Ukrainian drones attacked two Ozon logistics centers overnight on 27 August, one in Ufa and one in Orenburg Oblast, Russia's second-largest online store said. Staff were evacuated at both sites, and preliminary information indicated no casualties. Video published by Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ shows a drone reaching the Bashkortostan warehouse and exploding.
Ukraine's deep-strike campaign has spread across Russian refineries and fuel depots, chemical plants,
Ukrainian drones attacked two Ozon logistics centers overnight on 27 August, one in Ufa and one in Orenburg Oblast, Russia's second-largest online store said. Staff were evacuated at both sites, and preliminary information indicated no casualties. Video published by Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ shows a drone reaching the Bashkortostan warehouse and exploding.
Ukraine's deep-strike campaign has spread across Russian refineries and fuel depots, chemical plants, arms factories, railways, and the warehouses that move consumer goods. Together the strikes take refining capacity, storage space, and freight throughput out of service repeatedly, and sanctions leave Russia fewer parts and crews to restore them with.
The strike on camera
Exilenova+ reported in the morning that an Ozon warehouse was burning after impacts in Blagoveshchensk, a town north of Ufa. The Bashkortostan capital lies roughly 1,300 kilometers from the war zone in Ukraine. Around midday the channel published eyewitness video of what it called the moment of a drone attack on the site, and said the warehouse had not caught fire. The footage shows a drone reaching the site and detonating there.
Drone hit another Russian warehouse
Eyewitness video from Blagoveshchensk in Bashkortostan shows the moment a Ukrainian drone reached Ozon's fulfillment center — the largest logistics complex the online retailer runs in the Volga area — and detonated. The channel that published… pic.twitter.com/oHUgjRz0v0
Earlier, the channel reported that residents of Sterlitamak, Bashkortostan's second-largest city, about 120 kilometers from Ufa, had written about explosions, with nothing then known about impacts. Astra later placed smoke over what it said was probably the Bashkir Soda Company works there.
Ozon said the Orenburg site—about 1,200 kilometers from the war zone—has resumed work. The one it placed in Ufa sustained what it called minor damage but remains closed, because the grounds need a thorough inspection. It is not accepting deliveries.
Russian news Telegram channel Astra identified the damaged facility from the eyewitness footage as Ozon's UFA_RFC fulfillment center in Blagoveshchensk. When it opened in late 2024 it was billed as the largest Ozon logistics complex in Russia's Volga federal district, with a total area of 93,000 square meters.
Smoke over the Ufa refineries
Astra also traced smoke in eyewitness footage to the Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim refinery in Ufa. The plant is one of Rosneft's leading refineries and a dual-use site: it supplies specialized fuel to Russia's armed forces and petrochemical feedstock for defense-grade materials. It burned after a strike on 1 August.
Bashneft runs three refineries side by side in Ufa's northern industrial zone—Ufaneftekhim, Novoil, and UNPZ—forming one of Russia's largest refining complexes, with a combined capacity of up to 23.5 million tons of feedstock a year.
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What officials said, and didn't
Bashkortostan's authorities did not report the attack. Orenburg Oblast governor Yevgeny Solntsev mentioned drone danger in his region but gave no account of consequences. Ufa closed its airport.
Russia's Defense Ministry claimed air defenses destroyed 267 Ukrainian fixed-wing drones overnight across Russian regions, Bashkortostan among them.
The campaign so far
Ukraine's warehouse campaign began with Wildberries, Russia's largest online marketplace, which lost eight warehouses and roughly 860,000 square meters of storage in July alone. It reached Ozon for the first time on 22 August at Chapayevsk in Samara Oblast, where more than 500 employees evacuated and people were hurt. Four more Ozon hubs were hit across southern Russia two nights later.
Finnish President Alexander Stubb said Ukraine would receive about 90% of the drones that Finnish companies build under a planned Finland–Ukraine framework agreement, Mi-Ukraina reported on 26 August. Three days earlier in Kyiv, he said the other 10% would stay in Finland.
The planned arrangement follows a broader European shift toward co-production with Ukraine rather than supplying weapons from existing stockpiles. Drones have shaped much of the fighting on both sides
Finnish President Alexander Stubb said Ukraine would receive about 90% of the drones that Finnish companies build under a planned Finland–Ukraine framework agreement, Mi-Ukraina reported on 26 August. Three days earlier in Kyiv, he said the other 10% would stay in Finland.
The planned arrangement follows a broader European shift toward co-production with Ukraine rather than supplying weapons from existing stockpiles. Drones have shaped much of the fighting on both sides since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russia has repeatedly struck defense plants inside Ukraine—a Bayraktar plant under construction in Kyiv was hit four times in six months by August 2025—pushing Ukrainian makers to expand production into allied countries, Finland among them.
Asked what still had to be agreed before production could begin, Stubb said nothing did.
"Everything is done. There is a so-called framework agreement on drones that we're working on. It's more about cooperation between states—that is, Zelenskyy and me. And the companies between themselves do what they have to do. I think the doors are already open," Stubb said.
He said the 90/10 ratio is common practice in corporate contracts and that companies would determine the pace of production after finalizing their decisions. Some details could remain classified because of military secrecy, he said.
At a press conference on 23 August after the Nordic-Baltic Eight summit with Ukraine, Stubb had described the deal as still taking shape. He said seven Finnish defense companies interested in cooperation with Ukraine, including on maritime drone production, had traveled to Kyiv with him and that one had already provided production estimates.
"The companies are making actual deals. I'm looking forward to the results, but it seems one of the companies has already provided data on the number of drones that can be produced in Finland. And I think the deal will follow approximately the so-called 90/10 proportion. So 90% of the output is supplied to Ukraine, and 10% stays in Finland," Stubb said, according to Unian.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President of Finland Alexander Stubb took part in a roundtable on Ukrainian-Finnish cooperation in the defense industries, organized with the participation of the Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry. Photo: president.gov.ua
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 23 August that three of the seven Finnish companies present had already signed agreements for joint production, including drones. Yle identified the three as Patria, Insta, and Boomeranger, saying they had signed letters of intent with Ukrainian counterparts. Patria and the Ukrainian company General Chereshnia signed a memorandum of intent to produce defense drones in Finland, Patria announced.
Separately, Ukrainian drone maker Airlogix and Finnish technology company Innokas signed a letter of intent to establish joint drone manufacturing in Finland under Ukraine's "Build with Ukraine" initiative. Ukrainian firm TAF Industries and Finnish company Summa Defence had signed a similar agreement earlier under the same initiative.
Zelenskyy said the cooperation would combine Ukrainian combat experience with Finnish technology. Stubb said Finland already faces hybrid attacks, from undersea cable sabotage to drones, and treats sabotage as a standing risk to the plants, adding that Finland ranks among the largest per-capita suppliers of military equipment to Ukraine.
From support to co-production—and a two-way expertise swap
Stubb said the planned arrangement is not far from Denmark's model of directly financing Ukrainian defense production, according to Yle.
Zelenskyy said the agreements cover drones built in Finland for Ukraine and Europe, expanded maritime unmanned systems, and a plant for ground robotic systems, and Stubb said the documents signed during the visit concerned air, land, and sea.
The Finnish president said in the Mi-Ukraina interview that Europe's relationship with Ukraine has changed since the full-scale invasion. Ukraine once needed European support, while Europe now needs Ukraine's battlefield experience, he said. What Finland learned, by his account: trench warfare is over, a 40-kilometer kill zone means tanks firing at shorter range have no role, and Ukraine holds more data on modern war than the rest of Europe combined.
Shares in Russia’s second-largest bank VTB fell to an all-time intraday low of just under 50 rubles ($0.60) on 26 August, RBC’s exchange data showed. That was more than 40% below the 87-ruble (about $1) price set for a share sale partly intended to finance its Wildberries partnership. At that price, offering participants would pay about 75% more than investors buying the same shares on the stock market.
In the second quarter, the bank set aside 28% more for troubled loa
Shares in Russia’s second-largest bank VTB fell to an all-time intraday low of just under 50 rubles ($0.60) on 26 August, RBC’s exchange data showed. That was more than 40% below the 87-ruble (about $1) price set for a share sale partly intended to finance its Wildberries partnership. At that price, offering participants would pay about 75% more than investors buying the same shares on the stock market.
In the second quarter, the bank set aside 28% more for troubled loans while its profit fell by one-third.
VTB’s drop came amid a wider decline in Russian stocks. Kommersant’s market report said analysts also linked the fall to VTB’s own large new share issue.
Share issue could cut existing stakes by one-third
Under the bank’s offering plan, VTB could issue almost one new share for every two already in circulation. If VTB sold the full amount, an existing shareholder who bought no new shares would see their ownership stake fall by about one-third. VTB planned to finish the sale and close its Wildberries deal by 1 September.
The bank expected to raise 300–400 billion rubles ($3.6–$4.7 billion). VTB said it had assembled a group of large investors willing to participate but would not disclose who they were. Those investors would receive the same class of shares traded on the Moscow Exchange, but at the price fixed by VTB.
VTB described the partnership primarily as a route into Wildberries’ 80 million users—more than twice the bank’s own customer base. VTB would initially acquire a 5% stake in Wildberries’ banking arm, with the option to increase its holding later.
Reuters described both companies—Wildberries and rival Ozon—as central to Moscow’s plans to use online commerce as an engine of economic growth.
VTB held its price as shares fell
On 9 July, VTB kept its price even after the stock had fallen well below the offering price. The bank said its large, long-term investors were willing to look past short-term price swings.
On 16 July, VTB hit another low as investors prepared for its dividend cutoff and the new share issue. The first drone strikes on Wildberries warehouses followed two days later.
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VTB’s first-half results showed that its profit fell by one-fifth from a year earlier. In the second quarter, the bank set aside 28% more for troubled loans while its profit fell by one-third.
After the attacks, Moscow considered supporting Wildberries and its sellers, with VTB expected to play a central role. VTB shares fell 2.5% on 28 July amid uncertainty over the partnership. “If we receive such a request, we will, of course, be open to various forms of lending support,” VTB’s first deputy CEO Dmitry Pyanov told Reuters.
Norway's Air Force has put its first counter-drone system into service at Ørland, the country's only combat aircraft base, NRK reported. A launcher now stands beside the runway where Norway's F-35 stealth fighters are parked, bought specifically to bring drones down. The deployment follows a wave of drone sightings across Europe last autumn and will be phased in at other Norwegian bases.
Since Russia's full-scale invasion, European states have logged drone sightings ove
Norway's Air Force has put its first counter-drone system into service at Ørland, the country's only combat aircraft base, NRK reported. A launcher now stands beside the runway where Norway's F-35 stealth fighters are parked, bought specifically to bring drones down. The deployment follows a wave of drone sightings across Europe last autumn and will be phased in at other Norwegian bases.
Since Russia's full-scale invasion, European states have logged drone sightings over airports and bases, airspace violations, sabotage, and arrests for espionage, much of it attributed to Moscow, which denies involvement. This month, a suspected case turned physical: an explosive drone struck a Ukrainian cargo plane at a German airport but failed to detonate.
The launcher came from the British company ISS Aerospace and works as one of several effectors inside a system the military calls Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems, or C-UAS. Radars and other sensors spot the drones first. It is built to protect fixed installations against drones weighing up to 150 kilograms, and it can either jam a machine or destroy it. Ørland already has NASAMS air defenses, the Norwegian-American missile system Ukraine also uses, but firing interceptor missiles at small drones is expensive and described as shooting sparrows with cannons.
"We received a system in the spring, which we are introducing now, and it gives us a hugely increased capacity in drone defense," said the head of the counter-drone unit at the base, Sondre Steinsvik.
Officers of the base defense battalion and the counter-drone unit beside the British-supplied launcher at the Ørland fighter base in Norway, 26 August 2026. Photo: Ingrid Lindgaard Stranden / NRK
What pushed it forward
Police reported observations of possible drones near the base in September last year, part of a wider wave across Europe that also closed Oslo airport. Trøndelag police later concluded the lights had most likely been blinking celestial bodies. The purchase was already underway, but the sightings accelerated it, and the new sensors are meant to make such calls easier in future. Ørland's mayor said at the time the drone defense was arriving far too late.
A NASAMS air defense launcher at the Ørland fighter base in Norway, 26 August 2026. Photo: Ingrid Lindgaard Stranden / NRK
Small drones have become easily available, are relatively easy to smuggle in or rebuild locally, and could potentially do serious damage to aircraft parked in the open, according to Lars Peder Haga of Norway's Air Force Academy, who said that from a defense standpoint, such purchases can never move fast enough.
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Next bases, and Norway's own drones
Evenes air station, which handles Norway's quick-reaction alert mission among other duties, is among the sites due to receive it, NRK reported. Parliament's long-term plan set aside nearly $2 billion for drones, electronic warfare, and autonomy through 2036.
The base has also built a drone troop of its own, flying machines for search and mapping, with the aim of arming them to strike other drones.
"That is the direction we want to go. We see it is very effective in Ukraine," said the head of the base defense battalion, Tormod Overland.
All of Lukoil’s major refineries in Russia are now offline after a Ukrainian drone strike halted crude processing at its NORSI plant on 26 August, Reuters reported the shutdown. NORSI is Russia’s fourth-largest refinery and second-largest gasoline producer.
The latest attack produced the plant’s fifth drone-related shutdown in less than five months.
Ukraine’s General Staff said it had struck the refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, where a fire subsequently br
All of Lukoil’s major refineries in Russia are now offline after a Ukrainian drone strike halted crude processing at its NORSI plant on 26 August, Reuters reported the shutdown. NORSI is Russia’s fourth-largest refinery and second-largest gasoline producer.
The latest attackproduced the plant’s fifth drone-related shutdown in less than five months.
Ukraine’s General Staff said it had struck the refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, where a fire subsequently broke out. It said the refinery helps supply Russia’s armed forces.
Industry sources told Reuters that several processing units and other plant infrastructure had been damaged. No repair timetable is available, and Lukoil did not respond to the agency’s request for comment.
NORSI can process about 15 million tons of crude annually and produce about 5 million tons of gasoline and more than 5 million tons of diesel, according to Reuters.
A Reuters dispatch in The Moscow Times said Lukoil listed no NORSI-made gasoline, diesel, or other petroleum products for sale on the St. Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange after the shutdown.
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NORSI’s closure followed the complete shutdown of Lukoil’s Perm refinery after a 21 August drone strike. The company’s Volgograd plant had already stopped processing on 31 July.
The Moscow Times listed four previous occasions this year when drone strikes stopped NORSI from processing crude: 5 April, 20 May, 24 June, and 2 July. The latest attack, therefore, produced the plant’s fifth drone-related shutdown in less than five months.
Lukoil also operates a smaller refinery in Ukhta, which remains active.
Kremlin threatens retaliation
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin wrote that Russian forces had “repelled” more than 40 drones. He also reported damage to an unnamed industrial enterprise, several homes, and cars.
A day later, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov promised a “harsh response” to Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s economic and trade infrastructure.
Russia is facing its second bout of fuel shortages this summer. Gasoline sales limits have returned to Moscow and St. Petersburg, while Rosneft has capped purchases at 30 liters per vehicle across its filling-station network, The Moscow Times reported.
Kommersant reported that Astrakhan Oblast had capped gasoline purchases at 30 liters and was serving drivers according to odd- and even-numbered license plates. Orenburg Oblast introduced a similar system and capped purchases at 30 liters to preserve supplies for emergency services and public transport, Governor Yevgeny Solntsev announced.
Five days before NORSI stopped, the Russian government ordered officials to distribute available fuel more evenly between and within regions. Russia also plans to extend its diesel export ban through September as refinery outages constrain domestic supplies.
A car bomb killed a lieutenant colonel of Russia's Aerospace Forces in St. Petersburg on the morning of 27 August, the local outlet Fontanka reported. His wife survived and reached hospital in serious condition. Russia's Investigative Committee opened a criminal case, and nobody has claimed responsibility for the attack.
Ukraine's war reaches deep into Russia's rear, where officers, arms-industry figures, and quisling officials keep dying in blasts far from the front. W
A car bomb killed a lieutenant colonel of Russia's Aerospace Forces in St. Petersburg on the morning of 27 August, the local outlet Fontanka reported. His wife survived and reached hospital in serious condition. Russia's Investigative Committee opened a criminal case, and nobody has claimed responsibility for the attack.
Ukraine's war reaches deep into Russia's rear, where officers, arms-industry figures, and quisling officials keep dying in blasts far from the front. Who put the bomb in this car is a separate question. It could be Kyiv, or it could be a criminal score being settled — Russia has no shortage of those.
A bomb inside the car
Witnesses said the officer and his wife were pulling away from their house in a southern suburb of the city at around 10 a.m. when an improvised explosive device went off inside the car, Militarnyi reported. The officer died on the spot, and the blast tore off the legs of both spouses. Fontanka placed the dead officer in Russia's Air Force and Air Defense branches, which sit within the Aerospace Forces.
Russian channel Ren TV published a video of the wreckage and said the explosion followed the driver starting the engine. The Geely lost its rear window, hood, and rear bumper, and its body was badly deformed, and parts landed dozens of meters away, according to the channel. Footage from the site shows debris across the roadway and emergency crews arriving.
A car bomb killed a Russian Aerospace Forces lieutenant colonel in St. Petersburg
The unnamed officer died where he sat on the morning of 27 August. The Geely's hood and rear bumper ended up on the road, and parts landed dozens of meters away. Investigators opened the case as… pic.twitter.com/g132U7Oaft
Witnesses told the Russian news Telegram channel Ostorozhno Novosti that the blast wave badly deformed the driver's door and damaged cars parked alongside. Ukrainian monitoring Telegram channel Exilenova+ posted several clips from the site and described the dead man as a military pilot.
The Investigative Committee's St. Petersburg directorate said it had opened a criminal case over the burning of a car in which two people were hurt. It confirmed that one of them died and one was hospitalized, and it did not name the article of the criminal code.
Russia's Defense Ministry bought a significant share of the housing in that part of the city for servicemen and their families, according to available information.
Russian Aerospace Forces officer killed by a bomb in his own car in St. Petersburg
Bombings in Russia's rear
The killing follows a run of blasts against people tied to Russia's war. Earlier this month, a bomb under the car of Vladimir Tkachuk, who heads the plant making Upyr first-person-view drones, killed his bodyguard and put Tkachuk in intensive care. Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk reportedly died on 1 August in a blast at an Italian restaurant in Moscow.
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At least four senior officers have died in bombings in and around the capital since late 2024, including chemical defense chief Igor Kirillov, General Staff officer Yaroslav Moskalik, military planner Fanil Sarvarov, and Damir Davydov, who ran missile and shell deliveries for the Defense Ministry. Ukraine's security service claimed the Kirillov operation openly and, through a source, a 2024 Sevastopol car bombing that killed a Black Sea Fleet brigade commander. Kyiv has stayed silent on most of the rest.
