag removal in Prishtina

For many Kosovars, who have stood firmly with Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion, this is difficult to understand. There is particular pain in hearing President Zelenskyy appear to dismiss what Kosovars endured—when it is precisely that memory of war, displacement, and atrocities that made Kosova one of Ukraine’s most instinctive supporters.

The danger of “unilateral”

There is a big problem with the way Kosova is being discussed by President Zelenskyy. Describing its independence simply as a “unilateral declaration” removes everything that matters about how Kosova actually became independent.

It also plays directly into an argument Vladimir Putin has been making for years: if the West accepted Kosova, why should it reject what Russia has done in Crimea, Donetsk, or Luhansk?

Ukraine should be dismantling that argument, not inadvertently reinforcing it. Kosova’s declaration was unilateral in one narrow sense: Serbia did not consent. But Ukrainians should understand the problem with treating the aggressor’s consent as the decisive test.

Imagine telling a community in Ukraine devastated by Russian forces that Moscow must retain a permanent veto over the political settlement that determines its future.

Kosova’s path to independence

Kosova did not simply decide one day in 2008 to break away from Serbia. The declaration came at the end of a process that had lasted years. Kosova’s path to statehood came through the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, a federation that ultimately fragmented into seven independent states, and after years of systematic repression of Kosova’s overwhelmingly Albanian population. The culmination was the 1998–99 Kosova war.

Serbian and Yugoslav forces conducted a campaign of violence and forced displacement against Kosovar Albanians. Nearly 800,000 people were expelled from Kosova in a matter of months because of a violent ethnic cleansing campaign of the Serbian army against Kosovars.

Hundreds of thousands more were internally displaced. Thousands of civilians were killed, cities and villages burned, homes destroyed, and women subjected to sexual violence.

When the war ended in 1999, Kosova did not declare independence. Nor did Albania invade Kosova and annex it. Instead, Kosova was placed under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. For almost nine years, its institutions developed under international administration while its final status remained unresolved.

And then there were negotiations. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to lead talks between Belgrade and Pristina over Kosova’s final status. After those negotiations failed to produce an agreement, Ahtisaari concluded that returning Kosova to Serbian rule was no longer a viable option and recommended internationally supervised independence.

This matters because Kosova’s declaration in February 2008 did not reject that international process. It embraced it. The declaration committed Kosova to implementing the Ahtisaari settlement and invited continued international involvement, including an EU rule-of-law mission and NATO’s security presence.

Call the final declaration unilateral if you wish. The process that produced it was anything but.

What the ICJ found

Even after independence, the issue was subjected to further international scrutiny. At Serbia’s initiative, the UN General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice to examine the declaration. In 2010, the court concluded that Kosova’s declaration “did not violate international law.” It also found that it did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

None of this means Kosova’s path to independence was simple or uncontested. Clearly, it was not. But reducing this history to the word “unilateral” creates precisely the opening Russia needs to manufacture a parallel with Ukraine.

Crimea breaks the comparison

Putin has used Kosova for years to claim that the West created a precedent Russia merely followed: Kosova separated from Serbia without Belgrade’s consent, so why should Crimea be different? Because that is clearly where the similarity ends.

Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk were annexed following a Russian invasion. Moscow occupied Ukrainian territory, installed or backed proxy authorities, staged referendums under military occupation, and ultimately claimed Ukrainian land as its own.

Kosova emerged from an international process designed to resolve a conflict; Russia manufactured “independence” as an instrument of conquest. Ukraine should insist on that distinction every time Moscow invokes Kosova.

Ukraine understandably approaches Kosova cautiously. A country fighting for its territorial integrity is wary of anything that might appear to weaken that principle. But acknowledging the exceptional circumstances of Kosova does not weaken Ukraine’s argument. Treating Kosova and Crimea as comparable cases does.

Russia wants Kosova to be its precedent. Ukraine does not have to accept the premise. Ukraine, in fact, has a particular interest in explaining the difference, because Ukrainians know better than almost anyone what Russian-manufactured "self-determination” actually looks like. That is not Kosova’s story.

Kosova chose Ukraine first

There is also an irony here that is difficult for Kosovars to ignore. Kosova has stood with Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. It imposed sanctions against Russia and Belarus, provided assistance to Ukraine, and offered refuge to Ukrainian journalists.

It did all of this without being recognized by Kyiv—Kosovars did not need recognition to know which side they were on.

Ukraine’s experience resonates deeply in Kosova. We know what it means to live through war and displacement. We also know what it means when a larger neighbor invokes history to argue that it has the right to determine your future.

That does not make the two cases identical—but it should make Ukrainians skeptical when Russia tries to turn Kosova into a justification for its own imperial project.

Kosovars did not expect President Zelenskyy to arrive in Belgrade and announce that Ukraine had suddenly changed its position on Kosova. But it is reasonable to expect Kyiv to revisit its approach to Kosova and to recognize the process by which Kosova came to be, a process that Ukraine’s closest allies today understood, supported, and ultimately recognized.

That requires abandoning a framing that reduces Kosova’s history to a “unilateral declaration” and inadvertently gives credibility to the parallel Russia has spent years trying to construct. For Kosovars, the hope is that a more honest understanding of that history will eventually lead Ukraine to reconsider recognition, too.

Not as a reward for Kosova’s support for Ukraine, but as the natural outcome of seeing Kosova on its own terms rather than through the precedent Moscow wants it to be.

Putin has spent years trying to make Kosova his precedent. Ukraine should take that argument away from him. Doing so would bring Kyiv closer to the position of the allies standing beside it today—and perhaps, in time, recognition would follow.

Nezir Sinani

Nezir Sinani is executive director of the B4Ukraine Coalition, an alliance of more than 100 civil society organizations pressing companies and financial institutions to stop enabling Russia’s war against Ukraine. A longtime Kosovar activist, his work is rooted in Kosova’s own experience of war and displacement.

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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Russia's defense ministry posted photographs of attack drones in flight on its Telegram channel, captioned "like snow on your head," and told Ukrainians that "in winter, you'll get a freeze." The ministry attached the threat to its own earlier claim of strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and vessels.

The post puts in writing what Russia has done to Ukrainian civilians through every winter of the full-scale war: strike the power and heating grid to leave homes cold and dark. What is new is not the tactic but the candor — a ministry that usually insists it hits only military targets openly advertising the coming assault on the systems that keep civilians warm. And the taunt lands as Ukraine heads into the season more exposed than at any point in the war: President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told CNN this week that the country holds about 1% of the Patriot interceptors it needs to get through winter.

The winter campaign Russia is advertising

Since late 2022, Russia has systematically struck Ukraine's electricity, gas, and heating infrastructure, causing rolling blackouts and cutting heat and water during freezing weather. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly called the campaign "energy terrorism," and grid operators say the strikes have shifted toward knocking out entire energy districts rather than staging single mass barrages. This summer Russia widened the target set again: on 13 August a Russian drone set port infrastructure alight in Odesa Oblast and damaged a civilian vessel at a Mykolaiv port, the national rail operator and regional officials reported — the same kind of strike the ministry's post was boasting about.