The Financial Times reported that Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Poland are jointly urging the European Commission to restart work on using more than €200 billion ($233 billion) in frozen Russian central bank assets to fund Ukraine. Belgium blocked the proposal in December over legal and financial concerns.The Council says the EU’s €90 billion ($105 billion) loan covers two-thirds of Ukraine’s projected funding needs for 2026 and 2027. In the Financial Times,
The Financial Times reported that Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Poland are jointly urging the European Commission to restart work on using more than €200 billion ($233 billion) in frozen Russian central bank assets to fund Ukraine. Belgium blocked the proposal in December over legal and financial concerns.
The Council says the EU’s €90 billion ($105 billion) loan covers two-thirds of Ukraine’s projected funding needs for 2026 and 2027. In the Financial Times,Swedish Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard called the loan a “manifestation of the EU’s commitment to support Ukraine,” but said it was “clearly not enough.”
A draft obtained by the Kyiv Independent is dated 27 August and asks EU foreign ministers to hold an initial discussion in Ireland on 1–2 September. Three EU diplomats told the outlet they expected it to be sent the same day.
EU rules already channel profits from frozen assets to Ukraine, primarily to help repay EU and G7 loans. The Commission proposedusing cash balances from the Russian holdings for a separate reparations loan, while leaving the assets frozen.
In February, Kaja Kallas acknowledged that EU officials had done no further work on the option since December. Separately, Ukrainians and their supporters rallied across dozens of countries from 22 to 24 August to demand that Europe use the assets.
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Belgium’s objections remain unchanged. The government fears Russian legal retaliation and wider risks to financial markets because most of the assets are held in Belgium. No new proposal has resolved those concerns, and the coalition is asking the Commission for a progress report on possible legal and technical solutions.
Belarus is fitting a new base near its border with Ukraine to receive heavy military hardware by rail, according to Radio Svaboda, the Belarus service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. On paper it is a training ground—but the leaked design documents describe a site built to unload trainloads of vehicles. The work is moving ahead even as Belarusian commanders have begun saying there is no real threat from the West.
Belarus keeps adding permanent military infrastructure
Belarus is fitting a new base near its border with Ukraine to receive heavy military hardware by rail, according to Radio Svaboda, the Belarus service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. On paper it is a training ground—but the leaked design documents describe a site built to unload trainloads of vehicles. The work is moving ahead even as Belarusian commanders have begun saying there is no real threat from the West.
Belarus keeps adding permanent military infrastructure on its Ukrainian frontier even as its own commanders now drop the Western-threat case behind it.
A rail line sized for military trains
Construction is under way near the village of Yakimaŭka in Homiel Oblast, the part of Belarus that runs along Ukraine's northern edge. Radio Svaboda reported that the new rail infrastructure is designed to receive military trains. The finding rests on project documents obtained by a community of Belarusian railway workers.
The papers describe a separate access track sized for up to 60 railcars and a cargo platform with a ramp for unloading wheeled and tracked vehicles. A state military-design institute, Vaenpraekt, is listed as the client.
A base for a new assault brigade
The papers pin the range only to Homiel Oblast, but Radio Svaboda links it to a wider military complex built near Homiel since late 2023. That complex is the planned home of the 37th separate air-assault brigade of Belarus's Special Operations Forces. Cadastral maps split it into an eastern "military town" and a western "training-tactical field."
Alyaksandr Lukashenka's government created the brigade in 2025 to strengthen the country's southern sector, ostensibly against a threat from Ukraine. Part of the military town was reported finished in June 2026, and crews have since moved to the rail tracks.
Belarus drops its own threat talk
For months, Belarusian officials have claimed the West was preparing to attack. In June 2026, the Minister of Defense of Belarus Viktar Khrenin pressed the line at a meeting of defense ministers from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Moscow, and again at an "anti-fascist congress" in Minsk, where he accused Europeans of a "Nazi mentality."
Khrenin told Lukashenka the situation around Belarus was calm, with no sign that neighbors were preparing to act. On 16 August, the commander of Belarus's air force and air defense, Andrei Lukyanovich, said there was no external threat and that operational contacts with Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were ongoing.
China is helping Russia build a faster Shahed. Russia has begun using upgraded Shahed drones with Chinese-made turbojet engines that fly at speeds close to three times those of earlier versions, the Wall Street Journal reported.
The Shahed jet is designed to beat Ukraine's air defenses. Ukrainian interceptors have downed about 90 percent of the older piston-engine drones, which cruise at roughly 180 kilometers per hour, so Russia switched to the jet-powered Geran-4, whi
China is helping Russia build a faster Shahed. Russia has begun using upgraded Shahed drones with Chinese-made turbojet engines that fly at speeds close to three times those of earlier versions, the Wall Street Journal reported.
The Shahed jet is designed to beat Ukraine's air defenses. Ukrainian interceptors have downed about 90 percent of the older piston-engine drones, which cruise at roughly 180 kilometers per hour, so Russia switched to the jet-powered Geran-4, which cruises at around 500 kilometers per hour.
The engines come from one Shenzhen firm
The turbojets come from Telefly Telecommunications Equipment, founded in Shenzhen in 2010. The company chiefly makes computer hardware and communications equipment, but also sells its own line of micro-turbojets for drones.
China has long been the main clearinghouse for Shahed parts, including engine components, servomotors, and gyroscopes, the newspaper reported.
The company scrubbed its own website
After Ukraine publicized the discovery of Telefly engines in Russian drones, the turbojet section disappeared from the English-language pages of the company's website. The pages in Chinese and other languages still carry them.
China's foreign ministry, which did not respond either, has previously said it strictly regulates exports of dual-use components and rejects unilateral US sanctions on such trade.
Western parts fade as Chinese parts arrive
Downed Shaheds once carried microcontrollers from Texas Instruments in the US and linear regulators from STMicroelectronics, which the newspaper lists as being based in Switzerland. Over time, the Western components are disappearing even as the drones gain better navigation and attack systems, because US Treasury investigations found nearly all the Western parts were being diverted through Chinese intermediaries, often shell companies in Hong Kong.
Ukrainian government researcher Colonel Oleksandr Zaruba said in June that Shaheds now hold more antennas, modems, and SIM cards to correct their flight paths through local mobile networks, and that the components increasingly come from China.
Ukraine has drawn up a list of those who build Russia's ballistic missiles and wants all of them sanctioned by its allies. Kyiv is asking partners to impose sanctions on more than 100 Russian ballistics producers, presidential sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said at a press conference in Kyiv, according to Ukrinform.
The demand rests on physical evidence. An Iskander that Russia fired at Kyiv Oblast on 10 July held more than 140 foreign components, 62 of them A
Ukraine has drawn up a list of those who build Russia's ballistic missiles and wants all of them sanctioned by its allies. Kyiv is asking partners to impose sanctions on more than 100 Russian ballistics producers, presidential sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said at a press conference in Kyiv, according to Ukrinform.
The demand rests on physical evidence. An Iskander that Russia fired at Kyiv Oblast on 10 July held more than 140 foreign components, 62 of them American, alongside parts from Switzerland, Germany, Taiwan, China, and Japan, Vlasiuk reported in July. Most were made recently, which means the parts are still reaching Russia. Naming the factories is Ukraine's attempt to close the gap at the production end rather than chase each shipment.
The plan runs on synchronization
The commissioner laid out several parts of the plan at the press conference. The first is getting the same producers sanctioned everywhere at once, so a firm blocked in one country cannot operate through another. He said the files were handed to partners a few weeks ago, and Ukrainian specialists expect to identify every producer on allied lists by September or October.
The plan also covers what Vlasiuk called kinetic sanctions, meaning strikes on Russian defense-industry sites. He named the Kamensky Combine, which makes components for rocket fuel, as one such target.
The critical parts are still foreign
Ukraine keeps finding Western microelectronics in identified Russian ballistics, including Iskander-M missiles and those used by the S-400 system, with parts traced to the US, Japan, Germany, Taiwan, France, Britain, and Switzerland. The most sensitive elements are the Kometa satellite navigation system and autonomous inertial guidance units, which run on American, Swiss, and French microelectronics.
Ballistics is the most demanding product for quality and precision, Vlasiuk said, which is why those two systems are the chokepoint.
Ukraine wants smaller packages, sooner
The commissioner asked partners to adopt more stringent export controls, up to licensing or banning the export of sensitive components to third countries that help Russia evade sanctions. Ukraine has also compiled a list of more than 10 critical materials, including ammonium perchlorate, aluminum powder, and tungsten, as well as the numerically controlled machine tools Russia needs to build the missiles.
The EU has already begun work on a large 22nd sanctions package. Ukraine is urging it not to wait, asking instead for an interim ballistics package in September and another in October, moving in small steps as Ukraine, Britain, and Canada already do.
Ukraine is turning ordinary cars into robots instead of building them from scratch. Three units of the Armed Forces received the Kaban remote-control system, which converts vehicles into uncrewed ones, developer Drone Fight Group told Defender Media.
Ground robots have become a daily part of Ukraine's front. Ukrainian units ran 16,676 logistics and evacuation missions with them in June, up 122 percent since January, and the military has contracted more than 22,000 groun
Ukraine is turning ordinary cars into robots instead of building them from scratch. Three units of the Armed Forces received the Kaban remote-control system, which converts vehicles into uncrewed ones, developer Drone Fight Group told Defender Media.
Ground robots have become a daily part of Ukraine's front. Ukrainian units ran 16,676 logistics and evacuation missions with them in June, up 122 percent since January, and the military has contracted more than 22,000 ground robots for 2026, nearly double the 2025 total. Most are purpose-built platforms. Kaban takes the opposite route, converting vehicles that a unit already has.
The developers say Kaban was passed to the 3rd Army Corps, the 429th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment "Akhilles", and the 49th Brigade of the Armed Forces.
The system bolts on without modification
Kaban installs on a vehicle without altering its construction and works with different models, Drone Fight Group said. It lets the operator switch between remote and manual control.
The operator navigates on a digital map, plotting routes and setting markers. Manual correction is built in for GPS spoofing cases. The system predicts its trajectory and can automatically stop the vehicle if the connection is lost.
Starlink carries the control link
The main communication channel is Starlink, and the system also supports analog video transmission and radio control, according to the developers. A vehicle can be fitted with thermal cameras if needed.
Kaban provides two-way audio and remote control of lights, infrared illumination, and searchlights, and it can pull data from the vehicle's onboard computer. Among the optional add-ons, the developers list net launchers and platforms for launching drones.
Combat testing came before the handover
Kaban is developed with support from the Brave1 cluster, and the system has already passed combat trials, according to the developers. Work continues to refine it using feedback from military units.
Exclusives
Ukraine's secret counteroffensive is more successful than we thought. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps has cut across a dangerous Russian salient in the east. All without telling anyone.
Frontline Rolls: Ukrainian soldiers document their lives at the front on film. The 2025 project is now a photobook and traveling exhibition after winning two international photography awards.
US C-17 spends 8½ hours in Moscow during first CIA chief visit since 2021. Washin
In 2022, Russians fired artillery then advanced in vehicles
Four years later, they launch glide bombs then advance as small teams of infantry
Ukrainian drones stand in their way, and that's why drone operators are the main targets of Russian firepower before and during the advance
On Monday, a small team of Russian infiltrators reportedly slipped 10 km behind the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian troops just north of Kostiantynivka in eastern Ukrai
In 2022, Russians fired artillery then advanced in vehicles
Four years later, they launch glide bombs then advance as small teams of infantry
Ukrainian drones stand in their way, and that's why drone operators are the main targets of Russian firepower before and during the advance
On Monday, a small team of Russian infiltrators reportedly slipped 10 km behind the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian troops just north of Kostiantynivka in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.
Sneaking into the town of Druzhkivka, 10 km north of Kostiantynivka along the H20 highway, the Russians reportedly ambushed, captured and executed a group of three or four unarmed Ukrainian drone operators.
It's possible the drone operators had just arrived in Druzhkivka when the Russians appeared. According to analyst and mapper AMK Mapping, Ukrainian drone operators pulled out of the village of Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka—which lies between Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka—owing to the increasing threat from Russian KAB glide bombs. "It's likely that Russian forces monitored the withdrawals of Ukrainian drone operators and sent in [an infiltration group] after the new position was identified," AMK Mapping concluded.
The atrocity underscores the Russian military's new approach to ground warfare as Russia's wider war on Ukraine grinds through its 54th month. An army that once counted on its own artillery to suppress enemy artillery in order to allow mechanized forces to advance now uses precision bombs, small cruise missiles, tiny drones, and, yes, some artillery to suppress the Ukrainian drone teams that represent the main obstacle to a swift Russian advance.
Yesterday, a group of Russian DRGs was able to infiltrate from Kostyantynivka for at least 10 km behind Ukrainian lines, and kill 3-4 Ukrainian drone operators in the city of Druzhkivka. The drone operators were unarmed in their positions at the time of the ambush, not expecting… pic.twitter.com/KNxN0JelwL
And when the Russian firepower manages to suppress Ukrainian drone operators, allowing small teams of infantry to advance, the infantry's objective is often to take out the same drone operators whose suppression was a necessary pre-condition of any successful assault.
In short, the Ukrainians largely defend with drones. That means the Russians are fixated on first striking the drone teams in order to prevent them from launching their tiny lethal robots—and then, when they can, assaulting the drone teams' positions in order to capture or kill them. Or capture then kill them, as reportedly happened in Druzhkivka.
The Russians have learned the hard way that they can't advance without first finding and attacking Ukrainian drone operators. That hard experience has driven a profound transformation of the Russian way of war in just the last few years.
Map: ISW.
Precision suppression
As 2025 wore into 2026, Ukrainian forces finally deployed enough $500 drones to effectively halt any sustained Russian advance along the 1,200-km gray zone stretching across eastern and southern Ukraine. Between February and July, the Russians captured around 260 sq km of Ukrainian soil, according to a tally by the Black Bird Group. That's barely a fifth as much ground as they seized in the same six months in 2025.
Realizing they couldn't just fire an artillery barrage and then roll out the tanks the way they used to, the Russians have mostly parked their thousands of armored vehicles. Now they advance in small teams of lightly equipped infantry that, Russian commanders reason, stand a better chance of avoiding detecting and destruction by drones.
"Broadly speaking, current Russian military theory appears to emphasize restoring the ability to maneuver," Sidharth Kaushal and Sam Cranny-Evans wrote in a new study for the Royal United Services Institute in London. But the infantry infiltrators who do most of the maneuvering these days don't march out without support. A lot of it.
In the early months of the wider war in 2022 and 2023, the Russians counted on artillery—lots of artillery—to support the maneuver forces. But massed artillery is just as exposed to drone attack as massed tanks are, so Russian fire support has had to evolve, too.
Today, the Russians still fire artillery from fewer but more spread-out guns. But they also launch their own drones, small cruise missiles, and—perhaps most important—KAB glide bombs to force Ukrainian defenders, including drone teams, into their dugouts before the infantry dash across the gray zone. "Russian theorists appear to see the solution in highly mobile units designed to exploit lower-risk tunnels created by precision strike," Kaushal and Cranny-Evans explained.
It's explosive choreography requiring careful communication between the infantry, the artillery, drone teams and the air force. "Sustaining momentum in the face of adversary precision strike is a considerable challenge," Kaushal and Cranny-Evans wrote. But a necessary one as the Russian military "contemplates how it can break the current positional deadlock" in Ukraine "and avoid future ones."
But when it works, it works to catastrophic effect for Ukrainian defenders. As those unfortunate, murdered drone operators found out.
The suppress-then-advance method, but with precision munitions and small teams of infiltrators, works for both sides, of course. The Ukrainians can do it, too—and they recently did in some unspecified sector of the gray zone.
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Ukraine’s secret counteroffensive takes the pressure off Sloviansk
On the same day the Russians executed those drone operators, fellow Ukrainian drone pilot Dmytro Putiata reported a small Ukrainian mechanized advance. "At one of the direction at the front line, one of the Ukrainian brigades used four [infantry fighting vehicles] during the attack," Putiata wrote. "They have managed to break through up to three km; dismounted infantry and all of the vehicles managed to retreat."
They break through with the help of friendly drones units that suppressed Russian troops along the assault route, Putiata explained. "How did they manage not to be targeted by drones? The battlefield was prepared for that."
Ukraine's quiet counteroffensive north of Lyman has produced dramatic results since April
Now two Russian regiments are in danger of encirclement
Escape is still likely for the Russians, but their retreat buys time for the Ukrainian defenders of Lyman and nearby Sloviansk
Ukraine secret eastern counteroffensive seems to have been even more successful than some observers reported. It's possible that, in the sector just north of the town of Lyman in eastern Ukra
Ukraine's quiet counteroffensive north of Lyman has produced dramatic results since April
Now two Russian regiments are in danger of encirclement
Escape is still likely for the Russians, but their retreat buys time for the Ukrainian defenders of Lyman and nearby Sloviansk
Ukraine secret eastern counteroffensive seems to have been even more successful than some observers reported. It's possible that, in the sector just north of the town of Lyman in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps is just a few kilometers short of encircling two Russian regiments.
That doesn't mean the Russian units can't escape. After all, there isn't a contiguous line of Ukrainian forces—nor a contiguous line of Russian forces for that matter—anywhere along the 1,200-km disputed gray zone that threads across eastern and southern Ukraine.
Situation near Nove as of 23 August. Map: Euromaidan Press
But the closing pincer around elements of the Russian 2nd and 144th Motor Rifle Divisions could strain the Russians' logistics and compel the Russians to reconsolidate in order to preserve their combat power—by retreating east. That would take a lot of pressure off Lyman and, by extension, also take a lot of pressure off Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the last two big free cities in Donetsk.
Lyman, which lies 15 km northeast of Sloviansk—the northernmost of the free cities—is the main obstacle between at least six Russian regiments and Sloviansk. The Russians have been inching toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from several directions for months now, racing against the coming winter to position forces for a possible siege of the twin cities next year. Winter in Ukraine punishes any attacker by depriving them of the leafy tree canopy that can conceal infiltrating troops during warmer months.
According to the most recent map from analyst and mapper Thorkill, one of the more reliable observers of unit-level action in Ukraine, the Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade is just a few kilometers away from linking up with the 60th Mechanized Brigade in or around the village of Kolodyazi.
Sytuacja w rejonie Nowego (Łyman), część II.