Ukraine enters winter short of the weapon that stops ballistic missiles

The threat is heavier because Ukraine cannot reliably stop the missiles that would carry it out. Zelenskyy told CNN that selling Kyiv 5% of current US Patriot stocks would carry it through winter and 10% would let it "destroy all the Russians' ballistic missiles" — but that he holds 1%. On 5 August, Russia fired 28 ballistic and anti-ship missiles at Kyiv and Ukraine intercepted none, killing 17 people. July was the deadliest month for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022, according to the UN.

Europe is scrambling to add generation before the cold sets in. Finland said on 13 August it would fund a €28.5 million ($33.2 million) power plant project for Ukraine, one of several efforts to keep the lights on when the strikes resume. Ukrainian officials have warned that the coming winter could be more difficult than any before it.

Bulgaria's interest in buying Poland's retiring MiG-29s has pushed Warsaw and Kyiv closer to finalizing their long-stalled swap, Polish officials say.

Poland and Ukraine are in the final stage of negotiating a deal to transfer Poland's aging MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine in exchange for drones and Ukrainian drone-warfare know-how, with the jets potentially shipping within weeks, Polish outlet Wirtualna Polska reported, citing sources in the Polish Armed Forces and Defense Ministry. The report follows months of on-and-off talks that Poland's own officials have repeatedly declared both close to done and dead.

Polish Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk said on Polsat News that Bulgaria's competing interest in the jets has "livened up" Warsaw's discussions with Kyiv. Bulgaria has told Poland that if Ukraine will not commit, Sofia would buy the jets itself, Tomczyk said.

"I hope it will be soon," Tomczyk said when asked when Poland intends to sign the agreement with Ukraine. He said Poland has laid out the technologies and know-how it wants from Ukraine in return, calling the exchange in both countries' interest. "Today I cannot say with 100% certainty that this matter will be finalized, but we hope so."

According to Wirtualna Polska, the deal covers Soviet-era jets Poland's air force is retiring as it phases in Western aircraft, in exchange for a large batch of Ukrainian drones of various types and the transfer of Ukrainian combat know-how. The outlet reports Poland wants data on strike-drone communications links, control principles, footage of strikes on targets, and physical samples of the hardware itself.

Poland's Defense Ministry has said the process picked up pace after Rustem Umerov took over as head of Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tasking him with negotiating drone agreements. A source involved in the talks told Wirtualna Polska that Ukrainian drone maker Fire Point has offered to supply Poland with 1,500 long-range drones, plus a matching batch if war breaks out — an offer the source said Poland regards cautiously, since a company citing force majeure in wartime could leave Warsaw without the hardware it was promised.

A deal that has collapsed and revived for a year

Poland and Ukraine signed a bilateral security agreement in July 2024 that raised the prospect of transferring a squadron of at least 14 Polish MiG-29s. By early 2026, Warsaw had narrowed the offer to six to eight jets. In June, Poland froze the transfer, with Deputy Defense Minister Tomczyk citing Ukraine's refusal to share its drone and counter-drone technology. Talks restarted in July after Kyiv sent Warsaw a letter with concrete proposals, and by 31 July, Poland said Ukraine had returned with a specific list of drones it would hand over — a proposal Poland's ministry was still reviewing.

Poland's ambassador to Ukraine, Vasyl Bodnar, told Ukrainska Pravda's Yevropeiska Pravda that dialogue continues but that several obstacles still stand in the way of the transfer.

Why this matters

The MiG-29 remains a core part of Ukraine's air force even as it shifts to F-16s, Mirages, and incoming Gripens — Ukrainian pilots already fly the Soviet-era jets and have adapted them to carry Western precision weapons, so a new batch could enter service without the delays a Western aircraft transition requires. Poland's own hesitation reflects the same trade-off every one of its allies faces: what it gives up in hardware, it wants back in the operational knowledge Ukraine has built fighting Russia's drone war for four years — knowledge with no equivalent on any NATO training ground.

At least 437 civilians were killed and 2,610 injured across Ukraine in July, the highest monthly death toll since May 2022, according to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), which published the figures on 12 August. The toll was 30% higher than June and 70% higher than July 2025.

The deadliest single attack came on 2 July, when Russia launched 74 missiles and nearly 500 long-range drones at Ukraine, mainly targeting Kyiv. Ukrainian air defenses downed 524 of 570 aerial targets, but the 46 that got through — including 25 ballistic missiles — killed 30 people and destroyed a nine-story apartment block in the capital's Darnytskyi district. Russia fired at least 429 missiles at Ukraine over the course of the month, more than double June's total.

A trend that keeps getting worse

"Every month this year the number of killed and injured civilians has increased," HRMMU head Danielle Bell said. "That trend accelerated sharply in July. The number of civilian casualties in July was the highest we documented in a single month since March 2022."

Child casualties also hit a new high: 17 killed and 166 injured, the worst toll since April 2022. Over the first seven months of 2026, HRMMU verified 12,477 civilian casualties — 1,839 killed and 10,638 injured — a 44% increase over the same period in 2025 and more than double the 2024 figure.

Long-range weapons still the top killer, but glide bombs surged

Long-range missiles and drones caused 38% of all July casualties (183 killed, 967 injured), most of them far from the front line in cities. Casualties from aerial glide-bomb strikes jumped 143% compared with June — from 45 killed and 308 injured to 105 killed and 753 injured — making glide bombs the second-leading cause of civilian harm. Short-range drones near the front line killed 111 people and injured 710, the highest monthly toll from that weapon since 24 February 2022.

Kyiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Sumy took the heaviest losses among the 14 regions where casualties were recorded. HRMMU also verified 25 killed and 50 injured in Russian-occupied territory, cautioning that shrinking access to information there means the real toll is likely far higher.

Attacks on Black Sea shipping and port infrastructure in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts also intensified, with at least 39 strikes — 20 of them on vessels — killing 19 port and crew personnel and wounding 25.

Since the full-scale invasion began on 24 February 2022, the UN has verified at least 16,874 civilians killed and 51,173 injured.

On the evening of 12 August 2026, NASA displayed a map on which Crimea was marked as Russian. It happened during the live broadcast of a total solar eclipse: on the graphic, the peninsula was separated from mainland Ukraine by a border line and presented as part of Russia.

Crimea is a Ukrainian region that Russia occupied after its illegal annexation in 2014. Ukraine and the overwhelming majority of the world's states do not recognize that annexation, and no cartographic error changes the peninsula's status under international law. Each uncorrected map treats as ordinary what international law still calls an illegal occupation.

What happened during the broadcast

The US agency streamed the total eclipse, whose path crossed Greenland, Iceland, and Spain, live to a global audience. The error appeared on one of the visibility maps NASA showed during the broadcast: on it, Russia's border was drawn along the land boundary between mainland Ukraine and the peninsula, creating the impression that Crimea belongs to Russia.

Not the only case

In December 2024, FIFA eventually apologized for a map it displayed during the qualifying draw for the 2026 World Cup that left occupied Crimea outside Ukraine's borders. The graphic was meant to show pairs of teams that cannot be drawn against each other for geopolitical reasons, among them Spain and Gibraltar, Kosovo and Serbia, and Ukraine and Belarus. It marked out Ukraine but drew the country without the peninsula. Ukraine's Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi objected, Kyiv called the omission an unacceptable error, and football's world governing body pulled the image.