Jednym z odcinków frontu w Donbasie, na którym wojska ukraińskie prowadzą obecnie działania zaczepne, jest rejon Kateryniwka - Nowe – Zełena Dolyna, na północ od Łymanu. Od połowy maja 2026 r. pozycje rosyjskiej 144 Dywizji Strzelców… pic.twitter.com/AIvInwHGX3
If true, that means the 3rd Assault Brigade and adjacent units from the 3rd Army Corps have carried out one of the more successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in memory. In April they first exploited gaps in Russian defenses north of the village of Nove. In May and June they advanced toward the village. In July they captured it.
After that, the attacking Ukrainians kept pushing south into the right flank of a 10-km-by-10-km salient that advancing Russian regiments created as they maneuvered around Lyman from the north, aiming to surround the town instead of directly assaulting it on their way toward Sloviansk.
Leaving their flank exposed, the Russians trying to encircle Lyman found themselves at risk of encirclement, instead. If the 3rd Assault Brigade or 60th Mechanized Brigade—together possessing thousands of troops, on paper—can march through Kolodyazi, they will have closed a ring of loose Ukrainian control around at least two Russian regiments, also with potentially thousands of troops.
Emphasis on loose control. Again, there aren't enough Ukrainian forces on the ground north of Lyman to prevent any "encircled" Russians from retreating back to the east. But that retreat would represent a major victory for the Ukrainian defenders north and east of Sloviansk. "The fall of this salient [north of Lyman] would significantly delay the fall of Lyman," analyst and mapper AMK Mapping predicted.
Situational update on the Lyman direction:
The Ukrainian counterattacks north of Lyman are now entering their fourth month, as they come closer and closer to cutting off the Russian salient. Two pincers have been formed, which are both dangerously close to cutting the Russians… pic.twitter.com/mu2kZ4S3Jv
No one expects the Russians to halt their offensive toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. But in potentially taking two steps forward and one step back in their northerly march on the free cities, the Russians sacrifice time. Time the Ukrainians can use to stiffen their defenses in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk and evacuate more of the tens of thousands of civilians who remain in the cities despite the constant danger from Russian drones and bombs.
The possible extent of the Ukrainian gains north of Lyman—a 10-km march since April—is impressive given Russia's overall advantage in manpower and firepower in the east. Equally impressive is the operational security, or OPSEC, that cloaked the offensive until now. Sure, there were a few videos of action around Nove that hinted at a major Ukrainian action.
But the units involved exercised surprising discipline, and prevented too much information from leaking. "Someone in the 3rd Corps responsible for [OPSEC] is actually trying to do their job diligently and has quite effectively cut off information," Thorkill noted. The secrecy may have facilitated the Ukrainian advance by delaying any sense of panic among the Russian commanders who are responsible for reinforcing the Lyman salient, but who also tend to ignore bad news as long as possible because they know it could reflect poorly on them.
News of the counteroffensive is now available for all to see, even if official Ukrainian sources have yet to confirm it. That may mean time is running out for the 3rd Army Corps to close its pincer before the Russians retreat or reinforce. AMK Mapping has already seen some evidence of a "partial withdrawal from the most vulnerable positions in the salient.
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Can Ukrainian forces save Sloviansk and Kramatorsk?
Russia is trying to build the weapon Ukraine used against it. The Russian fleet is set to receive more than 150 uncrewed surface vessels in 2026, with the state order possibly rising to 230 units, Ukraine's Defense Intelligence told Oboronka.
Ukraine's naval drones drove Russia's Black Sea Fleet out of its main base. Magura strike drones operated by Defense Intelligence sank or damaged more than a dozen Russian vessels and forced the fleet to relocate from Sevastopol to
Russia is trying to build the weapon Ukraine used against it. The Russian fleet is set to receive more than 150 uncrewed surface vessels in 2026, with the state order possibly rising to 230 units, Ukraine's Defense Intelligence told Oboronka.
Ukraine's naval drones drove Russia's Black Sea Fleet out of its main base. Magura strike drones operated by Defense Intelligence sank or damaged more than a dozen Russian vessels and forced the fleet to relocate from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, roughly 300 kilometers east.
Russia is now ordering the same class of weapon in volume, three years after Ukraine first attacked Sevastopol with drone boats in October 2022.
Intelligence lists Russia's priorities
Ukraine's Defense Intelligence has identified what Russia is prioritizing in its uncrewed surface vessel program. Those are building universal drones from Russian-made components, integrating protected communications and artificial intelligence, and increasing the vessels' operating range.
Sanctions slow the build
Russian production is held back by a shortage of electronic components caused by sanctions, according to the agency. Moscow is finding it harder to import and to develop communications resistant to electronic warfare, Ukraine's Defense Intelligence said.
Limits on Starlink access may also have shaped Russia's naval drone development, the agency added. Russian forces had actively used the terminals to control uncrewed systems.
The imitation runs behind the original
Ukraine unveiled the Magura V11, the largest boat in the family, at its Independence Day drone parade on 24 August.
Rather than ramming ships like the one-way craft that cleared the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol, the V11 carries and launches other drones and stays at sea up to seven days.
UFORCE said the drone carries up to 2,200 kg (about 4,850 pounds) and can stay at sea for up to seven days. The company built it for reconnaissance, surveillance, support of landing operations, and resupplying fuel and equipment to other naval drones.
The Ukrainian company that taught Ukraine to hear Russian drones is now learning to listen underwater. Zvook, which develops acoustic systems for detecting drones and missiles, has begun testing hydrophones to detect vessels and other underwater objects by sound, the company said on LinkedIn.
Zvook built its name on land. Its acoustic sensors cover Ukraine at 1,000 meters and below for less than 50 million euros, a system NATO's assistant secretary-general for operation
The Ukrainian company that taught Ukraine to hear Russian drones is now learning to listen underwater. Zvook, which develops acoustic systems for detecting drones and missiles, has begun testing hydrophones to detect vessels and other underwater objects by sound, the company said on LinkedIn.
Zvook built its name on land. Its acoustic sensors cover Ukraine at 1,000 meters and below for less than 50 million euros, a system NATO's assistant secretary-general for operations, Tom Goffus, called crazy for its cost-effectiveness. Lithuania chose the same Ukrainian acoustic technology for deployment in 2026 after Russian drones entered its airspace.
The approach stays passive
Zvook says its underwater method emits nothing, unlike traditional sonar. Active sonar sends sound into the water and listens for its return. The company's system only listens to the acoustic environment and uses the information already present in it.
That principle is familiar to the company from the air. Underwater, almost everything else changes: sound propagation, background noise, reflections, environmental conditions, and acoustic signatures create a different detection problem.
Testing comes before any product
The company says its focus now is not a finished product but real-world data. It is working out which objects can be reliably detected and classified, and where a distributed passive underwater acoustic system could have practical value.
Possible applications range from maritime security and vessel awareness to the protection of ports and critical underwater infrastructure, the company explained. Zvook added that it is seeking commercial joint testing with defense organizations, maritime operators, and infrastructure owners.
The company frames it as one method across domains
Zvook cast the shift as continuity rather than a new line of work. From listening to the sky to acoustic tracking, and now beneath the surface, the domain changes, but the principle stays the same: passive, always listening, emitting nothing, the company said.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy has announced a reinforcement of Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast. This comes amid a Russian offensive against the fortress cities that have defended the region since 2014. Zelenskyy announced the decision after a meeting with Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered his army to seize the entire territory of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of this year, Zelenskyy said earlier.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy has announced a reinforcement of Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast. This comes amid a Russian offensive against the fortress cities that have defended the region since 2014. Zelenskyy announced the decision after a meeting with Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered his army to seize the entire territory of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of this year, Zelenskyy said earlier. This comes amid plans in Russia to mobilize 300,000 Russians in the autumn, UNIAN reports.
After speaking with the military and hearing General Staff reports, Zelenskyy said he, Drapatyi, and Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara determined the next steps to strengthen Ukrainian positions. Two renewed groupings in Donetsk Oblast will be reinforced.
Two Azov commanders take the groupings
The groupings will be led by Hero of Ukraine Denys Prokopenko and Hero of Ukraine Andrii Biletskyi, Zelenskyy said. Prokopenko commands the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard and led the defense of Mariupol in 2022. Biletskyi founded the Azov movement in 2014 and now commands the 3rd Army Corps.
Prepare for the worst
Robert “Madiar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, has commented on the decision.
“This is Smart War. Total synchronization with the Unmanned Systems Forces grouping, the shortest possible ‘sensor-to-shooter’ chain,” he said, adding that Russian forces should prepare for the worst possible consequences.
Analysts urged the move before it came
Earlier, two experts had also called for such a decision: Oleksandr Kovalenko of Information Resistance and Yurii Butusov, a drone company commander in the National Guard’s Khartia Corps.
"The eastern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration is taking on an increasingly threatening character," said Kovalenko, suggesting Andrii Biletskyi's 3rd Army Corps, often described as one of the most capable formations in Ukraine's forces, can be used to stop the catastrophe.
Yurii Butusov said that if Ukraine's forces retreat from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, it could ultimately lead to the loss of the Donbas.
Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, advisor to the president on the development of defense technologies, has highly praised the recent personnel changes in the new Ukrainian commander-in-chief's staff. He says that Mykhailo Drapatyi is appointing the most competent people available to the Armed Forces' technical directions, adding that "after many years of war, he knows most of the army's technical specialists."
The endorsement comes from Beskrestnov, an adviser to former Ukrai
Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, advisor to the president on the development of defense technologies, has highly praised the recent personnel changes in the new Ukrainian commander-in-chief's staff. He says that Mykhailo Drapatyi is appointing the most competent people available to the Armed Forces' technical directions, adding that "after many years of war, he knows most of the army's technical specialists."
The endorsement comes from Beskrestnov, an adviser to former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, considered the most effective in Ukraine's history. After the dismissal, he became a non-staff adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The technology war moves weekly
Beskrestnov rates the new appointees on temperament as much as expertise.
"The main thing is that these new heads are energetic, modern, and good communicators," he wrote.
In a war of technologies, everything changes literally every week, and "we have to react to all the enemy's challenges just as fast. Analyze, forecast, respond, and act a step ahead of the enemy," he added.
Drapatyi arrived in the same reshuffle
Zelenskyy named Drapatyi commander-in-chief on 21 July, replacing Oleksandr Syrskyi, and said in the same address that he had offered Fedorov a leadership position bringing together Ukraine's technological capabilities.
Fedorov's removal drew street protests across Ukraine. Drapatyi commands the General Staff rather than the ministry, so the appointments Beskrestnov praises sit outside the structure he left behind.
Change will be slow, he expects
"I believe big positive changes are ahead of us, but this will not happen fast, because a great deal has to change," Beskrestnov said.
He did not name any of the new appointees or their posts.
Earlier, Beskrestnov disclosed Russia's new tactics in its drones. According to him, while Ukraine's cheap interceptor drones have been knocking Russia's nightly attackers out of the sky, Russia has now bolted a jammer onto some of its own drones to blind them.
Belarus is building railway infrastructure capable of receiving military trains near the village of Yakimauka in Homiel Oblast, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Project documentation obtained by the Belarusian Association of Railway Workers confirms that separate railway infrastructure is being designed for a facility officially called "Construction of a training ground in Homiel Oblast," with the Military Design Institute named as the client.
Minsk backed
Belarus is building railway infrastructure capable of receiving military trains near the village of Yakimauka in Homiel Oblast, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Project documentation obtained by the Belarusian Association of Railway Workers confirms that separate railway infrastructure is being designed for a facility officially called "Construction of a training ground in Homiel Oblast," with the Military Design Institute named as the client.
Minsk backed Russia's aggression against Ukraine and opened its military infrastructure and airspace to the Russian army for the war and for strikes on Ukrainian cities. The first ballistic missiles in 2022 to Kyiv Oblast were launched from the territory of Belarus, killing dozens of civilians.
The site under construction lies about 40 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, and Belarus's three existing air assault brigades sit in Vitsebsk, Brest, and Maryina Horka, none of them on the southern frontier.
The documents specify 60 wagons
The project includes a separate access track designed for up to 60 wagons and a freight platform with a ramp for unloading wheeled and tracked equipment, according to the documentation. The exact location of the new training ground is not yet known.
A new base against "threats from Ukraine"
Large-scale construction of a military base has been underway near Homiel since late 2023, and the 37th Separate Air Assault Brigade of Belarus's Special Operations Forces is likely to be deployed there. Part of the new military town was finished in June 2026, and rail construction continues.
Belarus has formed one battalion of the brigade and plans a second this year, along with combat support, artillery, air defense, and reconnaissance units, Special Operations Forces commander Colonel Aliaksandr Iliukevich said, according to Dzerkalo Tyzhnia.
The government of Alexander Lukashenka established this brigade to “strengthen the southern sector,” ostensibly to counter threats from Ukraine. The eastern part of the new facility is designated on Belarusian state cadastral maps as a “military camp,” while the western section is marked as a “training and tactical field.”
Spain’s response to people displaced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has offered a revealing look at how the country approaches immigration more broadly. Ukrainians received access to residence, employment, healthcare and education under temporary protection, while everyday integration still depends heavily on navigating Spain’s administrative system. For foreigners establishing economic, professional or personal ties with the country, that often includes obt
Spain’s response to people displaced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has offered a revealing look at how the country approaches immigration more broadly. Ukrainians received access to residence, employment, healthcare and education under temporary protection, while everyday integration still depends heavily on navigating Spain’s administrative system. For foreigners establishing economic, professional or personal ties with the country, that often includes obtaining a Spanish NIE number, one of the key identifiers used when dealing with public authorities and private institutions.
More than four years after the full-scale invasion began, Spain is now home to a substantial Ukrainian population. By June 2026, more than 353,000 Ukrainian nationals held valid residence or stay documentation in the country, according to Spain’s Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration. Temporary protection remains valid until March 4, 2027.
But Ukraine is only one part of a much larger immigration story.
Ukraine tested Spain’s capacity to turn emergency protection into integration
The European Union activated temporary protection for people fleeing Ukraine in 2022, creating an exceptional framework that allowed displaced Ukrainians to establish themselves quickly across member states.
In Spain, temporary protection grants both residence and work authorization. Beneficiaries can work as employees or self-employed workers, access healthcare and use the reception system, while minors are entitled to education under the same conditions as children from the host country. The framework can currently be requested until March 4, 2027.
These measures were designed as an emergency response, but four years is long enough for temporary arrangements to become ordinary life.
People find jobs. Children enter schools. Families build social networks. Businesses hire workers who originally arrived under an emergency mechanism. Housing contracts, bank relationships and interactions with public institutions gradually replace the initial questions of immediate safety and shelter.
That process offers a useful perspective on Spanish immigration policy because integration is ultimately measured less by what happens at the border than by what becomes possible afterward.
Spain’s approach to immigration extends well beyond Ukrainians
Spain’s willingness to bring foreign residents into formal administrative status did not end with the Ukrainian response.
In 2026, the country carried out an extraordinary regularization process for foreigners already living in Spain under qualifying circumstances. Between April 16 and June 30, authorities received 1,174,978 applications.
Nearly 80% were applications based on exceptional circumstances linked to established ties in Spain, while the remainder came from applicants for international protection. About 87% of applicants were of working age, and 59.4% were younger than 34.
The nationalities involved also show how much broader this phenomenon is than any single humanitarian crisis.
Colombians represented 25.9% of applications, followed by Moroccans, Venezuelans, Peruvians and Hondurans. Two-thirds of applicants came from Central or South America.
That matters because it places Spain’s treatment of Ukrainians within a wider policy environment.
The mechanisms are different. Temporary protection for Ukrainians and extraordinary regularization for other migrants should not be treated as equivalent immigration routes. But both demonstrate a willingness to create pathways through which foreigners already connected to Spain can move into recognized legal and administrative structures.
Openness does not mean the bureaucracy is simple
This is where Spain can appear contradictory from the outside.
The country can adopt relatively integration-oriented immigration policies while still requiring foreigners to navigate a highly procedural administrative system.
Residence status is only one part of that system.
Foreign residents, investors, property owners, entrepreneurs and others with interests in Spain frequently encounter identification requirements, appointments, registrations, tax procedures and digital interactions with government agencies.
The NIE, or Número de Identidad de Extranjero, is one of the most visible examples. It identifies foreigners who have economic, professional or social interests connected to Spain and appears in a wide range of administrative and private transactions.
But obtaining an identification number does not itself grant residency, just as holding residence status does not eliminate all the other administrative requirements that come with establishing a life or economic connection in the country.
This distinction can be especially important for people looking at Spain from abroad.
Someone can have a reason to interact with Spanish authorities without necessarily immigrating permanently. An investor may need Spanish identification. A property buyer may encounter local administrative requirements. An entrepreneur can develop business interests in Spain while remaining resident elsewhere.
The relevant bureaucracy depends on what the person is actually trying to do.
Spain is also increasingly digital; but that creates another layer to navigate
One notable feature of Spain’s administration is how much of it now takes place electronically.
The scale of the 2026 regularization illustrated this clearly: 83.2% of applications were submitted digitally. Among online applications, professionals handled a large share, while some applicants submitted their own cases using digital certificates.
Spain’s digital certificate system allows individuals to identify themselves securely online, sign official documents and interact with government bodies without completing every procedure in person.
For someone familiar with the system, this can make administration considerably easier.
For someone approaching Spanish bureaucracy for the first time, however, digitization does not necessarily make the process intuitive. It can simply move unfamiliar forms, identification requirements and institutional terminology onto a screen.
That gap has created demand for services focused specifically on administrative navigation.
Gestoraz is a Spanish administrative-services platform that helps foreign individuals, international investors and businesses manage bureaucracy in Spain, with services including NIE and NIF applications and digital certificates. Its model is particularly relevant to people who need to establish an administrative or economic connection with Spain, including those completing Spanish procedures from abroad rather than relocating permanently.
Gestoraz is also an authorized verification point for digital certificate applications and offers an online process that does not require applicants to be physically present in Spain.
This is an important distinction when assessing Spain as an international destination. The country’s immigration environment is not only about who can move there. It is also about how foreigners interact with the state once some form of connection has been established.
The Ukrainian experience shows what integration looks like after arrival
Spain’s Ukrainian population makes that distinction particularly visible.
By June 2026, Ukrainian nationals with valid residence or stay documentation exceeded 353,000. Women accounted for 58% of the population, and the Ministry noted that a Ukrainian community had already been established in Spain before the full-scale invasion.
Temporary protection gave newly displaced Ukrainians an immediate legal framework.
What followed was a much more ordinary process: employment, schooling, documentation, housing and long-term decisions about whether Spain would remain temporary or gradually become home.
The same distinction applies, in a very different context, to other foreigners considering Spain.
A country may be attractive because of employment, investment opportunities, climate, culture or family connections. But the lived experience of entering a country depends partly on whether its institutions create realistic ways for newcomers to become administratively integrated.