On 24 September 2024, the British broadcaster Sky News published an investigation into a scheme for supplying sanctioned goods to Russia through third countries, Georgia among them. The report was accompanied by three maps of vehicle-transport routes into Russia, on each of which Crimea was marked as Russian territory, Detector Media reports. The maps have since been edited, and Crimea is now marked as part of Ukraine.

The Polish broadcaster TVN showed a map of Ukraine on which occupied Crimea was marked in a separate color during the entertainment show The Floor. The episode aired on Polish television, and the broadcaster published its video on its website in 2025.

Behind Putin's sacred Crimea stood Sevastopol's airfields

Explaining the annexation, Putin spoke not of the military but of sacred things. In his December 2014 address to the Federal Assembly, he called Crimea a place of "enormous civilizational and sacral significance," comparing the peninsula to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Europe rejected that mythology: just ten days after the sham referendum, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 68/262 by a vote of 100 to 11 and declared the annexation illegal.

But behind Moscow's "spiritual" rhetoric lay a different purpose for Crimea. Sevastopol, its airfields, and its logistics turned the peninsula into a springboard for the 2022 invasion, and it is largely for this reason that Ukraine's forces are now focused on striking Crimea. Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces on 10 August said that the strikes are the first phase of a campaign meant to render the peninsula unusable for Russian troops.

"Crimea is one of the key conceptual pillars on the path to ending the war," Madyar told the Associated Press.

Ukrainian drone operators overwhelmed US Army troops at a training exercise in Germany this year, the Wall Street Journal reported. The drill showed how far American forces still trail on the cheap front-line drones that dominate Russia's war on Ukraine, despite billions in Pentagon spending.

Drones now decide who moves and who dies along Ukraine's front, and Western armies are scrambling to master a way of fighting Kyiv rewrote under fire—some even copying its tools and procurement wholesale.

The dust gave them away

The exercise, Combined Resolve, ran in April and May. Around 3,500 US personnel, mostly from the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, tried to seize a position defended by an opposing force reinforced with Ukrainian drone troops of the 412th Regiment of Unmanned Systems Forces, or Nemesis. The Ukrainian operators "eliminated" the attacking armored brigade, US officials briefed on the drill told the Journal.

Heavy vehicles kicked up dust that reconnaissance drones caught at once. Explosive-dropping and first-person-view drones, flown straight into their targets, did the rest. Kills came so fast that US vehicles had to be "re-spawned" as fresh units to keep the drill running, a US official told the Journal.

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Years of fighting Russia made the difference

Ukrainian crews have fought Russia for nearly four and a half years, repairing and adapting drones on the move, while US operators have never had to fix and arm them under fire, one person present told the Journal. Midway through, the Ukrainians switched sides and coached the Americans on attacking with drones. Eliot Cohen of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said mastering drones is now vital for the US military, and that so far it has not.

Not everyone agrees on why. Some US officers say drones dominate only because the front barely moves, and that maneuver warfare would revive the tank, the Journal noted. Ukraine's former commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, argues drones have frozen maneuver for now, the reason the eastern front barely shifts.

Not the first Western army to lose

It keeps happening. Ukrainian drone teams beat British, Estonian, and other NATO troops, including Americans, at a Baltic exercise in May 2025, and outdid Swedish-led NATO forces this spring, the Journal reported. Back in 2023, a US officer training Ukrainians realized the lesson ran the other way.

What Washington is doing about it

The Trump administration, despite friction with Kyiv, has been reaching out to Ukraine, the Journal reported. It is testing Ukrainian drones it may buy, and used counter-drone tools proven in this war to defend its troops against Iran's drones. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said in May that he was sending more Americans to study drone warfare in Ukraine. By Washington's own reckoning, no US maker can match Ukraine's combat-forged drones.

Finland will provide €28.5 million ($33.2 million) to support new power generation in Ukraine, with Finnish company Wärtsilä selected to supply the equipment, Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on 13 August.

Ukraine’s power system has been repeatedly damaged by Russian attacks, leaving the country facing each winter with reduced generation capacity and a heightened risk of electricity and heating disruptions. Strengthening distributed generation is therefore a key part of keeping essential services running when further strikes hit the energy grid, as they are expected to do ahead of the 2026-27 winter season.

The total value of the power plant technology is €46.5 million, with Ukraine covering the remaining cost. The plants will be manufactured in Vaasa, Finland, with the Ministry saying it will support Finnish jobs and exports while adding generation capacity to Ukraine’s war-damaged energy system.

Power generation for Ukraine’s winter

Ukraine’s state energy company Ukrnafta is purchasing the power plants to strengthen electricity production, with the need particularly acute ahead of another winter under Russian attacks.

“Reliable energy production is vital, particularly in winter months, when Russian strikes on energy infrastructure have made day-to-day life in Ukraine difficult,” Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukraine’s electricity generation, transmission, gas, and heating infrastructure since the full-scale invasion. The attacks have caused widespread blackouts and damaged or destroyed large parts of Ukraine’s generation capacity.

Previous winters have shown the consequences. Russian strikes have repeatedly caused rolling blackouts, while damage to heating infrastructure has threatened access to heat and water during freezing weather.

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Ukrainian officials have warned that the coming winter could be more difficult than previous ones, as Russia is expected to again target Ukraine’s energy, heating, and water infrastructure. Russia has already intensified attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure this summer, raising concerns that the campaign against essential services could escalate further during the winter months.

Finnish technology heads to Ukraine

Wärtsilä Finland Oy will manufacture the power plants in Vaasa.

Finnish Foreign Trade and Development Minister Ville Tavio said the project combines support for Ukraine with Finland’s energy-sector expertise.

“Finland has world class energy sector expertise that can benefit Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts,” Tavio said. “I am pleased that Finnish technology and Finnish workers are playing a part in strengthening the security of Ukraine’s energy supply.”

How Finland is financing the project

The €28.5 million Finnish contribution comes through the Finland–Ukraine Investment Facility, which supports public investments in Ukraine using Finnish technology, expertise, and services.

Finland’s funding will cover the interest costs and capital of the investment loan Ukraine will take out for the project. Finnish export credit agency Finnvera is providing a 100% export guarantee for the loan.

The project combines immediate energy support for Ukraine with Finnish financing, technology, and manufacturing capacity.

Ukraine and international partners agreed to work urgently on a mechanism for up to €4 billion ($4.6 billion) in farm loans, Ukrinform reported on 13 August. The plan would use a proposed €220 million ($253 million) EU grant, the Agriculture Ministry said.

Ukraine rebuilt its maritime trade after pushing Russia’s fleet away from its coast. By 2025, its Black Sea route carried about 92% of the country’s grain and oilseed exports. Russia is now striking the Odesa ports sustaining that recovery. The ministry says the attacks have closed three deep-water ports. Ukraine planned to export 64.4 million tons of agricultural products in 2026/27, but now says shipments may reach only 29.6 million tons. The proposed loan mechanism is meant to cover that cash shortfall before next year’s sowing.