Spain’s recent record suggests that policymakers increasingly see migration not only as a question of entry but also as one of participation in the labour market and formal society.
The 2026 regularization provides one unusually large example. By June 30, the government reported nearly 160,000 additional Social Security contributors linked to the process, with hospitality, retail, administrative services and construction among the sectors recording the largest numbers of new registrations.
What Spain’s response tells people looking at the country from abroad
None of this means that moving to Spain is straightforward, that every foreigner qualifies for residence or that Spanish immigration policy is uniformly permissive.
It does suggest something more specific.
Spain has repeatedly used administrative mechanisms to integrate large foreign populations into legal residence, employment and public systems. Its response to Ukrainians made that particularly visible because it happened rapidly and at significant scale. The 2026 regularization showed that the broader policy direction was not confined to Ukrainians.
For people elsewhere considering Spain as somewhere to live, work, invest or build a longer-term economic connection, that distinction may matter.
Spain can be institutionally receptive while remaining bureaucratically demanding.
The Ukrainian experience demonstrates the first half of that equation particularly clearly. The paperwork encountered by anyone who subsequently tries to establish an ordinary life, investment or business connection with the country demonstrates the second.
Understanding both offers a more useful picture of Spain than either describing it as simply “open” to immigration or reducing the experience to its administrative hurdles.
The country’s recent record suggests that access and bureaucracy are not opposites in the Spanish system.
The Embassy of Ukraine in the USA asked the Annapolis Symphony Orchestra (ASO) on 25 August to cancel Russian-born violinist Vadim Repin's participation in its Forces of Nature concerts on 6–7 November at Maryland Hall, citing his involvement in Russian state-sponsored and state-linked cultural initiatives.
Since 2022, Ukrainian diplomats have turned individual concert bookings into an object of foreign policy, arguing that a performer carrying Russian state honors and
The Embassy of Ukraine in the USA asked the Annapolis Symphony Orchestra (ASO) on 25 August to cancel Russian-born violinist Vadim Repin's participation in its Forces of Nature concerts on 6–7 November at Maryland Hall, citing his involvement in Russian state-sponsored and state-linked cultural initiatives.
Since 2022, Ukrainian diplomats have turned individual concert bookings into an object of foreign policy, arguing that a performer carrying Russian state honors and state money brings the state onto the stage with him. Western institutions have answered case by case rather than by policy, so every booking is renegotiated from scratch, and what one venue cancels, another can quietly restore.
The embassy said Repin performed with the State Kremlin Orchestra on 21 February 2024 at a concert the Kremlin Foundation staged for Defender of the Fatherland Day, a Russian military holiday, framed as a tribute to Russia's "great defenders." It said his Vadim Repin Foundation for the Development of the Arts has received substantial funding since the start of the full-scale invasion from Russia's Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives, a state-established institution supporting Russia's cultural policy.
The embassy's request comes four years after the Annapolis Symphony dropped Repin from a March 2022 program and staged a tribute to Ukraine in his place—a decision the orchestra said at the time reflected both the war and respect for Repin's apolitical stance and the safety of him and his family.
A graphic from the Ukrainian embassy's appeal to the Annapolis Symphony Orchestra. Image: Embassy of Ukraine in the USA / Facebook
The orchestra has not addressed the reversal directly, but the program notes for the concert argue that Shostakovich wrote the concerto for Ukrainian-born David Oistrakh under Stalinist repression and that it "calls on listeners to reject the politics of revenge and hate while embracing the healing cycle of forgiveness." The embassy is asking ASO to reaffirm what it describes as the solidarity with Ukraine shown in 2022.
"We hope the Annapolis Symphony Orchestra will give these concerns careful consideration and reaffirm the solidarity with Ukraine it demonstrated in 2022, when it withdrew Mr. Repin from its program and replaced his performance with a musical tribute to Ukraine," the embassy said.
In March 2022, days after Russia's full-scale invasion began, ASO replaced Repin's planned appearance. The orchestra's then-executive director, Edgar Herrera, told WTOP that the decision was not only a response to the war but also "out of respect to Repin's apolitical stance and concerns for the safety of himself and his family."
The embassy noted that Germany's Mannheim Philharmonic, the Hungarian National Philharmonic, and Florida's Palm Beach Symphony have all reconsidered working with Repin this year, and that Palm Beach canceled his performance in March. Mannheim dropped a February concert after a request from Ukraine's embassy in Berlin, and the Hungarian orchestra replaced him at its Budapest season opening in June. A Change.org petition launched in June by Ukrainian Cultural Front DC had already called on ASO to cancel the November concerts.
Neither ASO nor Repin has commented publicly on the embassy's request.
Ukrainian drones struck the Wildberries logistics hub in the Russian town of Kotovsk for the second time in six weeks, Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ reported. A fire took hold across most of the 108,000-square-meter complex, and by late morning, the regional governor said the warehouse was destroyed. Wildberries, Russia's biggest online store, had restarted the site after a July strike. The facility is located in Tambov Oblast, about 420 km from the war zone i
Ukrainian drones struck the Wildberries logistics hub in the Russian town of Kotovsk for the second time in six weeks, Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ reported. A fire took hold across most of the 108,000-square-meter complex, and by late morning, the regional governor said the warehouse was destroyed. Wildberries, Russia's biggest online store, had restarted the site after a July strike. The facility is located in Tambov Oblast, about 420 km from the war zone in Ukraine.
Since mid-July, Kyiv's long-range drones have been burning through the depots of Wildberries and Ozon, Russia's two biggest online stores, alongside the refineries and fuel depots that remain on the target list. Marketplace hubs are wide, flat, and largely uncovered by air defense, and the space takes months to replace, so the campaign now reaches the part of the Russian economy that touches every household.
The second fire at the same hub
Exilenova+ reported the strike at 01:24, saying Ukraine's Defense Forces had hit the site again and that a fire was burning. Later, the channel continued to share photos and videos from Kotovsk. The Russian news Telegram channel Astra reported that local residents described the warehouse as attacked and alight. Witnesses counted at least 10 explosions in 40 minutes. Wildberries said a drone attack damaged its logistics facility in the oblast and started a fire, and that the site had stopped accepting new deliveries.
Smoke rising from the Wildberries logistics center after the drone strike in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast, Russia, 26 August 2026. Photo: Supernova+
What the governor said, and what changed by morning
Tambov Oblast governor Yevgeny Pervyshov confirmed the attack and put the burning area at more than 100,000 square meters. He claimed air defenses and mobile fire groups of a regional volunteer reserve unit destroyed 16 drones. He initially reported one Wildberries employee hurt, with concussion from a blast wave, and said a downed Ukrainian drone set a house on fire in a dacha settlement.
A helicopter carrying a water bucket above the burning Wildberries logistics center in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast, Russia, 26 August 2026. Photo: Exilenova+
By 11:17, Pervyshov's account had changed. Fire had destroyed the warehouse completely, and two people were injured, he said. Three strike drones had reached the building, the official stated. He closed by again urging men in the oblast to join the defense of its skies. Earlier, Kotovsk's mayor asked residents not to leave their homes for two days, citing the risk of carbon monoxide poisoning from the burning warehouse.
Russia's Defense Ministry separately claimed it destroyed 426 drones overnight across the country.
Last night, Ukrainian drones struck another warehouse in Russia
The Wildberries hub in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast, caught fire and the company announced a "temporary" suspension of its operations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces hit 16 targets in Russia over the past day, naming oil facilities — "the Russian oil wallet that finances the war" — along with airfields, a missile unit, a military plant, and Russian logistics. War has to return to where it came from, he said.
Almost no storage left in central Russia
The Kotovsk hub opened in 2025 as one of Wildberries' key logistics sites for central Russia, built to hold up to 54 million items at full capacity. Drones first hit it overnight on 18 July, when seven warehouse staff died and, by the governor's count, 25 more were hurt. The company suspended operations then, too.
By the end of July, the retailer had already lost more than a million square meters of warehouse space, Exile+ calculated, which leaves it physically almost no free capacity in the center of the country.
From one marketplace to the next
Ukrainian drones destroyed eight Wildberries warehouses in July alone, roughly 860,000 square meters or about 15.4% of the company's storage. The campaign widened to Ozon, Russia's second-largest online store, with its biggest Russian complex hit in Orenburg on 23 August, and three southern hubs struck the next night.
Frontline Rolls, a documentary photography project by Ukrainian photographer Serhii Melnychenko, began in February 2025, when Serhii started sending disposable film cameras to soldiers serving in different areas of the front line. He asked them to document their daily lives, routines, and work.The project has since been published as a standalone photobook and adapted into an exhibition, with photographs, handwritten letters, and artifacts returned by the participants. In 2
Frontline Rolls, a documentary photography project by Ukrainian photographer Serhii Melnychenko, began in February 2025, when Serhii started sending disposable film cameras to soldiers serving in different areas of the front line. He asked them to document their daily lives, routines, and work.
The Ukraine War Archive calls Russia’s war against Ukraine the most documented war in history. Frontline Rolls records it from the soldiers’ own perspective through their photographs, letters, and chosen objects.
How Frontline Rolls began
Serhii spent nearly all of 2024 working on Along the Dnipro. Since he did not have time to travel to soldiers’ positions but wanted to document their experiences, he began looking for alternative ways. He asked himself one question:
“Do I really have to be there in person to document this?” Serhii writes in the foreword to the book, the project’s print format.
The book Frontline Rolls: Photos, Letters & Artifacts from Ukrainian Soldiers. Photo: Serhii Melnychenko
The answer was for the soldiers themselves to document their lives for a period of time. Serhii reached out to Fotovramci, which agreed to provide him with disposable film cameras free of charge.
The bags contain film cameras along with the exposed film. Photo: Serhii Melnychenko
The photographs that came back document the soldiers’ daily lives and the spaces in which they served.
Ukrainian service members inside a dugout, 2025. Photo: project participant Andrii “Dronchik”
Project participants also shared their stories in the book:
“I joined because I have to protect my family from the orcs. Before the full‐scale invasion I was an artist–designer, worked in advertising. Now a tank commander and reconnaissance pilot on a Mavic. In my free time I decorate shell‐casings and send them to volunteers for help,” says Oleksii, a soldier and participant in the project who goes by the call sign “Lapa.”
A Ukrainian serviceman works on equipment inside a military vehicle, 2025. Photo: project participant Oleksii “Lapa”A cat sits inside a Ukrainian military dugout, 2025. Photo: project participant Oleksii “Lapa”
“For almost 3½ years I have remained in my soul a civilian. This system is very alien to me. In it I suffer a lot, in particular due to the huge restrictions on freedom. But I am here so that my country remains free. And for my values and convictions I have already paid a considerable price. If I had the option to choose another path—I would still choose this one,” says Oleksii “Photographer,” a soldier and project participant.
Ukrainian service members travel in a vehicle fitted with military communications or electronic equipment, 2025. Photo: project participant Oleksii “Photographer”
“I don’t have a callsign, because everyone knows me as Holikov. In the military since November 2023. From the very start of the full‑scale invasion I volunteered, but with each trip to the front I felt that I was doing not enough and decided to join the ranks of the 109th Separate Brigade of Territorial Defence,” says Viktor Holikov.
Mourners attend the funeral of a fallen Ukrainian service member, surrounded by Ukrainian flags and wreaths, 2025. Photo: project participant Viktor HolikovBurned-out vehicles stand beside a damaged building after an attack, 2025. Photo: project participant Viktor Holikov
“In the army I... feel calmer. I have finally found a certain peace of mind during the full‐scale invasion, despite the difficulties. Partly I still feel that I’m doing not enough, but now it doesn’t haunt me like it used to,” says Kseniia, a servicewoman who goes by the call sign “Jane.”
A Ukrainian servicewoman poses among tall grass and flowers near a frontline position, 2025. Photo: project participant Kseniia “Jane”
“The army for me is, first of all, what is called brotherhood. It is hard to describe—you can only understand it by being inside,” says Danylo “Doc.”
Ukrainian service members rest in a wooded area near the front, 2025. Photo: project participant Danylo “Doc”Small blue figurines are attached to a Ukrainian service member’s body armor, 2025. Photo: project participant Danylo “Doc”
The artifacts tell their own stories
Participants returned handwritten letters and personal objects with the exposed film. Serhii describes the resulting collection as a record of “personal experiences, struggles, and memories.”
“I collected artifacts that will remain part of our nation’s history after victory, reminding us of these challenging times,” Serhii says in the book.
Decorated spent shell casings provided by project participant Oleksii “Lapa,” 2025. Photo: Serhii MelnychenkoA handwritten letter from Ukrainian service member “Dronchik,” describing life at the front and thanking supporters for their help, 2025. Photo: Serhii Melnychenko An FPV drone—a drone remotely controlled by an operator using a live video feed, 2025. Photo: Serhii Melnychenko A handwritten remembrance by Roman 'Fjord' says Andrii 'Kratos' was killed after his position came under a gas attack, 2025. Photo: Serhii MelnychenkoA rosary with a crucifix belonging to Andrii “VirtuoZ,” 2025. Photo: Serhii Melnychenko
The photographs were also presented in Copenhagen as part of The War They Live, an exhibition curated by The Kyiv Independent photo editor Irynka Hromotska together with Serhii. The project was also shown at the Athens Photo Festival in 2026. According to Serhii, the exhibition is also scheduled to open at Fotografiska Stockholm in October 2026.
The Frontline rolls exhibition, featuring photographs, letters, and personal artifacts from Ukrainian soldiers. Ukraine House in Denmark, Copenhagen, 2026. Photo: Serhii Melnychenko
“I sincerely hope that when the war ends, every participant in this project will be alive. Because each of them has become much more to me than just a contributor—they’ve become true friends,” Serhii concludes the foreword to the book.
CIA Director John Ratcliffe visited Moscow on 25 August, becoming the first known serving CIA chief to travel to the Russian capital since November 2021, The Washington Post reported.
The CIA and White House did not publicly explain the mission.
The Kremlin said the unannounced trip involved “contacts between security services” but did not identify whom Ratcliffe met or what they discussed. Dmitry Peskov told Interfax that Ratcliffe did not meet with Russian Presiden
CIA Director John Ratcliffe visited Moscow on 25 August, becoming the first known serving CIA chief to travel to the Russian capital since November 2021, The Washington Post reported.
The CIA and White House did not publicly explain the mission.
The Kremlin said the unannounced trip involved “contacts between security services” but did not identify whom Ratcliffe met or what they discussed. Dmitry Peskov told Interfax that Ratcliffe did not meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The CIA and White House did not publicly explain the mission.
Expert raises possibility of a warning mission
Washington also asked Ukraine not to attack Moscow or St. Petersburg during the visit, Ukrainian sources told Suspilne. Kyiv was told that a senior US delegation was traveling to Russia, although officials were not initially told that Ratcliffe would be part of it.
“It is difficult to speculate because there is essentially no information,” Tartu researcher Vladimir Sazonov, an associate professor who studies Russian state ideology and information warfare, told Euromaidan Press.
Ratcliffe may have carried a warning, as William Burns did in 2021, Sazonov said. It could have concerned a possible new Russian mobilization after September’s State Duma elections or Moscow’s escalating hybrid operations against NATO.
Stalled Ukraine diplomacy and Russia’s relationship with Iran were other possible subjects. None has been confirmed.
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The last CIA visit came before Russia invaded
A US Air Force C-17 flew from Joint Base Andrews outside Washington to Riga, and then Moscow, according to flight data analyzed by The Washington Post. The aircraft remained at Vnukovo Airport for about eight and a half hours before returning to Latvia. The newspaper also verified footage of a diplomatic motorcade traveling through central Moscow.
The career diplomat and former ambassador to Russia, the CIA Director, William Burns/ Source: Getty Images
Ratcliffe’s visit was the first by a CIA director since Burns traveled to Moscow in November 2021 with evidence that Russia was preparing a major attack on Ukraine.
During that visit, Burns spoke with Putin by telephone from the Kremlin because the Russian president was in Sochi. Russia launched its full-scale invasion less than four months later.
Sazonov also raised the possibility that Ratcliffe discussed Americans detained in Russia. The CIA participated in previous negotiations that freed journalists Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva, and former US Marine Paul Whelan, RFE/RL documented CIA involvement.
“If we do not know the answers, all we can do is ask the relevant questions,” Sazonov added.
Ukraine has unveiled the largest robot boat in its Magura sea-drone family, and this one is built to carry and launch other drones instead of ramming enemy ships, the company UFORCE told Militarnyi. UFORCE showed the new V11 during Ukraine's Independence Day drone parade, signaling a move from single-use attack craft toward a floating base at sea.
Ukraine has fought its Black Sea war with throwaway robot boats—cheap, one-way, built to hit a ship and go down with it. Shi
Ukraine has unveiled the largest robot boat in its Magura sea-drone family, and this one is built to carry and launch other drones instead of ramming enemy ships, the company UFORCE told Militarnyi. UFORCE showed the new V11 during Ukraine's Independence Day drone parade, signaling a move from single-use attack craft toward a floating base at sea.
Ukraine has fought its Black Sea war with throwaway robot boats—cheap, one-way, built to hit a ship and go down with it. Shifting toward reusable platforms that keep other machines running far from any coast marks a different bet.
A floating base, not a battering ram
The V11 is the biggest drone in its class. Earlier, Magura boats were made to hit warships. This one is a transport platform that carries other unmanned systems and gear. Its main feature is the ability to launch a larger number of unmanned systems straight from its deck, turning one boat into a mobile base for them. The company refers to the drone as both the V11 and the MV11.
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What the V11 can do
UFORCE says the drone carries up to 2,200 kg (about 4,850 pounds) and can stay at sea for up to seven days. The company built it for reconnaissance, surveillance, support of landing operations, and resupplying fuel and equipment to other naval drones.
"It is a platform that provides multi-domain capability: one carrier that carries and launches other unmanned systems far from shore for operations across all domains," said Oleh Rogynskyy, CEO of UFORCE.
He said the investment the company attracts works for Ukraine's Defense Forces.
From strikes to a US production line
UFORCE's design and engineering office in Portugal developed the V11, drawing on international investment and aiming at the needs of Ukraine's Defense Forces. Its work there was first reported in September 2025.
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In July, the company and the US firm ReconCraft signed a memorandum for the licensed production of Magura naval drones in the US. Ukraine's Magura boats have forced Russia's Black Sea Fleet back to safer ports, and some versions have even shot down Russian fighter jets.
Slovak police foiled a planned arson attack on a drone factory in the country's east, the force said on 25 August. Investigators charged three foreigners with preparing the attack on commission and seized incendiary material and equipment at the scene. The plant belongs to the Ukrainian drone maker Skyeton, Militarnyi reported.
Russia's war has an arm inside Europe that usually works without missiles against Ukraine supporters — agents and recruited locals, carrying out
Slovak police foiled a planned arson attack on a drone factory in the country's east, the force said on 25 August. Investigators charged three foreigners with preparing the attack on commission and seized incendiary material and equipment at the scene. The plant belongs to the Ukrainian drone maker Skyeton, Militarnyi reported.
Russia's war has an arm inside Europe that usually works without missiles against Ukraine supporters — agents and recruited locals, carrying out arsons, parcel fires, flying an explosive drone at a Ukrainian cargo plane in Germany, plotting against arms-industry figures — and the point of hiring strangers to light fires is that a burned production hall costs Moscow nothing it can be held to account for.
Had the attack in Slovakia gone ahead, it risked a large fire, danger to life and health, and damage on a large scale, police stated. About 70 employees could have been in the building at the time, by preliminary estimates. Property inside the production hall is worth tens of millions of euros, according to the findings so far.
Officers seized a larger quantity of incendiary mixture, along with tools, mobile phones, an action camera, and a hand-made plan. The police Criminalistics and Expertise Institute gave a preliminary finding that the substance was a mixture of gasoline and polystyrene, commonly called napalm. Slovakia's anti-crime unit ÚBOK, part of the Police Presidium, identified the people preparing the attack and stopped it. Nobody was hurt and no property was damaged, police said.
Items seized during the operation, and one of the detained men, eastern Slovakia, August 2026. Photo: Police of the Slovak Republic
The charges, and where the three were detained
An ÚBOK investigator charged the three foreigners with preparing a particularly serious crime of general endangerment, committed as co-perpetrators on order. Officers detained two of them in Slovakia, and the investigator moved to have both taken into custody. German authorities detained the third on a European arrest warrant. The investigation continues, and the legal classification of the men's actions may still change.
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The plant, and a company Russia has already hit
Slovakia, a NATO and EU member, borders Ukraine on its eastern edge. Skyeton builds the Raybird, a fixed-wing reconnaissance drone that has served with Ukraine's Armed Forces since 2018 and stays airborne for up to 28 hours. The company began production in Slovakia in 2024, and more than €10 million in foreign investment went into the plant, one of several sites Ukrainian firms opened abroad to cut the risk of Russian attacks.
That risk is not theoretical. Russia destroyed Skyeton's Kyiv office in May, and the company said it had already spread production capacity across Ukraine and abroad in anticipation.
A Skyeton representative told Militarnyi:
"The recent attempt on our production in Slovakia is another sign that Ukrainian arms makers are already a bone in their throat, which means we are on the right path."
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WSJ: Russian sabotage groups suspected for arson attack on plant producing air defense systems for Ukraine
Arson against Ukraine's defense partners in Europe
Companies working for Ukraine have been hit across several countries this year and earlier.
In March, suspects who claimed a pro-Palestinian motive set fire to the Pardubice production of Archer, a Ukrainian maker of thermal imaging sights, destroying nearly all of the company's capacity in Czechia.
Estonia opened a Russian-link investigation this month into a suspected arson at a military robot maker supplying Ukraine, and Lithuania charged six people in January over an attempt to burn a factory that supplied radio-wave scanners.
A powerful explosion of undetermined cause hit EMCO, one of Bulgaria's largest private arms makers, which produces artillery ammunition for Ukraine, on 10 August.
A Ukrainian court sentenced three Russian agents to 15 years each for guiding Russian strikes on Donetsk Oblast, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said on 26 August. Each had been recruited to mark Ukrainian military sites or civilian targets in the east, and counterintelligence exposed them between spring 2025 and March this year. The court found all three guilty of treason committed under martial law. The SBU did not name the court or say which specific strikes th
A Ukrainian court sentenced three Russian agents to 15 years each for guiding Russian strikes on Donetsk Oblast, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said on 26 August. Each had been recruited to mark Ukrainian military sites or civilian targets in the east, and counterintelligence exposed them between spring 2025 and March this year. The court found all three guilty of treason committed under martial law. The SBU did not name the court or say which specific strikes the men enabled.
Russia has spent this war turning Ukrainian civilians into spotters for its bombs — reaching them through Telegram job and drug channels, forged official summonses, relatives in occupied areas, and promises of easy money — and the SBU has opened more than 3,800 treason investigations since 2022 as of February 2026, so any single verdict stands for a caseload far larger than what reaches the news.
The informer inside the armor repair base
One of the convicted men worked at a Defense Forces repair base, and the SBU detained him in the Kramatorsk sector in April 2025. Russian services noticed him through his brother, who lives in Russia and works for the Federal Security Service (FSB), the investigation established. Recruitment through relatives in Russia or the occupied territories is a method Ukrainian counterintelligence has documented before, including inside a marine brigade on the active front.
During his own shifts at the defense enterprise, he recorded the geolocations of repair shops used to restore heavy armored vehicles for Ukraine's Armed Forces. He tried to pass the photographs and building coordinates to his Russian handler through an anonymous chat in a messenger.
The Dobropillia man who aimed 1.5-ton bombs near Pokrovsk
The second man was an unemployed resident of Dobropillia and an agent of Russian military intelligence, which noticed him through anti-Ukrainian comments in Telegram channel chats, the SBU said. The agency's counterintelligence detained him near Pokrovsk in March this year. Investigators established that he directed 1.5-ton guided aerial bombs at fortified areas and at artillery positions that keep Russian assault groups under fire control on the Pokrovsk axis. Russian forces have leaned more heavily on heavy glide bombs across this stretch of front this year, hitting fortifications and reducing towns to rubble their infantry then uses as cover.
The Kostiantynivka resident who marked his own city
The third man, recruited by the FSB, lived in Kostiantynivka, and SBU military counterintelligence exposed him in August 2025, according to the report. He approached Russian services through pro-Kremlin Telegram channels and offered them his help.
He directed Russian guided aerial bombs and small first-person-view drones at the civilian infrastructure of the front-line city, according to the case materials. He also tracked the positions of Ukrainian drone units carrying out combat tasks on the Kramatorsk axis. Russian strikes on that axis have repeatedly hit residential blocks, with prosecutors opening war-crimes investigations.
Ukrainian courts have handed down the same 15-year term in comparable cases, including for a locomotive depot engineer who mapped Ukrainian positions around Lyman.
Fire has destroyed the Kherson apartment of Mariano García Calatayud, the Spanish volunteer, who was abducted by Russian forces during the occupation of the city in 2022. His partner, Tetiana Marina, told ZMINA she received two videos from neighbors that morning, the first showing her apartment alight and the second showing the fire spreading through the building.
Calatayud is one case in a system of civilian captivity that Russia does not acknowledge. Ukraine's ombudsm
Fire has destroyed the Kherson apartment of Mariano García Calatayud, the Spanish volunteer, who was abducted by Russian forces during the occupation of the city in 2022. His partner, Tetiana Marina, told ZMINA she received two videos from neighbors that morning, the first showing her apartment alight and the second showing the fire spreading through the building.
Calatayud is one case in a system of civilian captivity that Russia does not acknowledge. Ukraine's ombudsman estimates Russia holds up to 20,000 Ukrainian civilians, with confirmed identities for only a fraction. Russia has never charged Calatayud with a crime, never allowed him a lawyer or contact with his family, and for more than three and a half years has declined to confirm it holds him at all.
The building stands at the start of Yevropeiska Street, formerly Suvorova, roughly 500 to 700 meters from the Dnipro, Marina said. Police have recorded the damage. She does not know what caused the fire and suspects a Russian drone.
The videos showed the fire spreading
"In the first, I saw clearly that only my apartment was engulfed. In the second, I saw that all the apartments in the video had burned," Marina said.
She is still trying to reach a neighbor, Iryna, who had been sleeping in a bomb shelter because of the shelling.
"I still do not know what happened, but everything burned. It does look like a drone," she said.
A moral debt brought him to Ukraine
Calatayud ran the road construction department at Valencia city hall before retiring. He moved to Ukraine in 2014, collected humanitarian aid from several countries and delivered it to Marinka and Krasnohorivka in Donetsk Oblast, and worked with orphanages.
Marina explained his reason to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Under Franco, many children of repressed Spaniards were sent to Ukraine, to Odesa. His mother's family was among the repressed.
"That is why he went to Ukraine in 2014, to, as he put it, repay a debt to Ukraine," she said.
When Russian forces took Kherson, he stayed. He could have left for Spain, but did not.
Russia stopped acknowledging him
On 19 March 2022, Calatayud attended a pro-Ukrainian rally. Two men in balaclavas seized him at his own entrance, handcuffed him, put him in a dark blue minibus, and drove him to the occupation administration, Marina said.
He was held in Simferopol pre-trial detention center No. 2. According to other civilian hostages, he was beaten and subjected to electric shocks while in detention. They also described inhumane conditions and a lack of proper medical care. He suffered a heart attack in custody.
In December 2023, Russia reported Calatayud's transfer to Kherson Oblast, the Media Initiative for Human Rights reported. Spain proposed exchanging him for a Russian prisoner of war, and Russia refused. The Red Cross is searching for him in penal colonies, including in Siberia.
Russian military bloggers listed him in a database of foreign fighters, claiming he had joined Kherson's territorial defense. He never carried a weapon in the city, his wife said.
The Technological Forces of Ukraine have presented a strike drone built to cut Russian logistics. The new fixed-wing Baton is designed to hit firing positions, supply routes, and other targets at tactical depth, out to 90 kilometers, according to the association's announcement.
Everything Russian troops eat, fire, and drive reaches them by road and train. Ukraine has pushed cumulative Russian motor-transport losses past 100,000 vehicles by working that ground, destroyin
The Technological Forces of Ukraine have presented a strike drone built to cut Russian logistics. The new fixed-wing Baton is designed to hit firing positions, supply routes, and other targets at tactical depth, out to 90 kilometers, according to the association's announcement.
Everything Russian troops eat, fire, and drive reaches them by road and train. Ukraine has pushed cumulative Russian motor-transport losses past 100,000 vehicles by working that ground, destroying 483 in a single day on 29 May, the highest daily figure since February 2022. Baton is built for that band.
The numbers come from the association
Baton carries three kilograms over a stated range of up to 90 kilometers, stays airborne for 50 minutes, and cruises at 105 kilometers per hour, with a maximum of 140 kilometers per hour, according to the announcement. Its working altitude ranges from 150 to 500 meters, with a ceiling of 1,500 meters.
Eight airframes fit in one pickup, launch comes from a catapult under ground-station control, and preparation takes about 15 minutes, the association said.
Autonomy takes over at two kilometers
The drone locks onto a target and flies to it automatically from up to 2 kilometers away and at altitudes up to 500 meters, the association said. That final stretch is where Russian jamming would otherwise break the link.
Depending on the version, it carries analog or digital video, communicates over LTE or Starlink, and navigates a route autonomously with real-time positioning, according to the announcement.
Two figures do not sit together
Fifty minutes at the stated cruising speed covers roughly 87 kilometers. The 90-kilometer range is therefore a one-way distance at near-full endurance rather than an operating radius.
Earlier, a Ukrainian drone maker pitched a weapon that functions like a mortar, rather than a drone. F-Drones unveiled the F5, a compact five-inch strike FPV built for assault units working treelines, built-up areas, and position support at short range.
Ukraine opened a nationwide investigation into soldiers' payments five days ago. The State Bureau of Investigation has now charged a deputy commander of a separate security and servicing battalion in Odesa Oblast with issuing travel orders that sent his subordinates to fake combat groupings on paper, the bureau reported on 25 August.
Combat pay in Ukraine runs on paperwork. Assault and zonal payments depend on time spent on each mission and require documentary confirmat
Ukraine opened a nationwide investigation into soldiers' payments five days ago. The State Bureau of Investigation has now charged a deputy commander of a separate security and servicing battalion in Odesa Oblast with issuing travel orders that sent his subordinates to fake combat groupings on paper, the bureau reported on 25 August.
Combat pay in Ukraine runs on paperwork. Assault and zonal payments depend on time spent on each mission and require documentary confirmation, with the highest rates going to troops on the line of contact.
The travel orders carried the scheme
The soldiers collected the additional payment known as the Defender's Bonus for combat participation that did not happen, taking about $15,600, without grounds, according to the agency.
"In fact, soldiers remained in Odesa. Despite this, they were paid an additional bonus," officers said.
Part of that money went back to the officer who arranged it. He was detained and charged under Part Five of Article 426-1 of the Criminal Code, which covers a military official exceeding authority and carries a sentence of up to 12 years.
The case sits inside a national sweep
The bureau launched the operation, called Justice for Soldiers, on 20 August together with the General Staff, conducting 72 searches and preparing suspicions against 22 people.
Most of the cases concerned money wrongly paid to soldiers. Twelve proceedings were related to the illegal calculation and receipt of payments by soldiers, with 58 searches conducted and suspicions planned against 20 people.
Twelve of those proceedings deal with the illegal calculation and receipt of payments by soldiers. A separate strand covers commanders using troops for private labor.
A separate strand targeted the misuse of soldiers themselves. Five searches were conducted in a case involving the illegal use of military labor, in which subordinates, instead of performing military duties, were used for construction, household, and other work in the commanders' private interests.
Ukrainian officers have marched in one of Canada's oldest military parades for three consecutive years, Ukraine's Consul General in Toronto, Oleh Nikolenko, said. They took part in the 105th Warriors' Day Parade in Toronto, an event honoring former and serving military personnel that draws veterans, active-duty soldiers, and their families.
The parade rests on a working military relationship. Canadian forces have trained more than 50,000 Ukrainian security forces person
Ukrainian officers have marched in one of Canada's oldest military parades for three consecutive years, Ukraine's Consul General in Toronto, Oleh Nikolenko, said. They took part in the 105th Warriors' Day Parade in Toronto, an event honoring former and serving military personnel that draws veterans, active-duty soldiers, and their families.
The parade rests on a working military relationship. Canadian forces have trained more than 50,000 Ukrainian security forces personnel since 2015 under Operation UNIFIER, roughly 16,000 of them across Europe since the full-scale invasion, with about 300 Canadian personnel currently deployed on the mission, Canada's Department of National Defense said.
The parade has opened the CNE since 1921
The Warriors' Day Parade has opened the Canadian National Exhibition every year since 1921, marching from the Princes' Gates along Princes' Boulevard to the Stanley Barracks, and organizers call it the longest-running veterans' parade in the free world, according to the CNE.
The consul general framed it as a signal
Nikolenko said Ukrainian soldiers standing among those Toronto honors carried weight beyond the occasion.
"It was very important to see Ukrainian defenders among those to whom Torontonians paid tribute. Their presence is a powerful symbol of the strength of Ukrainian-Canadian friendship, solidarity, and shared support," he stated.
European capitals opened their parades this summer
During the summer of 2026, Ukrainian defenders took part in different parades of their allies. In July, twenty-five Ukrainian soldiers marched down the Champs-Élysées at France's Bastille Day parade on 14 July, behind around 500 troops from 35 Coalition of the Willing countries, while two French Mirage 2000B fighters opened the flypast with a Ukrainian co-pilot in each cockpit.
A week later, the same soldiers led the foreign component of Belgium's National Day parade in Brussels, their first appearance in the city that hosts NATO and EU headquarters.
However, Ukraine was not invited to Poland's Armed Forces Day parade in Warsaw on 15 August, the largest in Polish history, while contingents from the US, Canada, Australia, Lithuania, and other allies did take part, Militarnyi reported.
Exclusive
Ukraine fires state bank chair after alleged $3.3 million bail-laundering scheme. The government and central bank also moved against Sense Bank's CEO and financial monitoring chief while reviewing the bank's entire supervisory board.
Ukraine's secret counteroffensive takes the pressure off Sloviansk. Under strict operational security, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps has been counterattacking north of Lyman. For months now.
Russia turns failed drone defense
A delegation from the Spanish Santa Clara Convent Foundation, with Sister Lucía Caram, visited Ukraine on its most important day. It handed an ambulance, a pickup, and five cars to the 11th Border Detachment, the "Forpost" brigade holding one of the hardest sectors in Kharkiv Oblast, the State Border Guard Service reported.
The vehicles are the visible part of a medical channel. Sister Lucía Caram, based in Manresa, delivered its 45th convoy to Kyiv this week, according
A delegation from the Spanish Santa Clara Convent Foundation, with Sister Lucía Caram, visited Ukraine on its most important day. It handed an ambulance, a pickup, and five cars to the 11th Border Detachment, the "Forpost" brigade holding one of the hardest sectors in Kharkiv Oblast, the State Border Guard Service reported.
The vehicles are the visible part of a medical channel. Sister Lucía Caram, based in Manresa, delivered its 45th convoy to Kyiv this week, according to Atalayar.
The surgery program moves to its next stage
Acting Border Guard Service head Major General Valerii Vavryniuk met the delegation alongside a simultaneous video call with Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles.
Two commitments came out of it. The border service is to continue rehabilitating severely wounded border guards in Spanish medical facilities, and to begin advanced training for its own surgeons in reconstructive surgery.
Housing came up as well
Caram raised an initiative by the HANSEN Ukrainian Mission, which offered partnership support in housing families who lost their homes to fighting in the east.
The two sides also discussed rehabilitation more broadly for border guards wounded in combat. Vavryniuk thanked Caram and Spain for the aid programs.
Catalan business pays for the convoys
Before the meeting, Caram and the head of the 10th Mobile Border Detachment laid flowers at the Nebesnyi Dozor monument in Kyiv's Darnytskyi district. She also attended Ukraine's National Prayer Breakfast, the annual interfaith event bringing together political, religious, and civic figures.
Earlier, Robles announced Spain would transfer 100 VAMTAC armored tactical vehicles to Ukraine, along with a batch of 155 mm artillery shells.
In March, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced a new €1 billion military aid package for Ukraine for 2026. Part of the aid, financed through the EU SAFE instrument, was intended to support the development of joint production within Ukraine’s defense industry.
Ukrainian troops have been shooting down Russian aircraft with Polish Pioruns since 2022. Poland's Defense Ministry has signed a framework agreement worth more than $2 billion for several thousand shoulder-fired systems in the largest order ever placed for these launchers and missiles.
The money comes from SAFE, the European Union's 150-billion-euro defense loan facility created in response to Russia's war. Poland holds the largest national envelope at 43.7 billion euro
Ukrainian troops have been shooting down Russian aircraft with Polish Pioruns since 2022. Poland's Defense Ministry has signed a framework agreement worth more than $2 billion for several thousand shoulder-fired systems in the largest order ever placed for these launchers and missiles.
The money comes from SAFE, the European Union's 150-billion-euro defense loan facility created in response to Russia's war. Poland holds the largest national envelope at 43.7 billion euros, ahead of 18 other participants, TVP World reports.