EU and Norwegian diplomats joined the meeting with representatives of the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

The participants agreed to develop the plan through the Ukraine Facility and EU guarantee institutions. They aim to do so in the coming weeks, before fall storage use peaks. The grant has not yet been approved.

Odesa attacks send Kyiv toward Baltic ports

The loan plan comes as Russia’s attacks force Ukraine to seek new export routes.

Russia initially blockaded Ukraine’s ports after launching its full-scale invasion. Ukraine later restored a sea corridor after forcing much of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet away. Moscow then shifted pressure to missiles and drones, hitting Ukrainian ports 90 times in 2025 and intensifying attacks this summer.

A Russian strike killed 10 people aboard the grain-carrying Golden Leo on 19 July. Three days later, no ship passed through the corridor.

Kyiv is now considering the Polish Baltic ports of Gdańsk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and Świnoujście. Yet the ministry estimates that all alternative routes may eventually carry only 2.9 million tons a month. Ukraine’s monthly target was 5.4 million tons.

Farm loans target next year’s sowing

The €220 million would not go directly to growers. It would subsidize interest and partly cover banks’ lending risks, including by expanding Ukraine’s “5-7-9%” affordable-loan program.

The ministry wants the support to generate €4 billion in farm loans at annual rates no higher than 10%. It calculates that every euro of grant money could mobilize more than €18 in lending.

Ukraine has also temporarily adjusted minimum export price coefficients to offset higher logistics costs, meeting participants noted. Without grain sales, farmers struggle to pay wages and land rents or buy fuel and fertilizer. By November, Ukraine's storage shortfall could reach 11 million tons of crops, with more than €10.8 billion ($12.4 billion) tied up in unsold stocks.

Russia may expand hybrid attacks against Poland and the Baltic states, including infrastructure sabotage or false-flag attacks, Bloomberg reported on 12 August, citing an unnamed European intelligence official. 

The warnings come amid concern that Moscow wants to intimidate Ukraine’s supporters. The CIA warning follows Russian threats, incursions, alleged sabotage plots, and disinformation against Poland and the Baltic states. Most Western military aid reaches Ukraine through Poland, while the Baltic states rank among Kyiv’s strongest supporters. Sabotage of transport, energy, or communications can slow aid delivery and test NATO while hiding Russia’s role.

Separately, a European government official told Bloomberg that the CIA had warned countries in the region of a possible future Russian attack. The CIA declined to comment.

The same official said Russia might instead be creating the impression of an impending attack to sow fear as part of an information operation. The official saw no signs that Moscow was preparing a conventional attack or invasion.

Moscow tests NATO’s eastern flank

Poland and Lithuania had already raised similar concerns. In July, Poland said it had credible intelligence that Russia was planning new provocations. Lithuania later warned that Moscow might rebuild captured Ukrainian drones for false-flag strikes on critical infrastructure.

In September 2025, between 19 and 23 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, shutting down airports and damaging buildings. Poland closed four airports as NATO aircraft responded.

Meanwhile, five people are on trial in Lithuania over attacks allegedly organized for Russian military intelligence in 2024, Bloomberg reported. Lithuania has reinforced infrastructure sites and deployed troops since June.

These warnings and incidents place the CIA alert within a wider pattern of pressure on NATO’s eastern flank and Ukraine’s supporters. 

How Russia strikes without starting a war

Bloomberg cited several recent unexplained drone incidents in Germany alongside the CIA warning. Citing Die Zeit, Euromaidan Press reported that an explosive-laden drone struck the wing of a parked Ukrainian An-124 at Leipzig-Halle airport and failed to detonate. A US Defense Department official in Europe told CNN that Washington assessed the drone belonged to Russian intelligence. 

Bloomberg also reported that a cargo plane hit an unidentified object and that drones appeared over a military base the following day. It did not connect either incident to Russia.

More broadly, Russian hybrid operations have grown sharply since the full-scale invasion. CSIS found that attacks in Europe tripled from 2023 to 2024, after quadrupling the previous year. Separately, the US Helsinki Commission mapped nearly 150 operations in NATO territory attributed to or suspected of Russia between February 2022 and November 2024.

Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges told Euromaidan Press in February that attacks on ports, railways, and cables can probe routes needed for NATO reinforcements. Their deniability raises the political cost of responding.

By hiding its role, Moscow can disrupt support for Ukraine and test NATO without openly starting a war. 

The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War said the remains arrived on 13 August, and that investigators will now work to establish the identities.

Ukraine recovered the 261 bodies as part of repatriation measures carried out with Russia, the Coordination Headquarters reported. Russia claims the dead are Ukrainian servicemen, but law enforcement investigators and forensic experts will conduct the identification before any confirmation.

The return of the dead remains one of the few channels that still functions between Kyiv and Moscow during Russia's war against Ukraine. Each handover lets families of the missing bury their relatives, and it again relied on the International Committee of the Red Cross, which helped coordinate the exchange.

Ukraine's Interior Ministry, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Armed Forces, the Office of the Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, the State Emergency Service, and the Secretariat of the Commissioner for Missing Persons under Special Circumstances all took part, the Coordination Headquarters said. Units of the Armed Forces transported the remains and passed them to police and to medical examiners under the Health Ministry for identification.

Previous exchanges

The handover is the latest in a long series of transfers Russia has carried out during its war against Ukraine, and in each case it has claimed the dead were Ukrainian servicemen or citizens, an account Ukrainian forensic experts verify independently. The exchanges have followed the Istanbul agreements that Kyiv and Moscow reached on 2 June 2025. Over the course of that June, Russia returned 6,057 bodies, and on 17 July 2025 it handed over another 1,000. Further transfers of 1,000 followed on 19 August, 18 September, 23 October, and 20 November 2025, before Russia returned 1,003 bodies on 19 December. The exchanges continued into 2026 with 1,000 bodies on 26 February and another 1,000 on 9 April, after which the totals fell to 522 on 18 June and 501 on 16 July, ahead of the 261 returned on 13 August.

Taken together, the transfers have returned thousands of the dead since mid 2025, which makes the repatriation of remains one of the most consistent forms of contact that still survives between Kyiv and Moscow.

Poland will decide within days whether to send Ukraine another batch of Patriot interceptor missiles, Deputy Defense Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka said in a radio interview RMF24. Any transfer, she said, has to be judged first against Poland's own security.

A Russian strike on NATO soil is now moving Warsaw where months of Ukrainian appeals had not. Sobkowiak-Czarnecka said Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz leans toward sending more interceptors after a Russian missile crashed inside Poland on 30 July, and that he would rather one be shot down over Ukraine than reach Polish soil.

Tusk had signaled at the end of July that Warsaw would soon weigh sending more Patriots. Sobkowiak-Czarnecka's remarks are the first to put a timeline on that decision.

Warsaw had been split for weeks over whether giving up the missiles was the right call. She set that argument aside, saying only that a decision is a matter of the coming days.

A second handover from a thin stock

This would not be the first transfer. In the spring, Poland quietly gave Ukraine five PAC-3 MSE interceptors — the missiles a Patriot battery uses to stop ballistic threats — a move confirmed only in July, when the defense ministry declassified its aid records and Prime Minister Donald Tusk put the number at five.

The disclosure drew sharp criticism at home. Opposition figures noted that the PAC-3 is the only interceptor Poland holds capable of downing Russia's Iskander ballistic missiles — the same class of weapon now crossing into Polish airspace.

Why the interceptors are so scarce

PAC-3 interceptors are among the hardest munitions in NATO to spare. The United States builds them at a rate that does not cover its own needs, and only a handful of alliance members operate them at all.

Ukraine has been pressing for them for months. In early July, after one of the largest air attacks of the war, Kyiv appealed to nearly 40 countries to release Patriot missiles from existing stocks, warning that its air defenses cannot stop Russia's ballistic missiles without them.

Poland holds roughly 200 of the interceptors, by Ukrainian estimates — its own shield against the missiles now reaching its border. Kosiniak-Kamysz's reasoning turns that overlap into the case for giving some away: better the interceptor meets the missile over Ukraine than over Poland.

The transfer would come with Polish-Ukrainian relations at their lowest point in years. In May, Volodymyr Zelenskyy granted a special forces unit the honorary title "Heroes of the UPA" — the wartime insurgent army Poland blames for the Volhynia massacres of the 1940s, which Warsaw recognizes as genocide. Polish President Karol Nawrocki responded in June by stripping Zelenskyy of the Order of the White Eagle, the country's highest honor; three former Ukrainian presidents returned their own in solidarity, and Nawrocki has since tied Ukraine's path into the EU to the unresolved history. Yet the friction runs mostly at the presidential level. The aid decisions sit with the Tusk government, and it has kept the weapons — and now, in all likelihood, the interceptors — moving to Kyiv regardless.

Ukraine struck the Novorossiysk naval base in Russia's Krasnodar Krai overnight on 12 August, and for the first time coordinated more than 15 different strike systems in a single operation, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. The package combined Palianytsia jet drones, Neptune anti-ship missiles and naval drones, hitting warships, air defenses and oil infrastructure at the Black Sea Fleet's main base.

Novorossiysk is the refuge Russia's fleet fled to after Ukrainian drones and missiles pushed it out of occupied Crimea. Reaching its warships there with a mixed salvo — and getting through air defenses that bystander footage showed firing heavily — is the operational read the strike carries, more than any single ship damaged.

The systems and the targets

Zelenskyy named more than a dozen systems that worked together for the first time, from the Palianytsia and Peklo drones to the long-range Neptune and a set of naval drones. He thanked weapons developers for the added reach, framing the coordination itself as the milestone rather than the results.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) confirmed hits on two Kalibr-carrying frigates, the Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov, and the patrol ship Vasily Bykov. The same strike hit an S-300 radar, a firing position on one of the port's piers, the Sheskharis oil terminal and three of the harbor's berths — a target list wider than the ships alone.

How many ships

The three Ukrainian accounts agree on the two frigates but not on the full tally. The General Staff counted four warships, adding a Buyan-M missile ship to the SBU's three. Zelenskyy separately cited a large landing ship and a corvette among the vessels hit.

Independent analysts who reviewed satellite imagery told The Maritime Executive the damage did not appear catastrophic, with no ships visibly burning or sinking. Ukraine's General Staff said the assessment is still under way.

The fleet's shrinking refuge

The strike extends a campaign that has driven Russia's fleet eastward without Ukraine fielding a navy of its own. Having lost safe basing in Sevastopol, Russia moved its ships more than 300 kilometers from the front — far from Ukraine, but no longer out of reach.

The operation's footprint reached past the base. Russian authorities in Novorossiysk declared a state of emergency and cut water to the port city, and the strike on the Sheskharis oil terminal hit infrastructure that helps fund the war. Zelenskyy said Ukraine would keep striking such targets, and that Russia alone can end the war it started.

Ukraine holds only about a tenth of the Patriot interceptor missiles it needs from the United States to stop Russia's surging ballistic strikes, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told CNN. Selling Kyiv 5% of the current US stockpile would carry the country through winter, he said, and 10% would let it "destroy all the Russians' ballistic missiles" — but he holds 1%.

The plea puts a number on a shortage that has run through Ukraine's diplomacy all summer and left its cities increasingly exposed. It is the concrete cost of near-empty interceptor stocks: on 5 August, Russia fired 28 ballistic and anti-ship missiles at Kyiv and Ukraine intercepted none of them, killing 17 people, and four days earlier launched 27 ballistic missiles with only one stopped. July was the deadliest month for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022, according to the UN.

The arithmetic of a losing race

"This year we have two and a half times less interceptors than we had in 2025," Zelenskyy said, while "Russia has two times more ballistic missiles per month than they had before."

The interceptor that most reliably stops those missiles, the US-made Patriot's PAC-3, is scarce worldwide: the war between the United States and Iran drained stocks as American and Gulf forces spent dozens against Iranian missiles and drones, and the shortage has fallen hardest on Ukraine.

The bottleneck is structural, not budgetary. Only five or six countries build interceptors capable of stopping ballistic missiles, the US makes around 600 Patriots a year, and orders are placed years in advance — so money alone cannot close the gap before winter, defense expert Marc DeVore told Euromaidan Press in June.

A home-built Patriot, still uncertain

Zelenskyy said doubts remain over whether US President Donald Trump's apparent offer to let Ukraine manufacture its own Patriot interceptors will materialize. At the NATO summit in Ankara, Trump said he would license Ukraine to build the missiles, then days later said he was unsure; the Patriot makers have since sent officials to Kyiv, without result so far. "I hope that I will get it," Zelenskyy said, calling it "one of the biggest [challenges] I had from the very beginning of this war."

He described daily, largely private deal-making to close the gap: "million phone calls ... I try to exchange something to missiles ... I do some things which I can't even share. It doesn't mean that it's outside of the law. But I can't speak about it."

Putin, the Donbas, and the next war

On the stalled peace process, Zelenskyy said Kyiv had put new proposals to the Trump administration and needed "more involvement of the American side," adding that Vladimir Putin "doesn't want to stop this war now and (there's) not enough pressure on him now." He rejected ceding the rest of the Donbas that Putin seeks, arguing security guarantees matter more: "Why he will not come again ... to occupy us?"

He confirmed a recent call with Vice President JD Vance but declined to say whether Vance had asked Ukraine to halt strikes on a Russian Black Sea oil port that were hurting US firms and threatening a spike in global energy prices, as the Financial Times reported. Zelenskyy also endorsed Western assessments that Putin could widen the war toward a smaller NATO state, likely in the Baltics: "He wants quick victory ... occupy or destroy or control."

A large-scale Ukrainian drone attack cut electricity across occupied Sevastopol overnight on 13 August, with power later restored on a temporary scheme after strikes damaged the city's energy infrastructure, the Russian-installed head of the city wrote on his Telegram channel.

The blackout is the latest blow in Ukraine's months-long campaign to isolate occupied Crimea by degrading the fuel, power, and transport networks Russia relies on to hold the peninsula. Sevastopol — the former main base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet — has lost power repeatedly since early June, when Ukraine sharply escalated strikes on Crimean energy sites.