Four countries split the order
The systems will go to the armed forces of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway, the last of which is not an EU member. More than 80% of the missiles and launchers are earmarked for the Polish army, with the implementation agreement for Poland financed from SAFE funds, according to the ministry's release.
The contract also covers simulators, training, and logistics packages. Mesko, part of the state-owned PGZ defense group, manufactures the system.
"Piorun is our export hit," said Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka, state secretary at Poland's Defense Ministry, adding that other EU countries showed interest in them during talks on the SAFE mechanism.
The seeker head does the work
The Piorun is a modernized Grom that remains in Polish service. The upgrade brought a modified launch mechanism, a new and more sensitive homing head, and an electro-optical sight mounted on a rail.
Those changes improved target acquisition, resistance to countermeasures, and effective range against low-flying aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones.
Ukraine's record set the reference
Poland approved its first Piorun transfer to Ukraine on 1 February 2022, three weeks before the full-scale invasion. Ukrainian crews have since used the system against cruise missiles, aircraft, and helicopters, and Western analysts list it among the short-range systems European industry can supply without American approval.
The ministry's announcement names no allocation for Ukraine.
Ukraine's ground robots ran more than 100,000 missions in the first eight months of 2026. The Defense Procurement Agency will now buy logistics and strike ground robotic complexes according to specifications set by the Defense Ministry, rather than approving models one at a time, the ministry announced.
The mechanism is three days old. The agency applied the same structure to fiber-optic FPV drones on 22 August—classes, multiple lots each, no supplier above half a class
Ukraine's ground robots ran more than 100,000 missions in the first eight months of 2026. The Defense Procurement Agency will now buy logistics and strike ground robotic complexes according to specifications set by the Defense Ministry, rather than approving models one at a time, the ministry announced.
The mechanism is three days old. The agency applied the same structure to fiber-optic FPV drones on 22 August—classes, multiple lots each, no supplier above half a class. Ukraine is standardizing how it buys entire weapons categories, one category at a time.
The rules sort makers by class
Complexes will be divided into classes by operating range and payload, with four to five lots per class. No single manufacturer may take more than half the order within one class.
Suppliers must meet the technical specifications and hold at least one codified ground robotic complex. The procurement runs in a closed environment under defense security requirements.
"A tender is one of the best instruments for this, because we can buy more equipment for the same money and minimize the risk of supply disruptions by splitting the order among different manufacturers," Deputy Defense Minister Mstyslav Banik said.
Mission volume keeps climbing
Monthly figures of ground robot missions logged in the DELTA combat system rose almost without interruption: 7,511 in January, 11,028 in April, 19,969 in July. Units recorded another 15,729 between 1 and 20 August, about 790 a day compared with roughly 640 a day in July, The Defense Post reported.
Ukraine has contracted more than 22,000 ground robots since January, nearly double the total for all of 2025. The number of units operating them grew from 117 at the end of 2025 to 230 by mid-2026.
A commander disputes the evacuation case
The ministry lists casualty evacuation as one of the tender's purposes. A frontline officer challenged that three days ago.
Tetiana Chornovol, who commands an anti-tank guided missile platoon, said ground robots are too slow for evacuation and often easy targets for Russian drones, arguing brigades need staffed evacuation teams and small light-armored vehicles instead.
Ukraine's cheap interceptor drones have been knocking Russia's nightly attackers out of the sky, so Russia has now bolted a jammer onto some of its own drones to blind them, according to Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine's President on defense technology. He examined the system, found in drone wreckage, and mapped how it strikes back at the interceptor sent to hunt it.
Russia batters Ukrainian cities with long-range drones most nights, and Ukraine has le
Ukraine's cheap interceptor drones have been knocking Russia's nightly attackers out of the sky, so Russia has now bolted a jammer onto some of its own drones to blind them, according to Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine's President on defense technology. He examined the system, found in drone wreckage, and mapped how it strikes back at the interceptor sent to hunt it.
Russia batters Ukrainian cities with long-range drones most nights, and Ukraine has leaned on a cheap shield—drones costing a few thousand dollars—instead of burning through far pricier missiles. Anything that dulls that shield pushes the cost of defending the sky back up.
A jammer that waits for the interceptor
The unit rides on a Geran, Russia's version of the Iranian Shahed one-way drone. It listens for the video signal an approaching Ukrainian interceptor beams back to its pilot. Its receiver reads the interceptor's working frequency, then orders a transmitter to bury that same channel in noise, Beskrestnov found.
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How Ukraine uses AI to guide long-range drone strikes through electronic warfare and deep into Russian-controlled rear areas
By his first estimate, the jammer's signal runs about five times stronger than the interceptor's video link—enough to wipe the picture and any chance of steering the drone onto its target.
Seconds decide it
In Beskrestnov's account, the system detected a test transmitter and switched on jamming after about three seconds, and the feed cut out. The device stays nearly idle until a hunter comes close, then jumps to full power to smother the signal. It targets the ordinary analog video band around 5.8 gigahertz that many cheap interceptors still use.
Possible answers, include interceptors with terminal-guidance homing for the final stretch of flight, digital communication links, or transmitters set to non-standard frequencies.
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“Two targets and ammo with one drone”: How a Ukrainian drone crew hunts Russian transport behind the front line
An old problem for Russia's drones
Russia has tried again and again to keep its one-way drones alive against Ukraine's defenses, including wiring jammers into some Shaheds earlier this year. Spending weight and power to protect a drone from a far cheaper interceptor shows how well those cheap drones work.
A Ukrainian drone maker is pitching a weapon that works like a mortar, not a drone. F-Drones has unveiled the F5, a compact five-inch strike FPV built for assault units working treelines, built-up areas, and position support at short range, according to the company's announcement.
Fiber-optic drones are now a bulk consumable. Ukraine's military received 374,000 under state contracts in 2025 and nearly as many again in the first four months of 2026, the Defense Ministry
A Ukrainian drone maker is pitching a weapon that works like a mortar, not a drone. F-Drones has unveiled the F5, a compact five-inch strike FPV built for assault units working treelines, built-up areas, and position support at short range, according to the company's announcement.
Fiber-optic drones are now a bulk consumable. Ukraine's military received 374,000 under state contracts in 2025 and nearly as many again in the first four months of 2026, the Defense Ministry reported in April.
The F5 arrives three days after Ukraine's Defense Procurement Agency launched its first purchase of fiber-optic FPV drones, in line with ministry-set specifications rather than individual manufacturers.
The specifications come from the manufacturer
F-Drones describes a lightweight five-inch carbon frame that carries up to one kilogram and is supplied in two control configurations.
The fiber-optic version flies about six kilometers. The radio version reaches roughly twice that, up to 13 kilometers. Several drones fit in one backpack, and a ground robot can deliver nine to a position at once, compared with the six FPVs per carrier on the Black Widow ground system.
Fiber optics buys immunity at a cost
F-Drones calls the fiber version fully invulnerable to electronic warfare. Fiber-optic control does defeat jamming because the drone emits no radio signal, but the cable restricts range and maneuverability and can snap or tangle mid-flight, cutting control. Ukrainian crews have also tracked Russian operators by following reflective fibers in sunlight back to the launch point.
The company compares its drone to a mortar
The pitch is about availability, not reach.
"In its role, the F5 is closer to an 82mm mortar than to a classic long-range FPV: always nearby and ready to close out the task here and now," the company said.
The F5 ships with a codified Opera electronic initiation board, and F-Drones says the aircraft has been tested and codified by Ukraine's Defense Ministry.
Ukraine's military intelligence has named the Russian companies that build the Su-35S fighter jet and singled out those no country has sanctioned, according to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Defense Ministry (HUR). The unsanctioned suppliers make parts as ordinary as wheels and fuel-system units, and one of them helped develop the aircraft. Kyiv wants sanctions efforts synchronized across every link of Russia's military-industrial complex.
More than four
Ukraine's military intelligence has named the Russian companies that build the Su-35S fighter jet and singled out those no country has sanctioned, according to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Defense Ministry (HUR). The unsanctioned suppliers make parts as ordinary as wheels and fuel-system units, and one of them helped develop the aircraft. Kyiv wants sanctions efforts synchronized across every link of Russia's military-industrial complex.
More than four years of harsh restrictions have made Russia's arms industry slower and costlier to run rather than idle, and it keeps closing the gaps by substituting parts and buying through third countries. Every restriction works one company at a time, which makes the depth of a sanctions list, not its length, the thing that decides whether production slows.
The 22 firms no one has sanctioned
HUR identified 79 companies in the Su-35S production chain. Of those, 22 face no sanctions from any country restricting Russia over the war. The agency highlighted three. Rubin Aviation Corporation supplies the aircraft's braking and non-braking wheels. Gidroavtomatika builds the AU46-05 control units inside the fuel system. The Oktava research institute carried out design and development work on the Su-35S itself.
The 79 firms develop and produce the engines and fuel system, the control, communications, and guidance systems, the electronic warfare suite, and the main aviation missiles the jet carries into the war against Ukraine. HUR set the data out in the "Components in weapons" section of its War&Sanctions portal. The page carries a rotatable 3D model of the aircraft whose parts open onto the firms behind them, alongside directory listings and a profile for each company.
Russia uses the jet mainly to cover its own Su-34 fighter-bomber strike groups, ground troops, and installations. It also intercepts Ukrainian drones and cruise missiles, and works against Ukrainian air defense systems. Ukraine's Air Force said in July it had shot one down over the east, and such losses are hard for Moscow to replace: Russian factories ordered 12 of the jets in 2024 and delivered 10.
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Ukraine mapped Russia’s Su-35 down to individual control units—and found 22 firms nobody has sanctioned
Three sanctions regimes, loosely aligned
The gaps HUR points to exist because the restrictions are not one list. The EU legislates in packages, the US and other G7 states maintain their own designations, and Ukraine issues sanctions by presidential decree, each covering a different set of firms. Kyiv has spent years asking partners to synchronize those lists, and its own designations often run ahead of them. A company can therefore supply a frontline fighter and still trade freely under most of them.
Previously, HUR ran the same exercise on the Su-34, where a third of the production network was still unsanctioned. The same pattern shows up above the component level, with Russia's largest arms conglomerate covered by EU measures while hundreds of its subsidiaries are not, and Western machine tools still sitting inside Russian missile plants.
Ukrainian drones struck the Afipsky oil refinery in southern Russia overnight on 25 August, monitoring Telegram channels reported. Regional authorities claimed falling drone debris caused fires. Ukraine's General Staff later confirmed the strike, and, in the same post, a hit on a gas processing plant in Astrakhan Oblast the night before.
Ukraine's long-range drones reach deep into Russia against refineries and fuel depots, but also arms plants, military bases, rail nod
Ukrainian drones struck the Afipsky oil refinery in southern Russia overnight on 25 August, monitoring Telegram channels reported. Regional authorities claimed falling drone debris caused fires. Ukraine's General Staff later confirmed the strike, and, in the same post, a hit on a gas processing plant in Astrakhan Oblast the night before.
Ukraine's long-range drones reach deep into Russia against refineries and fuel depots, but also arms plants, military bases, rail nodes, and the warehouses of Russia's biggest online retailers — straining the economy and cutting the oil revenues that feed the war machine.
Fire at the plant, and Russia's debris account
Initially, the Ukrainian monitoring Telegram channels Exilenova+ and Supernova+ reported the strike, publishing footage of the fire and placing one burning storage tank on the plant's grounds. NASA's FIRMS satellite fire data confirmed the burning site, Militarnyi reported.
Fire-detection points at the Afipsky oil refinery and in Afipsky settlement, Krasnodar Krai, Russia, 25 August 2026, with insets showing the plant, its location southwest of Krasnodar, and the fire at night. Map: Militarnyi analysis using ESRI mapping and NASA FIRMS data
The Krasnodar Krai operational headquarters stated that falling drone parts started the fire. Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that debris fell on the grounds of the Afipskaya railway station, killing two people and injuring two more, and stated that fires broke out in the nearby settlement and at the refinery itself.
Ukrainian forces struck two U-272 gas separation units at the Astrakhan gas processing plant the night before, the General Staff wrote in the same post. That plant makes technical sulfur, which goes into explosives.
Drones also attacked Rostov Oblast overnight, with the Novoshakhtinsk refinery as the target, according to Supernova+.
Afipsky ranks among the largest refineries in southern Russia and handles more than 2% of the country's refining, Ukrainian sources said. Reuters, citing industry sources, put 2024 throughput at the plant together with the linked Krasnodar refinery at 7.2 million tons. Reuters also described it as export-oriented and not currently making commercial gasoline or diesel for the domestic market, a narrower picture than the product list Ukrainian sources give. Ukraine's military has previously described Afipsky as a producer of motor fuels for Russia, involved in supplying the Russian army.
The refinery Ukraine keeps targeting
Drones have reached the plant repeatedly this year, in January, March, June, and July, making the latest hit the fifth since the start of the year, The Moscow Times counted. In the July case, the Russian news Telegram channel Astra said the fire started near the tank farm.
Ukrainian drones have attacked Russian refineries more than 70 times since the start of 2026 and knocked several dozen plants out of service, The Moscow Times said, while Ukraine's General Staff counted 194 strikes on refineries in the first half of the year alone. Five stopped processing entirely after strikes since 1 August: Permnefteorgsintez, Orsknefteorgsintez, Zapsibneftekhim, and the Saratov and Volgograd refineries, the outlet said.
Russian propagandists filmed the target for Ukraine themselves. Operators of Ukraine's 422nd Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment "Luftwaffe", part of the 17th Army Corps, have destroyed a Russian logistics hub that occupation forces had set up inside a former Epicentr hardware store in occupied Melitopol, regiment commander Major Mykola Kolesnyk told Army TV.
Melitopol sits on Russia's land corridor to occupied Crimea. The city was occupied on the second day of Russia's
Russian propagandists filmed the target for Ukraine themselves. Operators of Ukraine's 422nd Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment "Luftwaffe", part of the 17th Army Corps, have destroyed a Russian logistics hub that occupation forces had set up inside a former Epicentr hardware store in occupied Melitopol, regiment commander Major Mykola Kolesnyk told Army TV.
Melitopol sits on Russia's land corridor to occupied Crimea. The city was occupied on the second day of Russia's full-scale war in 2022.
Russian occupation forces had moved a large consignment of generators and other equipment into the building for military use. Russian state television broadcast footage of the delivery.
Propaganda footage exposed the shipment
The video gave the regiment its confirmation. Russian channels posted footage showing many generators that had not been there before, Kolesnyk said, that had been brought in deliberately.
"The hub was used, above all, to supply the people fighting directly against us, as their forward positions are not far from there. Calling it a civilian facility would be a considerable stretch, because this really was a hub whose services were used directly by Russian troops," Kolesnyk explained.
Operators tracked the target before striking
The regiment watched the site before hitting it, and no civilian was harmed, according to Kolesnyk. He set the operation against the Russian strike on Kryvyi Rih on 21 August, when two waves of drones, half an hour apart, killed 16 people and injured 130, including 23 children.
The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine visited the site and a hospital and said the shopping center was operational and full of civilians when it was struck, and that the attack appears to breach international humanitarian law.
Generators feed the drone war
The hub's destruction will narrow Russian capacity to equip shelters, Kolesnyk said. The generators mattered for a more specific reason.
"A generator is what makes it possible to charge batteries for the unmanned component that then flies at us. So it is an absolutely legitimate target, and I am sure we will not stop here," the commander added.
Ukraine has dismissed Mykola Hladyshenko as chair of the supervisory board of state-owned Sense Bank after NABU released recordings that it says show the bank was used to launder 150 million hryvnias ($3.3 million) to post bail for a former minister.The Cabinet’s 21 August decision ended Hladyshenko’s powers and appointed a state representative to the board to help restore a quorum. The Finance Ministry and National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) must now ensure the bank is properl
Ukraine has dismissed Mykola Hladyshenko as chair of the supervisory board of state-owned Sense Bank after NABU released recordings that it says show the bank was used to launder 150 million hryvnias ($3.3 million) to post bail for a former minister.
The Cabinet’s 21 August decision ended Hladyshenko’s powers and appointed a state representative to the board to help restore a quorum. The Finance Ministry and National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) must now ensure the bank is properly governed and prepare it for sale.
The material suggested that Hladyshenko’s withdrawal had been merely formal and that he continued influencing the bank.
New recordings changed the NBU’s assessment
The NBU’s 20 August decision followed a review opened in May, when recordings linked to the wider Mindich case raised questions about Hladyshenko’s independence. The regulator twice asked Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies for evidence, but they could not release pretrial investigation materials. Hladyshenko stepped aside while the review continued.
NBU Governor Andrii Pyshnyi told Parliament that new public evidence changed the regulator’s assessment. The material suggested that Hladyshenko’s withdrawal had been merely formal and that he continued to influence the bank.
It also raised questions about the remaining board members’ oversight. That evidence emerged on 19 August as part of Operation “Forest Gump”.
The Mindich tapes are recordings from NABU’s investigation into an alleged $100 million kickback network at state nuclear operator Energoatom. They are named after businessman Tymur Mindich, a former business partner of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The NBU also demanded that Sense Bank suspend Liudmyla Snihur, head of the bank’s financial and currency monitoring department, while it investigates possible interference with the bank’s operating systems. The government initiated suspension proceedings against the chair of the management board, Oleksii Stupak.
According to Ekonomichna Pravda’s account of the NABU materials, investigators allege that the group moved illicit cash through Sense Bank, companies under its control, and private individuals before using the money to post bail for former Energy and Justice Minister Herman Halushchenko, a suspect in the Mindich case.
Snihur allegedly helped create a temporary “window” during which transactions passed without the bank’s usual checks.
Sense Bank was already for sale
Ukraine nationalized Sense Bank, formerly Alfa-Bank Ukraine, in 2023 after sanctions barred its Russian-linked owners from controlling it.
Russia is ramping up a campaign of covert mobilization to recruit troops for its war against Ukraine. Over the past month and a half, residents of at least 17 Russian regions have complained of forcible detention, beatings, and coercion into signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry, the independent outlet Verstka reported, citing three legal-aid organizations.
Russia recruited 403,000 soldiers in 2025 and set a target of 409,000 for 2026, Ukraine's military i
Russia is ramping up a campaign of covert mobilization to recruit troops for its war against Ukraine. Over the past month and a half, residents of at least 17 Russian regions have complained of forcible detention, beatings, and coercion into signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry, the independent outlet Verstka reported, citing three legal-aid organizations.
Russia recruited 403,000 soldiers in 2025 and set a target of 409,000 for 2026, Ukraine's military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said. Since April, Russian companies have been ordered to nominate two to five employees each for military service.
The School of the Conscript recorded 11 complaints in July and August. Five came from Udmurtia, one each from Primorye, Irkutsk, Ryazan, and Arkhangelsk oblasts, one from Buryatia, and one from the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk Oblast.
The victims share a profile
The men targeted are not chosen at random. In most appeals, complainants say the victims are men with alcohol, drug, or mental health problems, older or physically disabled men, men living alone, and men with pending legal trouble, said Timofey Vaskin, who heads the legal department at the School of the Conscript.
Four cases show the method
Idite Lesom documented how the coercion works in practice. In Novorossiysk, a man was taken to a police station, beaten, had drugs planted on him, and was made to sign a contract.
In Arkhangelsk Oblast, a man detained for drinking on the street was sent to the front. In Omsk, a man was taken from his workplace, held, and had the contract signed for him. In Udmurtia, a man was removed from a psychiatric register and sent to Donetsk Oblast.
Recruiters work from state records
The targeting runs on official data. Authorities know who carries debts, who is under investigation, and who has recently lost a driver's license, and those are the people they pursue, said Idite Lesom's director, Grigory Sverdlin.
Volunteers are getting harder to find, which is why the pressure is increasing, he added. Call to Conscience advised men in affected regions to grant relatives the power of attorney to represent them at enlistment offices, avoid drinking alone, and refuse to sign a contract under any circumstances.
Ukrainian investigators recovered an unencrypted American AI module from a Russian Molniya drone that killed three civilians near a Zaporizhzhia gas station on 6 July, and read the code that guided its targeting, the New York Times reported. No human operator made the final call.
Commercially sold AI boards have been turning up inside Russian strike weapons for more than a year, and autonomy is the direction both armies are moving in. What changed is the evidence rather
Ukrainian investigators recovered an unencrypted American AI module from a Russian Molniya drone that killed three civilians near a Zaporizhzhia gas station on 6 July, and read the code that guided its targeting, the New York Times reported. No human operator made the final call.
Commercially sold AI boards have been turning up inside Russian strike weapons for more than a year, and autonomy is the direction both armies are moving in. What changed is the evidence rather than the technology. Until now, autonomy had to be inferred from what a wreck lacked—an antenna, a radio trace.
Tetiana Bubynets, a 19-year-old accounting student at Zaporizhzhia National University, was declared dead at a hospital, one of her professors said. Oleksii Svirin, 41, and Roman Karpii, 48, later died of their injuries. The drone had attempted to navigate around an apartment building toward the gas station's propane tanks but struck a wall and detonated near people sheltering there.
What investigators found in the wreckage
The wreckage contained an Nvidia Jetson Orin minicomputer, an off-the-shelf AI module that costs a few hundred dollars. The chip was not encrypted. Ukrainian officials said they could read the terrain imagery loaded for visual navigation and the object-detection code that defined what the drone was trained to target, NYT reported. The drone carried no radio antennas and was flying in a wave of approximately six, none of them transmitting. A missing antenna alone would not prove self-targeting—a drone flying a preprogrammed route needs no antenna either, but it would have no use for an Nvidia chip.
Human operators had programmed the drone to fly toward the gas station and set the general target area before launch. Once near the site, the onboard system identified and selected the specific object—most likely propane tanks it had been trained to recognize—on its own, drone experts and military officials said. Vadym Kushnikov, a drone expert at the Kharkiv Aviation Institute, described the drone as "a preprogrammed tool trained in virtual reality to track specific objects," NYT reported.
Russian Molniya kamikaze drones. Photos from Russian sources via Militarnyi
Where else the Nvidia module has turned up
Kateryna Bondar, a senior fellow at the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, told NYT that no earlier Russian strike by a self-targeting drone has been documented killing civilians, which would make 6 July the first such case on record. She called the Nvidia module "the best proof" that Russia was experimenting with autonomous AI.
The Jetson Orin is not new to the battlefield. The module is made by the American chipmaker Nvidia. Ukraine's sanctions on Russia's AI drone supply networks, imposed in August 2025, hit Russian, Chinese, and Belarusian drone developers and component suppliers—not Nvidia.
Ukrainian intelligence first identified the module in the V2U autonomous strike drone in June 2025, mounted in a Chinese Leetop A203 minicomputer. It has since reported Jetson-based AI modules in Russia's Lancet and Klin drones—the Klin an older Jetson TX2—and, most recently, in the S-71 Monokhrom cruise missile.
In those cases, the finding was the hardware, and what Ukrainian intelligence inferred from it. This time, the code itself was legible.
Nvidia confirmed to NYT that the photographed board was a Jetson Orin. The company said the minicomputer is a consumer-grade product "sold to students, developers and start-ups for a wide range of beneficial applications," that it does not sell the computer in Russia, and that it is widely available through resellers.
Zaporizhzhia as testing ground
Russia began test flights of AI-guided Molniya drones in May, and had begun testing self-targeting systems in the V2U several months earlier, some of those for last-mile guidance only, Ukrainian air defense experts told NYT. Local air defense officials said Russia has been aiming at civilian objects—pumps and propane tanks at gas stations—along with military recruitment centers while trying out autonomous drones in Zaporizhzhia. Why those targets were chosen for the tests is not clear.
Gas stations have been under sustained attack independently of the AI trials. Russia has destroyed approximately 200 across Ukraine since spring, around 50 in June alone, by UNITED24 Media's count.
In Zaporizhzhia, gas stations now prop plastic sheeting at odd angles around propane tanks to confuse the drones' image recognition, and Ukraine has turned to shooting down drones that electronic warfare cannot jam.
Without much fanfare, Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking north of Lyman in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast
The Ukrainian advance takes some pressure off the free city of Sloviansk, just 20 km to the southwest
The problem is: the Russians are advancing toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from several other directions
Russian forces are fighting against time to close a pincer around the last free cities in eastern Ukraine. The deadline: the coming winter,
Without much fanfare, Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking north of Lyman in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast
The Ukrainian advance takes some pressure off the free city of Sloviansk, just 20 km to the southwest
The problem is: the Russians are advancing toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from several other directions
Russian forces are fighting against time to close a pincer around the last free cities in eastern Ukraine. The deadline: the coming winter, which will strip the leaves from the trees and leave any attacking force exposed to overhead surveillance and attack.
But in one key sector, Ukrainian forces are spoiling the coordinated Russian operation to partially surround Sloviansk and neighboring Kramatorsk. With admirable operational security, or OPSEC, a clutch of Ukrainian brigades under the 3rd Army Corps hasn't just blunted the advance of the Russian Center Group of Forces—it has pushed the Russians back.
This Ukrainian counterattack along the axis through the town of Lyman, ongoing since May, has largely escaped widespread notice. Yes, there is some scant video evidence of Ukrainian attacks. And yes, a few analysts have adjusted their maps to account for apparent Ukrainian advances, especially in the direction of Nove, a Russian-occupied village 15 km north of Lyman, which itself lies 15 km north of Sloviansk.
Ukrainian forces have been conducting for weeks two unnoticed counter-attacks in two directions of the frontline.
With barely any geolocation, the Ukrainians kept a good level of OPSEC and the russians have been reluctant to publish videos from these areas.
But for the most part, Ukrainian and Russian sources have avoided talking about Lyman. "The Ukrainians kept a good level of OPSEC and the Russians have been reluctant to publish videos from these areas" depicting their retreats, analyst and mapper Clément Molinnoted in June, just a few weeks after the Ukrainians attacked toward Nove.
Molin, for one, expects the OPSEC to lift in the coming days. "By the end of the month, we should have an official update on the good results of a Ukrainian offensive that has largely remained secret," he wrote on Monday.
Situation near Nove as of 23 August. Map: Euromaidan Press
April offensive
The Ukrainians' limited counteroffensive around Lyman apparently kicked off on in mid-April. One of the first attacks that left any real evidence occurred on 22 May, when a small Ukrainian mechanized force—perhaps from the 60th or 66th Mechanized Brigade, the 77th Air Assault Brigade, or the Presidential Brigade—attacked in armored trucks and M-113, Stryker, and BTR-4 armored personnel carriers. Heavy bomber drones flew top cover.
The Russian 144th Motor Rifle Division fought back with its own drones. Interceptor drones took aim at the bombers. First-person-view and heavy bomber drones blasted at least one BTR-4, hitting it before and after it dropped off its infantry passengers. Drones struck some of the disembarked Ukrainian infantry.
How many Ukrainian troops survived and entrenched in new positions on 22 May is unclear. Regardless, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps wasn't done with Nove. Attacks continued. And sometime after the 22 May assault on Nove, "the Ukrainians managed to consolidate their gains," Molin concluded after scrutinizing a few videos and some satellite imagery.
By early July, Ukrainian forces had succeeded in "operationally encircl[ing] the Russian forces defending the village of Nove," according to analyst and mapper Thorkill. "Fierce fighting is currently underway to expel the Russians from that locality," Thorkill reported at the time.
Sytuacja w rejonie Nowego (Łyman).
Jednym z odcinków frontu w Donbasie, na którym wojska ukraińskie prowadzą obecnie działania zaczepne, jest rejon wsi: Nowe – Zełena Dolyna, na północ od Łymanu. Od połowy maja 2026 r. pozycje rosyjskiej 144 Dywizji Strzelców Zmotoryzowanych… pic.twitter.com/2EJQgz4eps
The aim of the Ukrainian counterattacks is obvious. The 3rd Army Corps intends to put pressure on the northern right flank of 10 km-by-10-km salient jutting into the battleground north of Lyman. The Russian 144th Motor Rifle Division has been pouring troops into the salient, clearly intending to surround and isolate Lyman instead of directly assaulting it—all in order to clear a path toward Sloviansk.
Salients are risky for both sides, however. The farther the Russians extend their Lyman salient, the more exposed they are on their flanks. The Ukrainians know this. And even if the 3rd Army Corps can't fully cut across the salient in order to surround the Russians inside of it, the corps can at least take advantage of the salient's exposed flanks.
Capturing Nove, on the very northern edge of the salient, could allow the Ukrainians to bring to bear more artillery and drones on the Russians south of Nove. The 3rd Army Corps doesn't have to fully encircle the Russian troops closest to Lyman in order to hammer them with withering firepower.
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Just how successful the 3rd Army Corps has been in its local counteroffensive could become clearer very soon. That won't spell lasting relief for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, however. Fighting against the clock as summer begins turning into fall and then winter, the Russians are slowly advancing toward the twin cities from several directions.
The siege of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk is coming. Perhaps not this year, but surely by 2027. To fully safeguard the twin cities, the Ukrainians would need to duplicate their success north of Lyman along several other directions.
That's a big ask of a Ukrainian force that's overall still outnumbered and outgunned.
The school year in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine will open with propaganda. On 1 September, pupils in territories outside Ukrainian government control will begin the day with a flag-raising, Russian anthem, and a first lesson drawn from the state "Conversations about Important Things" program, the occupation outlet Donetsk News Agency reported.
Russia's curriculum now governs almost 2,000 schools in the temporarily occupied territories, shaping the edu
The school year in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine will open with propaganda. On 1 September, pupils in territories outside Ukrainian government control will begin the day with a flag-raising, Russian anthem, and a first lesson drawn from the state "Conversations about Important Things" program, the occupation outlet Donetsk News Agency reported.
Russia's curriculum now governs almost 2,000 schools in the temporarily occupied territories, shaping the education of more than 582,000 children, according to research by the Almenda Center of Civil Education, Ukrainska Pravda reports. Ukrainian was removed as a school subject entirely under federal standards on 15 December 2025.
Russia's education minister Sergey Kravtsov said the relevant recommendations have already been sent to the regions.
The first lesson carries a state theme
The opening session is tied to what Moscow calls the Year of the Unity of Russia's Peoples. The stated content covers cohesion among the country's peoples, "careful treatment of historical memory," and the formation of patriotic views and spiritual-moral guideposts.
"Conversations about Important Things" run every Monday in schools and colleges across Russia and the occupied territories. In practice, the sessions serve as propaganda.
Three other changes land on the same date
The flag ceremony is not the only thing new this September. A compulsory Russian identity subject, a standalone military training course, and behavior grades for children in second grade all take effect on 1 September, the Yellow Ribbon resistance movement reported.
Two new regional history textbooks also became compulsory for grades 5–7 that day. They recast Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts as historically Russian land.
Earlier, an expert mission under the OSCE's Moscow Mechanism told the OSCE Permanent Council that Russia's remaking of education in the occupied territories breaches Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
The local administration told Suspilne that Chernivtsi Oblast, on Ukraine’s borders with Romania and Moldova, has commissioned three gas-fired cogeneration units totaling 3.9 MW since the beginning of 2026. The units generate electricity and usable heat from the same gas, allowing municipal boiler houses to continue supplying heat when grid power fails.Ukraine’s Communities Ministry says smaller, decentralized plants are part of the country’s response to repeated Russian a
The local administration told Suspilne that Chernivtsi Oblast, on Ukraine’s borders with Romania and Moldova, has commissioned three gas-fired cogeneration units totaling 3.9 MW since the beginning of 2026. The units generate electricity and usable heat from the same gas, allowing municipal boiler houses to continue supplying heat when grid power fails.
Ukraine’s Communities Ministry says smaller, decentralized plants are part of the country’s response to repeated Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. Producing power close to where it is consumed helps maintain essential services when larger facilities or transmission lines are damaged.
A strike at one large plant can cut off all services. When generation is divided among boiler houses and utilities, damage to one unit affects only that site, while the others continue operating. Disabling the whole system would require attacks on many separate targets rather than on a single concentrated source.
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According to Vasyl Zazuliak’s Facebook post, one 1.2–1.3 MW unit installed in Chernivtsi fully covered a large boiler house’s electricity demand and could send an additional 400–500 kilowatts into the grid. Zazuliak, then Chernivtsi’s deputy mayor, said the boiler house could therefore continue operating during a blackout.
The latest Suspilne report says the oblast installed two earlier units, each with 1.5 MW of capacity, during 2024–2025. Five more units totaling 10.5 MW are due by the end of 2026, followed by seven totaling 20.4 MW in 2027. Officials withheld their locations because disclosure could harm national security.
Delivery has outrun commissioning
Lviv-based investigative outlet NGL.media surveyed Ukraine’s regional administrations about cogeneration equipment supplied during 2022–2025. Its March investigation found that 59% of 137 identified units had been commissioned by February.
Ukraine’s Communities Ministry told the outlet that USAID had supplied 188 units in total, meaning the 59% figure covers the documented sample rather than the entire program. Projects often stalled because utilities could not finance connections or find specialists to install and service the equipment.
The Cabinet later allocated funding to connect 75 existing units with almost 100 MW of electrical capacity. It ordered communities to complete the connections by 1 October after acknowledging that local authorities lacked sufficient financing and technical expertise.
German investigators now count three drones around the failed 4–5 August attack on a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig airport, Tagesschau reported on 25 August. Officers found the third machine and a suspected military explosive in a field near the runways. Security circles assume Russian intelligence services helped plan the attempt, and Russia denies any role.
Russia has answered Western support for Ukraine with a campaign inside Europe that runs on arson, recruited a
German investigators now count three drones around the failed 4–5 August attack on a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig airport, Tagesschau reported on 25 August. Officers found the third machine and a suspected military explosive in a field near the runways. Security circles assume Russian intelligence services helped plan the attempt, and Russia denies any role.
Russia has answered Western support for Ukraine with a campaign inside Europe that runs on arson, recruited agents, and plots against arms-industry figures. While attribution in this case stays at the level of assumption, a suspected move by Moscow's services from watching people to leaving explosives on a working apron widens what German authorities have to guard rather than merely monitor.
A third drone and about 50 grams of suspected hexogen
Investigators found the third drone on the early evening of 14 August in a field in Kabelsketal, security circles told NDR, WDR, and the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ). The area borders the airport's western edge in Saxony-Anhalt. Forensic technicians from Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) arrived that day, and the next day they reportedly found a substance at the site. First assessments put it at about 50 grams of hexogen, a military explosive known internationally as RDX. The perpetrators may have had a far larger attack in mind than what has become public, according to Tagesschau.
The target was a Ukrainian plane
The drone found on the tarmac was meant to hit a Ukrainian Antonov cargo aircraft that moves military goods, according to the investigation cited by the public broadcasters NDR and WDR and SZ. The bomb never went off, because its detonator was apparently defective. The plane had been apparently loaded with ammunition the previous day. Leipzig/Halle carries military freight for the German armed forces and NATO allies, and Ukraine's Antonov Airlines uses it as a base, Euronews reported the same day.
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The first drone turned up on the airport grounds at around 23:42 on 4 August. Shortly afterward, at about 00:03, a second drone reportedly collided with a cargo plane of the delivery company DHL. That aircraft had broken off its landing because the first find shut the airport, and it probably hit the drone at fence height at several hundred kilometers per hour. Neither that drone nor parts of it have turned up, NDR, WDR, and SZ reported. The German broadcasters placed the damage on the tail unit, while Bild gave a different account, putting the collision about six kilometers out with minor damage to the nose, Euronews said.
Camera footage analyzed after the attempt showed a quadcopter carrying Semtex plastic explosive fly into the wing of a parked An-124 Ruslan without detonating, and Washington assessed that the drone belonged to Russian intelligence. The same airport saw a parcel ignite in July 2024, before crews could load it onto a DHL cargo plane, in what security services treated as a suspected Moscow-linked arson plot.
State-protection officers at the BKA work under orders from Federal Prosecutor General Jens Rommel to establish how the attack was meant to run and who is responsible. Investigators are following several leads, among them recovered DNA. Germany ranks among Ukraine's biggest military backers, and its authorities suspect Russia of orchestrating many of the drone incidents as part of a campaign of sabotage, espionage, and disinformation, Euronews said.
Humanitarian supplies stored for the coming winter in Kherson burned in a Russian drone attack, the Ukrainian Red Cross said. The fire at the organization's warehouse also took stock kept for emergency repairs after Russian strikes. The attack injured no staff or volunteers, and Red Cross teams keep working in Kherson and Kherson Oblast.
The war grinds on with daily Russian strikes on cities far behind the front, wearing civilians down while Russia's ground gains stay s
Humanitarian supplies stored for the coming winter in Kherson burned in a Russian drone attack, the Ukrainian Red Cross said. The fire at the organization's warehouse also took stock kept for emergency repairs after Russian strikes. The attack injured no staff or volunteers, and Red Cross teams keep working in Kherson and Kherson Oblast.
The war grinds on with daily Russian strikes on cities far behind the front, wearing civilians down while Russia's ground gains stay slow and costly, and humanitarian stock is one of the things that campaign consumes.