What was hit

Drones headed toward the Balaklava thermal power plant, one of the peninsula's two main power stations, while mobile fire groups worked over Sevastopol, the monitoring channel Crimean Wind reported. Witnesses described an explosion and the loss of electricity across the city.

A fire also broke out at a large water-supply facility near the village of Shturmove, south of Sevastopol, around the time of the strike on Balaklava, the same channel said. The cause has not been established. The site houses the city's No. 3 hydro unit, which supplies Sevastopol's water.

Elsewhere on the peninsula, gunfire was reported near the Tavriiska thermal power plant, and Russian air defense operated near the Gvardiiske airfield.

A grid already rationing power

Russia closed the Crimean Bridge to road traffic during the attack, the crossing's occupation-run information channel reported.

The outage lands on a grid already under strain. Sevastopol last went fully dark on 27 July, and in July the occupation authorities imposed a rolling blackout schedule that left residents with about six hours of electricity a day. Since early June, Ukrainian strikes have repeatedly cut power across Crimea, with some districts dark for a week or more, alongside disruptions to water and mobile coverage.

The isolation campaign

Ukrainian officials have described the strikes as stages of a plan to cut occupied Crimea off from mainland Russia. Beyond power plants, Ukraine has hit the fuel tankers supplying the peninsula, the bridges and rail links feeding it, and Russian vessels — leaving Crimea rationing petrol and, at times, short of food.

Ukraine's military had not publicly claimed the 13 August strike as of publication.

A Russian jet-powered Shahed drone struck the locomotive of a passenger train in Odesa Oblast on the morning of 13 August, killing the driver and his assistant, Ukraine's national rail operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported. The train was carrying 340 passengers on the Odesa–Dnipro route.

Russia has spent 2026 methodically dismantling the network that keeps Ukraine supplied, destroying or damaging more than 200 locomotives in the first half of the year alone, as Euromaidan Press documented. The crew kept the train moving toward a station so passengers could get out; all 340 evacuated without injury, and were driven on to Odesa by bus.

Overnight drone barrage

Ukraine's Air Force shot down 111 of the 133 Shahed drones Russia launched overnight, it said. Part of Izmail lost power after the attack, and a strike set port infrastructure alight in Odesa Oblast.

A drone damaged a civilian vessel at a Mykolaiv Oblast port. In Chernihiv Oblast, Russia hit two raions, damaging homes and knocking out a filling station; a child was treated for shock.

Kherson and Kharkiv

Two men were killed and a three-year-old injured in a strike on Kherson's Korabelnyi district, according to reports. A separate airstrike on the city's central district injured a 63-year-old man, local officials reported.

In Kharkiv Oblast, a Russian strike killed a 36-year-old woman in Tsyrkuny. Three more people were wounded when Russia hit the center of a village elsewhere in the oblast.

Zaporizhzhia and the northeast

Over the previous day, Russia killed one person and injured three in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, striking 52 settlements 962 times with airstrikes, drones, and artillery, regional head Ivan Fedorov said. Seven people were injured across Sumy Oblast, where Russia shelled 19 settlements, the regional administration reported.

Overnight on 7 August, a vessel was possibly sunk in the Black Sea near Novorossiysk, the Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ reports. The project, which spotted the ship in satellite imagery, suggests it may have been carrying military cargo.

Russia has a practice of concealing its fleet losses. Moscow tries to mask the scale of the problem in various ways: it classifies sinkings as accidents, downplays the number of casualties, or stays completely silent about vessel losses. Russia acknowledges fleet losses only when it happens accidentally or when concealing the sinking or damage is no longer possible. The 141-meter vessel, which had no foreign owner to demand explanations, has received none.

Russian officials have not commented on the sinking, Exilenova+ says.

"The news passed quite modestly, but there is a nuance. Russia's 'official' authorities have not reported about any sunken vessel. It just sank. It is not ruled out that the ship was carrying military cargo for Russia's armed forces. Otherwise, why pretend nothing happened?" Exilenova+ wrote.

The vessel was approximately 141 meters long, suggesting a displacement of roughly 10,000 tonnes, according to the Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi.

The strikes that may have caused the sinking

Over 48 hours on 6-7 August, the Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS) struck 102 enemy targets, SBS Commander Robert “Madyar” Brovdi reported. In the same post, he noted that the targets included six shadow fleet vessels in the Black and Azov Seas: two tankers and four dry cargo ships. The SBS also reported striking three units of Russia's fleet on 7 August alone.

"It is entirely possible that the vessel that sank near Novorossiysk is among those struck in those days”, Militarnyi suggests.

Novorossiysk under fire again on 12 August

Just hours after the news of the earlier reported sinking surfaced publicly, Novorossiysk came under attack. Overnight on 12 August, Ukraine's defense forces conducted what President Zelenskyy called a "unique operation" against the naval base, using Palianytsia jet drones, Neptune missiles, and unmanned naval systems.

Novorossiysk became Russia's primary Black Sea naval hub after Ukrainian strikes forced the fleet out of Sevastopol.

Ukraine's first-person-view (FPV) drones are not being displaced by newer unmanned systems, a Ukrainian officer told Ukrinform. They remain a central tool for precision strikes, while Ukrainian forces claim a separate advantage in larger bomber drones.

Unmanned systems have become a defining weapon of Russia's war against Ukraine, and both sides race to out-innovate each other, a contest in which a cheap UAV can down a platform costing dozens of times more.

FPVs remain central

"Since FPVs appeared in service, they have become a leading means of precision engagement. This trend will continue," said Captain Anton Bobrovskyi, who commands a company training unmanned-systems specialists at the 199th Training Center of the Air Assault Forces.

Bobrovskyi conceded that Russia also uses drones effectively and that Ukraine learns from it, but said Ukraine keeps a lead in one category: bomber drones.

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Ukraine's bomber-drone advantage

Russian forces fear Ukrainian bomber drones, according to Bobrovskyi. He said Ukraine outmatches Russia many times over in such systems, and that Russian troops who encounter one often do not know what to do with it.

The distinction matters because bomber drones work differently from single-use FPVs. Rather than flying into a target and exploding, larger bomber drones carry and release munitions, then fly on. Euromaidan Press has documented the growing role of these systems, including reusable platforms capable of returning to base after dropping their payloads. Developers have also adapted them to fly through Russian electronic warfare, with upgraded Vampire drones built to resist jamming.

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Bobrovskyi said Ukraine's advantage does not mean Russia lacks comparable technology. Instead, he argued that Ukrainian forces and society initiated many of the current battlefield drone trends and have kept the initiative in using them.

Each new drone class draws a countermeasure, so the side that keeps iterating fastest holds the battlefield initiative. How long Ukraine's bomber-drone edge lasts will depend on its ability to keep protecting and upgrading those platforms.

Newly analyzed airport camera footage shows a quadcopter drone loaded with Semtex explosive flew straight at a parked Ukrainian An-124 Ruslan cargo aircraft and struck its wing at Leipzig/Halle airport in Germany on the evening of 4 August, the media outlet Die Zeit reported on 10 August. The device bounced off the wing, fell to the ground, and failed to detonate. The drone attacked the aircraft at around 19:30 local time, the media outlet reports.

Russia's hybrid attacks are increasingly moving from the information domain into the physical one, including on the territory of other countries. This incident makes sabotage on NATO member states' territory potentially more dangerous if suspicion of Russian involvement is confirmed.

Footage contradicts the warning-shot theory

The drone struck the wing near the fuel tanks, then bounced off the aircraft's surface and fell to the ground. The explosive device also ended up on the ground and did not detonate. The device contained Semtex plastic explosive. Approximately four hours later, a tourist bus driver accidentally noticed it lying on the ground, put his foot on it, and reported the find to airport security.

Video analysis contradicts the earlier theory that the incident may have been intended only as a warning. The nature of the attack indicates an attempt to cause actual damage.

Investigators examining foreign state involvement

German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt suggested that a state actor may have been behind the explosive-laden drone found at the airport. On 7 August, Germany's National Security Council convened under Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Earlier, the United States assessed that the drone discovered at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany overnight into 5 August belonged to Russian intelligence, a US Department of Defense official in Europe told CNN.

The cargo aboard the Ukrainian aircraft targeted in the sabotage attempt consisted of military equipment and ammunition that had arrived in Germany from France and was being prepared for further transportation, Süddeutsche Zeitung stated, citing a confidential German police report. However, Germany's Federal Ministry of the Interior denied this claim, according to dpa.

The An-124 Ruslan, struck by the drone, is operated by the Ukrainian company Antonov Airlines. After Russian forces destroyed its main base in Hostomel in 2022, the company has been using Leipzig/Halle airport as a temporary base for its aircraft.

Ukraine’s Agriculture Ministry has cut its forecast for agricultural exports in 2026–2027 by 54% as Russian attacks disrupt shipping through Odesa’s ports, Bloomberg reported.

The ministry now expects 29.6 million tons of agricultural exports, down from 64.4 million. Its wheat export forecast fell by 53%, from 17.6 million tons to 8.3 million tons.

Ukraine grows far more grain than it consumes, exporting 65%–70% of its agricultural output. Bloomberg said the sector generated more than half of Ukraine’s export revenue last year. But Russia’s summer attacks have stalled the sea corridor as the harvest arrives, driving some wheat prices below production costs. Land and river routes cannot match the Black Sea shipping capacity, while sales through neighboring EU states remain politically contested. That leaves farmers with less money for the next sowing and further reduces Ukraine’s export income.

Ukraine has about 59 million tons of grain storage. That storage could be full by early November, leaving the country 11 million tons short of space by the end of fall 2026. 

Wheat sells below cost as the silos fill up

Ukraine’s export bottleneck is already hitting its farmers. Port prices fell by another 12-15% in one week, while some farmers sold wheat below production cost. When ships stop, traders either stop buying or pass the higher cost of alternative routes on to producers. That leaves farmers with less cash for fall sowing.

To ease the pressure, the government has approved subsidized loans for agricultural producers. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Kyiv would expand storage. Ukraine's Agriculture Ministry has also asked the European Commission for €220 million to help cover interest for small and medium-sized farms.

Ukraine and Moldova are discussing a rail route to Romania’s Constanța port. According to the report, grain was already being redirected through Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary, but these routes cannot replace Odesa’s capacity.

Now the ports and the ships are Russia's targets

The export bottleneck is only part of the problem. Russia’s bombardment also threatens the ports, civilian ships, and crews needed to keep the corridor operating. 

The port of Odesa normally handles about 90% of Ukraine’s grain shipments. Russia intensified attacks on terminals and civilian ships in July 2026 as the harvest reached the coast.

On 19 July, three Russian missiles struck the foreign-flagged Golden Leo as it left Odesa carrying corn, killing 10 people, including a Ukrainian sea pilot. Three days later, no vessel passed through the corridor.

Alternative routes offer little relief, as record-low Danube levels were restricting river traffic. Poland continues to bar Ukrainian grain from its domestic market. Those constraints leave more of the harvest inside Ukraine and farmers with less money to plant the next crop.

Russia wants its tanks moving again after two years of Ukrainian drones freezing its armored assaults, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported. Its main bet is a tank-mounted system that fires interceptors at incoming drones. The system worked on at least one tank, but Russia lost it anyway.

Since 2022, cheap Ukrainian FPV drones have turned the open approach to any position into ground where armor rarely survives, forcing Russia into slow, infantry-led assaults and years of experiments to armor its tanks against drones.

The shield shot down some drones. Ukraine still killed the tank.

In early August, footage surfaced of Ukrainian drones destroying a Russian tank fitted with the Arena-M active protection system in the Dobropillia sector of Donetsk Oblast. Militarnyi identified the vehicle as a T-72B3A, side number 133, and Militarnyi reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) released the clip. ISW geolocated the footage near occupied Volodymyrivka, east of Dobropillia.

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Russia took the cages off its newest tanks. The new Arena-M shield bought them a few minutes.

Dmytro Putiata, a Ukrainian combat drone specialist who posts as kriegsforscherD, spoke with the unit involved. On that tank, Arena-M shot down seven drones before its magazine ran dry, he said.

"Unfortunately, it works," Putiata wrote.

It still wasn't enough. Ukrainian crews finished the tank off with more drones. It took 15 to 20 first-person-view (FPV) drones to kill each vehicle, Putiata said. Footage shows the tank moving with its interceptor cells empty. It was the first time the Arena-M was credited with shooting drones down in combat.

Russia keeps sending tanks into that ground for a reason

Russian forces are experimenting with new technology to restore mechanized maneuver and break out of positional warfare—the static, trench-like fighting that has defined the front, ISW reported. They are fitting tanks with active protection systems to help armor survive in the "kill zone," the open ground where drones and other weapons destroy almost anything that moves.

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ISW judged that Arena-M alone cannot shield Russian assaults from the drones, let alone the rest of Ukraine's weapons. Russian commanders have largely kept tanks off the roads because drones kill them faster than factories rebuild them. In these assaults, the tank's job is less to fight than to survive long enough to drop infantry closer to Ukrainian lines. Russia will likely keep trying to restore maneuver even after its late-July mechanized assault in the Dobropillia sector failed, ISW added.

Why Russia wants the shield: the cages don't let tanks fight

The bolt-on armor carries a cost. Cope cages and "turtle" shells weigh tanks down and often jam the turret so the main gun can't aim. That trade-off is part of why Russia wants Arena-M: protection without the bulk, so a tank can still move and shoot. Russia recently sent tanks stripped of the welded cages, carrying the shield instead.

Arena-M is not new. Active protection systems like it were first built to stop anti-tank missiles, and Russia adapted this one to catch drones. The system's lineage dates back to the late Soviet era, and Russian industry has for years claimed mass deployment that never came. Designers worked on fitting it to T-72B3 and T-90M tanks since at least 2019, yet only single vehicles turned up by 2024—some used to shoot a propaganda film rather than fight.

Russia will introduce two editions of a new regional history textbook series in occupied Ukrainian schools on 1 September 2026. The books present the occupied Ukrainian regions as historically Russian, MOST, a Kherson-based outlet, reported on 10 August.