Winter equipment, medical supplies, and blankets among the burned stock
The attack occurred on the evening of 23 August. The fire damaged or destroyed aid worth almost UAH 28 million ($626,000), the Red Cross said. Part of the stock was equipment and materials for the autumn and winter period. Another part was held for fast response after Russian shelling, including materials for temporarily covering damaged buildings. The warehouse also stored medical supplies, blankets, hygiene kits, and equipment for supplying water and electricity.
A firefighter directing water into the burning Ukrainian Red Cross warehouse, Kherson, 23 August 2026. Photo: Ukrainian Red Cross
Kherson and the de-occupied part of Kherson Oblast come under Russian attack every day with various weapons. Authorities there report civilian casualties and damage daily. Ukrainian prosecutors have documented more than 11,000 small-drone attacks on civilians since 2024, with nearly half of the cases in Kherson Oblast.
Aid the Ukrainian Red Cross stockpiled for winter in Kherson burned in a Russian drone attack
Aid stores keep burning across Ukraine
In early August, the Ukrainian Red Cross said Russian forces had subjected its facilities to "unprecedented attacks" in July, which hurt its ability to respond quickly and deliver aid to people. A massive Russian attack on Kyiv damaged one of its warehouse complexes, burning 320,000 units of humanitarian cargo and hospital equipment worth more than $1.77 million. Russian forces destroyed a Red Cross humanitarian aid warehouse in Kherson on 20 December 2023.
Fire burning inside the Ukrainian Red Cross warehouse, with rubble outside the building, Kherson, 23 August 2026. Photo: Ukrainian Red Cross
Other aid stores have burned this summer, among them a World Health Organization medical warehouse in Dnipro and a Kyiv Oblast warehouse holding HIV-prevention supplies.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has made inadequate drone defenses and slow repairs grounds for putting private assets under state management. His 24 August security decree opens a new way to government control over Russia’s economy.It expands a mechanism Russia has used against foreign-owned businesses since 2023, according to research by Nektorov, Saveliev and Partners (NSP), a Russian law firm that tracks state takeovers.
The text does not specify what counts as “in
Russian President Vladimir Putin has made inadequate drone defenses and slow repairs grounds for putting private assets under state management. His 24 August security decree opens a new way to government control over Russia’s economy.
It expands a mechanism Russia has used against foreign-owned businesses since 2023, according to research by Nektorov, Saveliev and Partners (NSP), a Russian law firm that tracks state takeovers.
The text does not specify what counts as “ineffective” drone protection or how quickly a facility must be restored.
A business need not lose a facility before the measure can apply. Decree No. 604 allows action over late security measures, safety violations, conduct that endangers normal operations, ineffective counter-drone steps, or delayed restoration.
The text does not specify what counts as “ineffective” drone protection or how quickly a facility must be restored. Covered sectors include energy, industry, communications, utilities, transport, logistics, and life-support infrastructure, plus any sites deemed important to Russia’s security or economic stability.
Foreign controllers are also covered, including foreign organizations and citizens controlling Russian companies. Temporary management can reach all or part of an entity’s Russian property, securities, stakes in Russian companies, and other property rights—the rule is not limited to the damaged or vulnerable facility alone.
A mobile Russian air-defense radar pictured in April 2024. Russia’s new decree lets the state take control of wider company assets when drone defenses are deemed inadequate. Photo: United Russia.
“Temporary” control has no deadline
At the same time, the text mentions no automatic return deadline. Putin must instruct the government to begin temporary management and then end it. By default, the Federal Property Management Agency assumes the owner’s powers, except for the right to dispose of the assets. The assets’ costs will be covered from its income.
Interfax published Denis Manturov’s remarks. The first deputy prime minister said the measure would be used selectively for specific security tasks and would leave formal ownership unchanged.
Komsomolskaya Pravda’s Alexander Kots raised a practical problem: Russian law, he wrote, gives businesses no instructions for defending sites against drones or cruise missiles, while barriers require extensive approvals, and private guards cannot easily be given weapons more powerful than shotguns.
The decree followed weeks of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries, ports, and warehouses. Ozon reported six disruptions at its facilities after 22 August. The listed retailer’s shares fell as much as 29.09% from Friday’s close on Monday, after five weeks of strikes on privately held Wildberries.
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NSP’s nationalization study records more than 100 cases since 2022 and about 6.5 trillion rubles (about $78 billion) in seized assets. It says cases averaged one court hearing and roughly two months.
The NSP temporary-management table lists several foreign-owned businesses placed under “temporary” management from 2023 whose owners still lack access because the arrangements remain indefinite.
In 1991, Ukraine did not shed a drop of blood. It was a transition of power. We raised a flag, we declared ourselves independent, and we received our independence as a gift.
Now we are shedding rivers of blood for real independence.
That is the difference between this Independence Day and the ones before it, and I do not think we have absorbed it yet.
Colonial theory has a name for what happened to us thirty-five years ago. It is called flag independen
In 1991, Ukraine did not shed a drop of blood. It was a transition of power. We raised a flag, we declared ourselves independent, and we received our independence as a gift.
Now we are shedding rivers of blood for real independence.
That is the difference between this Independence Day and the ones before it, and I do not think we have absorbed it yet.
Colonial theory has a name for what happened to us thirty-five years ago. It is called flag independence. You raise the flag, you declare the state, and for a while you believe that was it—that this was the end, and now we simply continue as an independent nation.
In theory it was believed to be like that. In practice, every decolonized nation eventually discovered the same thing: it is not the end. It is the beginning.
The nations that gathered at Bandung in Indonesia in 1955 worked this out before us. They had their flags. They also had the former metropolis still holding the strings—to their economies, their cultures, their political classes. They named it: neocolonialism.
National flags at the 1955 Bandung Conference, where 29 Asian and African states gathered in the postcolonial era. Their experience helped expose the limits of what colonial theory calls “flag independence”: gaining a state and a flag while the former metropolis retains economic, cultural, or political influence. Credit: Smith Archive
And they understood that real independence would take something longer and harder than a declaration. Not only liberation with arms, but liberation of the mind from the colonial legacy. Not erasing the colonial memory—reworking it, synthesizing it into something new.
So here is the shape of it. Before 1991, Ukrainians waged a struggle for independence without statehood. After 1991, we have been waging a struggle for independence within statehood. The struggle did not end. It changed its conditions.
In 1991 we did not shed a drop of blood. We received our independence as a gift.
What was gathered into the Act of Independence
The crowd throws opposition MP Levko Lukianenko into the air after the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine, Kyiv, 24 August 1991. Photo: Pavlo Pashchenko
The declaration was a beginning, but it was also a result—of generations.
It begins in the nineteenth century, with people like Taras Shevchenko, who essentially invented a Ukrainian identity. It was a construction. It was not, as Putin claims, the invention of Vladimir Lenin. It was the invention of Ukrainian intellectuals, writers, and religious leaders, who constructed this nation on the basis of what came before—the Cossack Republic, Kyivan Rus, the long stretch from the Middle Ages through early modernity.
Then the dissidents of the Soviet period. Then the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought on two fronts against three colonizers: the Germans, the Poles, and the Soviets. Their struggle was clearly anti-colonial. Brutal, but anti-colonial. I do not justify everything they did. I am applying postcolonial theory in order to make sense of what they did, or tried to do. They were defeated. Their ideas resurfaced in 1991 and were gathered into the Act of Independence.
And that Act, while it closed a long period of Ukrainian struggle without a state, opened a new one.
Today, more independence than colonialism
A Congress of former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions in 2012. Yanukovych fled in 2013 following the Euromaidan Revolution. The party was banned in 2023. File photo
Before 2013, I would say, there was more neocolonialism than independence.
This is a description, not a figure of speech. The former metropolis re-established the strings. Russian capital came into the economy under the presidencies of Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych, and Russian corruption came with it.
Proxy parties were planted—the Party of Regions and its various clones. Russian pop music was everywhere, which sounds like a small thing and is not: in postcolonial studies, literature and popular culture are considered among the most effective vehicles of neocolonial control.
Today it is the other way around. Neocolonialism has not evaporated, but the proportion has changed. There is now more independence than neocolonialism—and that itself is what thirty-five years of struggle have achieved.
And corruption was a neocolonial instrument. This is the part Ukrainians resist, so let me put it plainly: our fight against corruption is effectively an anti-colonial fight. In Ukraine people sometimes present this as a dilemma—either we fight corruption or we fight the Russians, we cannot do both. From the perspective of postcolonial studies the dilemma does not exist. Both are anti-colonial efforts. They go hand in hand.
Our fight against corruption is effectively an anti-colonial fight. Both go hand in hand.
Empires have always travelled with religion on their shoulders, and religion has always helped establish imperial rule in the colonies. In the Ukrainian case it was first the Greek Catholic Church, established in 1596 an instrument of Polish colonization, although this is not the case anymore. But that is how it began.
Anatomy of treason: how the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sold its soul to the “Russian world”
Here I have to say something uncomfortable for many Ukrainians.
Nations that decolonize very often produce new subalterns. In post-colonial language, these are parts of the population that are subdued, oppressed by the dominant power. But we may be producing such subalterns as an effect of pushing back against Russian colonization: groups of Ukrainians belonging to the UOC MP being marginalized, subalternized, by our own struggle. It is a very difficult dilemma how to deal with this subalternization, and I do not have a resolution for it.
We may be producing new subalterns: Ukrainians marginalized by our own struggle. I do not have a resolution for it.
Two revolutions against the ratio
Volunteer medics provided aid to the wounded during Euromaidan protests in Kyiv. Photo: Maksym Liukov. 20 February 2014
Both of Ukraine’s major “Maidan” protests were anti-neocolonial revolutions.
In the Orange Revolution of 2004 and again during the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013, Ukrainians protested because they had decided there was not enough independence—that what we had was more neocolonial than independent, more fake than real, and that the proportion had to be corrected. That is what a Maidan is. A public consensus that the ratio is wrong.
In February 2022, independence very nearly ended. People gave our statehood three days—and not only Russians. That was the opinion of most observers. It did not end. We survived it. But our statehood is still not secured, and it is being secured every day, including today.
What Ukraine contributed to the empire, and how
There is an argument against everything I have said so far, and Ukrainians make it as often as anyone. They object: look, we have contributed to the Russian Empire and to the Soviet one. We have basically built them.
Which is true.
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But Ukrainians were never permitted to contribute as independent agents. They were allowed to contribute exactly as long as they lost their identity—as long as they denounced their own agency. They were contributors without their will and without their identity.
Corsica is my example. It had its own culture, its own identity, its own language, still spoken in pockets. Go into a good Corsican restaurant in Corsica and they may speak Corsican to you; I have had this experience. But it is not a language widely spoken anymore. It has been completely subsumed by French, and France holds Corsica tightly today. And what is France? To a great extent, it is the creature of a great Corsican named Napoleon Bonaparte, who built the French Empire. Nobody concludes from this that Corsica was not a colony.
Russian fund chief and presidential envoy Kirill Dmitriev (left) with US Special Envoy for Peace Missions Steve Witkoff (right) in Saint Petersburg, April 2025. Photo: RIA Novosti.
It is remarkable to me that Putin still does this. He puts people with Ukrainian backgrounds into key positions—in the military, in propaganda, in negotiations.
Vladimir Medinsky, one of his chief propagandists and now his negotiator, was born in Smila, in Cherkasy Oblast, my own small motherland.
Valentina Matviyenko, third in the official hierarchy, comes from Shepetivka in Khmelnytskyi Oblast.
Kirill Dmitriev, who negotiates with the Americans, was born in Kyiv to a family of Ukrainian biologists.
Russian delegation head Vladimir Medinsky during talks with Ukraine on 16 May 2025. Photo: Meduza
It was Medinsky, incidentally, who announced in a 2012 interview that the Russian people has one extra chromosome—his explanation for how Russia survived the catastrophes of the twentieth century when other nations, the Scythians and Sarmatians among them, broke and vanished. Russians mocked him for it, since an extra chromosome is the marker of Down syndrome.
As a claim, though, it is a race claim. Made by a man born in Cherkasy Oblast, about a people he was not born into.
They contribute to the Russian neo-empire. They contribute to it not as Ukrainians but as those who denounced Ukrainian identity. This is how empire functions. It absorbs the representatives of subaltern nations who willingly denounce their own will. It was so under the Romanovs. It was so in the Soviet empire. It is so in Putin's quasi-empire now.
Ukrainians were, and still are, a subaltern nation.
Ukrainians were allowed to contribute to the empire exactly as long as they lost their identity.
Papua, and Scotland
There are worse outcomes than ours and there are better ones.
The Papuans of West Papua tried. They fought for independence, failed, and many of them were killed. They are still oppressed. That is the bad end of the range, and it is not hypothetical.
The better scenario would be the Scots. They had statehood, and it was strong—kings and queens, pride, history, narratives, everything a full and self-sufficient nation possesses. Then they lost it. They are not being killed. They do not suffer the way the Papuans suffer. And yet many of them remain deeply dissatisfied with what they are. We support the United Kingdom, of course, but we are also mindful of the peoples who constitute it—Scots, Irish, Welsh. They have their pride, their nation, their language, their history, their self-consciousness, their identity.
They cannot fully live any of it without independence.
That would be a much better scenario for us than the Papuan one. From where we are now, I still do not think it would be enough.
Colonies taken by neighbors
Timor-Leste has stayed with me. One of the newest countries in the world, independent since 2002, and before that a genocide. Up to a third of its population died. Its capital, Dili, was destroyed in 1999.
Our own Baturyn, the capital of the Cossack Hetmanate, was destroyed by Peter I's army in 1708 in the same way.
And Timor is not an overseas colony. That is the other thing. There is the colonization conducted across an ocean—the Dutch in the Malay Archipelago, to which Timor belongs—and there is the colonization conducted by a neighbor. Indonesia, having been a Dutch colony itself, became independent, developed a colonial attitude within thirty years, and invaded Timor.
Ukraine was taken by neighbors too. First Poland, then the Russian Empire. Both committed atrocities here. We always resisted, and always with some violence—there has never been an anti-colonial struggle that was not violent, and ours is not an exception. I wish it were an exception. It was not.
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The first colonization, and the first decolonization
The Polish colonization is the one Ukrainians forget, and it matters for a reason that has nothing to do with Poland.
It ended. And the decolonization from it was successful: we regained our ground, re-established Ukrainian identity on our territory, our own way of living. And there was a process of reconciliation that worked, at least to some extent. That is the first decolonization Ukrainians ever accomplished, and it is the paradigm I hold onto when I think about what happens with Russia.
Which does not mean it is finished. Some of the reactions coming from the Polish side now are, to me, surprising and incomprehensible, and I can explain them only through this lens: post-colonial phantom pain. They lost a limb and they still feel it. Russia feels the same phantom pain about what it calls the Russian World, and reacts far more violently, because Russia is historically far more violent. But the pain is the same kind of pain.
One white nation killing another
Much of the world does not accept that any of this is decolonization. In the Global South the response is: one white nation is killing another white nation, why should we care.
They should care, because our struggle is the same as theirs was. If ours is meaningless, then theirs was meaningless too.
They are working with a black and white colonial paradigm—sometimes literally—which skims over the surface. There is a name for what we are: a South within the North. Inside the Global North pockets of land and people exist whose experience and self-perception are closer to the peoples of the Global South than to their neighbors. Ukraine is one of those pockets. Our vision of ourselves may be nearer to the Global South than to Europe.
Race is the real difference, and I will not pretend otherwise. Though even there the resemblance is closer than people assume. When we were a Polish colony, the Poles developed the idea that we were an inferior people—chłopy—while they were Sarmatians, a superior nation. Not race as skin color. Race as ethnic origin, which does the same work.
By my own study, something like 90% of the criteria that apply to other colonies apply to Ukraine. Perhaps 10% do not.
But before the world can see this, we Ukrainians have to see it.
If our struggle is meaningless, then theirs was meaningless too.
Why the blood
Fanon believed that violence is embedded in colonialism—that it is intrinsic, that you cannot be a colonial power without being violent, without being prepared to kill the subalterns. He also believed that anticolonial struggle is inevitably violent. Sartre, who wrote the preface to him, believed it too. Maybe that is right, and it would be a good and easy explanation.
But our struggle is particularly bloody for a particular reason, and it is Russian. Russia has adopted most of its ideas from the West, and has almost always put them into practice through violence exceeding anything done in the place the idea came from. Marxist ideas about the counter-revolutionary nature of the peasantry produced the Holodomor; American culture wars are producing this one.
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Our resistance is violent because their aggression is. It is a reaction, and it does not exceed the action. If anything it is disproportionate in the other direction. They kill our civilians in daylight and destroy hospitals and residential buildings. We destroy their oil plants and the warehouses of their online marketplaces.
From the standpoint of genocide studies, what is being done to us is a classical genocide. Not a rhetorical trope—a scientifically provable case. What is unprecedented is not the death toll but the intensity: the quantity of weaponry and ammunition involved in this anti-colonial war has no precedent among anti-colonial wars.
Agency
This is what Ukraine has to contribute to postcolonial theory, and I think it is the important thing.
The victims are not powerless and they are not will-less. They have their own volition. They have their own agency. And the purpose of an anti-colonial struggle is to regain agency—not merely independence, not merely economic freedom, not merely the cutting of ties with international capital or with the old and new empires. Agency.
Our struggle is a struggle for and through our agency. And it is a path that other peoples still living with the residues of colonialism could follow.
The neocolonialism that is not Russian
The Russian form is the most obvious available to us. It is not the only one.
The newest arrived with the Trump administration, which tried to exchange support for our resources—rare earth elements and so forth—essentially requiring us to give them up in return for help. This is a classical neocolonial attitude. It is what happens when a neocolonial power is being established.
I want to be careful here, because this is the policy of the White House and not of Americans. Most Americans who come to Ukraine come as volunteers, prepared to sacrifice their lives, because they understand that global democracy depends on what happens here. The neocolonial attitude belongs to a minority. Unfortunately, that minority currently holds power.
It is a new situation for us, but it is not unique for the world. Still, we can survive it if we understand what it is.
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Whether it is worth it
It is not for us to answer that.
Our generation has decided that it is worth it. But we should remember that we have also decided for the next generation. The Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, a volunteer legion of students and intelligentsia raised in Lviv in 1914, decided in their time that it was worth sacrificing themselves for Ukrainian independence, and we now judge that they were right. The UPA, fighting into the 1950s, decided the same. They were defeated.
We do not know how the next generation will judge us. Because there will be millions of Ukrainians who will not have been born as a result of this war. They will not decide whether we were right or wrong. They will not exist.
Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun is a professor of ecclesiology, international relations and ecumenism at Sankt Ignatios College, University College Stockholm, and a director of the Huffington Ecumenical Institute at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles.
Edited by Alya Shandra
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