The new textbooks bring Russia's campaign to erase Ukrainian identity into occupied classrooms, where authorities remove Ukrainian from curricula and replace lessons with Russian ideology, military drills, and firing-range visits. Moscow's Russification campaign extends beyond schools to efforts to change the demographics of occupied Ukrainian territory and re-educate forcibly transferred Ukrainian children.

The new textbook series, entitled "History of Our Region: Donbas and Novorossiya," comprises one edition for grade 5 and another for grades 6–7. The course attached to the books will be compulsory throughout Russia's so-called "new regions," according to the Ukrainian human rights center ZMINA.

"Novorossiya" is an imperial term Moscow uses to claim southern and eastern Ukraine. 

Russia's Education Ministry calls the course "objective" and part of a "unified history of Russia," Meduza reports. Minister Sergei Kravtsov claimed it contains "objective information, rather than the lies that appeared in Ukrainian textbooks."

Replacing the curriculum, then the population

The "Novorossiya" textbook forms part of a broader Kremlin campaign to Russify occupied Ukraine's education, culture, and demographics. 

Since occupying Melitopol, Russian authorities have systematically replaced Ukrainian curricula and textbooks. Older Russian textbooks, issued after Moscow's full-scale war, already depicted occupied Melitopol as part of Russia. 

A 2025 Kremlin strategy requires occupied regions to enter Russia's educational, cultural, and information space. The policy also sets a nationwide target for “All-Russian civic identity” to reach at least 95% by 2036.

35,000 Ukrainian children still missing

Meanwhile, experts estimate that about 35,000 Ukrainian children remain missing and are likely held in Russia or Russian-occupied territory. Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab identified at least 210 facilities used to hold children from Ukraine. The lab found that at least 130 facilities subjected Ukrainian children to pro-Russian cultural, patriotic, or military programs. 

One case shows where such indoctrination can lead. Once listed as missing under occupation, Ukrainian boy Oleksandr Mustiatse later appeared online in a Russian uniform bearing the “Z” invasion symbol, Save Ukraine reported.

Ukraine is testing a new electronic-warfare solution to protect heavy bomber drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) from cheaper FPV drones. The project has reached field testing, with several prototypes sent to military units, RBC-Ukraine reports.

Ukraine's war has become a laboratory for the economics of unmanned combat, where a mass-produced quadcopter can take down platforms that cost dozens of times more, forcing both volunteer foundations and defense firms to look for asymmetric answers on the electronic side of the front.

$20,000 bomber vs. $300 drone

The gap runs more than 60-to-1. Liuba Shypovych, head of the Dignitas foundation, told RBC-Ukraine that a heavy bomber can cost around $20,000, while an FPV drone capable of damaging or destroying it can cost about $300. Shypovych said the bombers are particularly vulnerable because they are relatively slow and less maneuverable than smaller FPVs, and that shootdowns are becoming increasingly frequent.

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A $300 FPV downs a $20,000 bomber drone. Ukraine tests an EW shield for it

Yet Ukraine cannot simply stop using the larger drones. According to Shypovych, they are used to deliver water, food, and ammunition to positions that are difficult or impossible to reach by ground. The military therefore approached Dignitas with a request to protect the platforms, and the team is working on the task together with the company Aura.

The jammer has a problem of its own

Equipping a heavy bomber with electronic warfare creates an unusual technical problem. The bomber needs a communications link with its operator, but the same EW system designed to disrupt an incoming enemy FPV could also interfere with that control channel. The problem extends to UGVs, including platforms used to evacuate wounded soldiers. Shypovych said the goal is to develop EW that can counter hostile drones without cutting the Ukrainian platform's own communications.

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From the test range to the first units

Dignitas and Aura are testing the systems at training grounds and have already sent several samples to military units. Shypovych expects the solution to be ready in roughly two months.

The effort comes as Ukraine rapidly expands its use of unmanned ground systems. Kyiv has set a target to contract at least 50,000 UGVs, with robots already taking on logistics and evacuation tasks in high-risk zones. Ukrainian forces have already received 1,028 UGVs through the DOT-Chain Defense marketplace, with the systems handling logistics, evacuation, mine-laying, and combat. Ukrainian Vampire bombers have also been upgraded to shrug off Russian jamming and even hunt the jammers themselves.

South Korea is keeping lethal aid to Ukraine off the table while continuing humanitarian and reconstruction support, Yonhap reported on 10 August. The outlet cited a senior South Korean Foreign Ministry official.

South Korea’s response maintains its established policy of providing humanitarian and nonlethal support to Ukraine, but not direct weapons. Seoul previously helped move artillery shells to Ukraine through the United States. While South Korea arms NATO members with K2 tanks and K9 howitzers to free up older kit for the Ukrainian front, it still draws the line at any direct transfer to Kyiv. Seoul rejects Ukraine’s purchase requests as North Korea sends Russia ammunition and troops in exchange for money and military technology.

South Korean law bars direct exports of lethal weapons to countries in active conflict, a rule rooted in constitutional principles and Seoul's wariness of antagonizing Moscow and Beijing while managing the threat from the North.

Ukraine is seeking South Korean interceptor missiles for its air defenses. The official neither addressed the request specifically nor formally rejected it:

“South Korea’s supply of defense materials to any country has always been carried out in accordance with domestic law,” the official said. Seoul will continue to support Ukraine’s recovery through assistance in energy, infrastructure, healthcare, and education. 

The official also declined to confirm whether Seoul and Kyiv were discussing military support. However, he said Moscow-Pyongyang military cooperation “is directly related to our security and violates the United Nations resolutions” and should stop immediately.

Seoul’s indirect aid stopped short of direct arms transfers

In 2023, Seoul transferred hundreds of thousands of 155 mm shells to the United States under a confidential arrangement. Washington then arranged for them to reach Ukraine, The Wall Street Journal reported.

South Korean exports have also helped NATO members replace weapons sent to Kyiv. Poland bought South Korean K2 tanks and K9 howitzers while transferring older tanks and Polish-built Krab artillery systems to Ukraine.

Yet Seoul rejected Ukraine’s request to buy air-defense systems, radars, and artillery propellant in November 2024. In February 2026, it still limited support to humanitarian and nonlethal aid while considering NATO’s request to help purchase US weapons for Ukraine.

North Korean deployments bring the war closer to Seoul

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said a decision had been made to deploy 30,000–50,000 more North Koreans to Russia. He warned that they would gain modern combat experience and Russian technology that could later threaten Asian countries. Kyiv wants South Korean air defenses and has offered cooperation on drones.

The South Korean official cited by Yonhap declined to confirm either the reported deployment or Zelenskyy’s statement that Ukrainian and South Korean diplomats were discussing possible cooperation.

North Korea is already believed to have sent approximately 20,000 combat troops and military engineers to Russia’s Kursk region, according to Yonhap. Pyongyang has earned as much as $22 billion from arming Russia, helping it finance conventional and nuclear forces.

The Japanese outlet Kyodo News reported in November 2025 that North Korea had transferred about 6.5 million rocket and artillery munitions in exchange for Russian air-defense, space, and nuclear technologies.  Moscow and Pyongyang’s 2024 mutual defense pact formalized the expanding military relationship.

Seoul says no again to Ukraine’s weapons request as Pyongyang gets ready to send Russia more troops